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AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

By JOHN LOCKE, Gent.

TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED,

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To which is prefixed

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IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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BOOK IV.—CHAP. I.

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7. And of Moral.
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11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.

12. So far as they agree with thoſe, ſo far our Knowledge concerning them is real.
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BOOK II.—CHAPTER XXIV.

OF COLLECTIVE *IDEAS* OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. *One* Idea.

BESIDES theſe complex *ideas* of ſeveral ſingle ſubſtances, as of man, horſe, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath alſo *complex collective ideas* of ſubſtances, which I ſo call, becauſe ſuch *ideas* are made up of many particular ſubſtances conſidered together, as united into one *idea*, and which ſo joined are looked on as one; *v. g.* the *idea* of ſuch a collection of men as make an army, though conſiſting of a great number of diſtinct ſubſtances, is as much one *idea* as the *idea* of a man; and the great collective *idea* of all bodies whatſoever, ſignified by the name world, is as much one *idea* as the *idea* of any the leaſt particle of matter in it; it ſufficing to the unity of any *idea*, that it be conſidered as one repreſentation or picture, though made up of ever ſo many particulars.

§ 2. *Made by the Power of compoſing in the Mind.*

THESE collective *ideas* of ſubſtances the mind makes by its power of compoſition, and uniting ſeverally, either ſimple or complex *ideas* into one, as it does by the ſame faculty make the complex *ideas* of particular ſubſtances, conſiſting of an aggregate of divers ſimple *ideas* united in one ſubſtance; and as the mind, by putting together the repeated *ideas* of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex *idea* of any number, as a ſcore or a groſs, &c. ſo, by putting together ſeveral particular ſubſtances, it makes collective *ideas* of ſubſtances, as a troop, an army, a ſwarm, a city, a fleet; each of

which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one *idea*, in one view; and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one, as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one *idea*, than how a man should make one *idea*; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the *idea* of a great number of men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct *ideas* that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

§ 3. *All artificial Things are collective* Ideas.

Amongst such kind of collective *ideas* are to be counted the most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances; and, in truth, if we consider all these collective *ideas* aright, as *army*, *constellation*, *universe*, as they are united into so many single *ideas*, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one *idea*; as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*.

CHAP. XXV.

OF RELATION.

§ 1. *Relation what.*

Besides the *ideas*, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any *idea* as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one

thing that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, *relation* and *respect*; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call *relatives*; and the things so brought together, *related*. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that *idea*, but what really exists in Caius; *v. g.* when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex *idea* of the species man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name *husband*, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name *whiter*, I intimate some other thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any *idea*, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct; therefore, any of our *ideas* may be the foundation of relation. As in the above mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination or relation of husband; and the colour white, the occasion why he is said to be whiter than freestone.

§ 2. *Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceived.*

THESE, and the like *relations, expressed by relative terms, that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation*, as father and son, bigger and less, cause and effect, *are very obvious* to every one, and every body at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of

them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. *Concubine* is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife; but, in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some *idea*, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in, the thing to which the denomination is given: or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a relation.

§ 3. *Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.* ANOTHER sort of *relative terms* there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable relation. Such are the *seemingly positive* terms of *old*, *great*, *imperfect*, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

§ 4. *Relation different from the Things related.* THIS farther may be observed, that the *ideas* of relation may be the same in men, who have far different *ideas* of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; *v. g.* those who have far different *ideas* of a *man*, may yet agree in the notion of a *father*; which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby

he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

§ 5. *Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.*

THE *nature* therefore of *relation* consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all: *v. g.* Caius, whom I considered to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time: *v. g.* Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

§ 6. *Relation only betwixt two Things.*

WHATSOEVER doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing, is positive; and so not only simple *ideas* and substances, but modes also are positive beings, though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex *idea* of one thing; which *idea* is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of diverse parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or *idea*. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be *relative*, yet the *idea* of the whole is a positive, absolute *idea*. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things. There must always be in relation two *ideas*, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

§ 7. *All Things capable of Relation.*

CONCERNING relation in general, these things may be considered:

First, That there is *no one thing*, whether simple *idea*, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, *which is not capable of almost an infinite number of* considerations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words: *v. g.* one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following *relations*, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almost infinite number; he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, *relation* is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one, or both of them, some appellation from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

§ 8. *The* Ideas *of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related.*

Secondly, This farther may be considered concerning *relation*, that though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced; yet the *ideas*, which relative words stand for, are often clearer and more distinct than those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man; or, if you will, *paternity* is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear *idea* than of *humanity*: and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action, or one simple *idea*, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of sundry *ideas* is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them; so that, when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a

very clear *idea* of that relation. The *ideas* then of *relations are capable* at leaſt *of being more perfect and diſtinct in our minds, than thoſe of ſubſtances*; becauſe it is commonly hard to know all the ſimple *ideas* which are really in any ſubſtance, but for the moſt part eaſy enough to know the ſimple *ideas* that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for; *v. g.* comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very eaſy to frame the *ideas* of brothers, without having yet the perfect *idea* of a man. For ſignificant, relative words, as well as others, ſtanding only for *ideas*; and thoſe being all either ſimple, or made up of ſimple ones, it ſuffices for the knowing the preciſe *idea* the relative term ſtands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear *idea* of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear *idea* of the relation of *dam* and *chick*, between the two caſſowaries in St. James's Park, though perhaps I have but a very obſcure and imperfect *idea* of thoſe birds themſelves.

§ 9. *Relations all terminate in ſimple* Ideas.

Thirdly, Though there be a great number of conſiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and ſo a multitude of *relations*; yet they *all terminate in*, and are concerned about, thoſe *ſimple ideas*, either of ſenſation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I ſhall ſhow it in the moſt conſiderable relations that we have any notion of, and in ſome that ſeem to be the moſt remote from *ſenſe* or *reflection*; which yet will appear to have their *ideas* from thence, and leave it paſt doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain ſimple *ideas*, and ſo originally derived from ſenſe or reflection.

§ 10. *Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated are relative.*

Fourthly, That *relation*, being the conſidering of one thing with another, which is extrinſical to it, it is evi-

dent that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other *ideas* than are supposed really to exist in that thing, to which the words are applied, are *relative words*: *v. g.* a *man*, *black*, *merry*, *thoughtful*, *thirsty*, *angry*, *extended*; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated: but *father*, *brother*, *king*, *husband*, *blacker*, *merrier*, &c. are words, which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.

§ 11. *Conclusion.*

HAVING laid down these premises concerning *relation* in general, I shall now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the *ideas* we have of *relation* are made up, as the others are, only of simple *ideas*; and that they all, how refined and remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple *ideas*. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned; and that is, the relation of *cause* and *effect*: the *idea* whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, *sensation*, and *reflection*, I shall in the next place consider.

CHAP. XXVI.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. *Whence their* Ideas *got.*

IN the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation, we get our *ideas* of *cause* and *effect*. That which produces any simple or complex *idea*, we denote by the general name, *cause*; and that which is produced, *effect*. Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple *idea* that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the ap-

plication of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple *idea* of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also, finding that the substance wood, which is a certain collection of simple *ideas* so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance called ashes; *i. e.* another complex *idea*, consisting of a collection of simple *ideas*, quite different from that complex *idea* which we call wood; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect. So that, whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple *idea*, or collection of simple *ideas*, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.

§ 2. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.* HAVING thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operation of bodies on one another, got the notion of *cause* and *effect*, viz. that a *cause* is that which makes any other thing, either simple *idea*, substance or mode, begin to be; and an *effect* is that which had its beginning from some other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts.

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist, *in rerum natura*, which had before no being, and this we call *creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which, considered altogether, make up such a collection of simple *ideas*, as had not any *existence* before, as this man, this egg, rose or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary course of nature by an internal principle, but set on work by, and received from, some external agent or cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call *generation*: when the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or *juxta*-position of discernible parts,

we call it *making*; and such are all artificial things. When any simple *idea* is produced, which was not in that subject before, we call it *alteration*. Thus, a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new sensible quality or simple *idea* is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are *effects*; and those things, which operated to the existence, *causes*. In which, and all other cases, we may observe, that the notion of *cause* and *effect*, has its rise from *ideas*, received by sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the *idea*, of *cause* and *effect*, it suffices to consider any simple *idea*, or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

§ 3. *Relations of Time.*

Time and *place* are also the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already shown, in another place, how we get these *ideas*, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus, when any one says, that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words answering, *how long*. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066, which means this; that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes: and so do all words of time, answering to the question, *when*, which show only the distance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

§ 4.

THERE are yet, besides those, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive *ideas*, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative, such as are *young*, *old*, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the *idea* in our minds. Thus, having settled in our thoughts the *idea* of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is *young*, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to: and when we denominate him *old*, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the *idea* of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals: which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: but yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at seven years: because, in each of these, we compare their age to different *ideas* of duration, which are settled in our minds, as belonging to these several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of nature. But the sun and stars, though they have outlasted several generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period GOD hath set to that sort of beings. This term, belonging properly to those things which we can observe, in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and so have, in our minds, as it were, a standard to which we can compare the several parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or a diamond, things whose usual periods we know not.

§ 5. *Relations of Place and Extension.*

THE *relation* also that things have to one another in their places and distances, is very obvious to observe; as above, below, a mile distant from Charing-cross in

England, and in London. But as in duration, ſo in extenſion and bulk, there are ſome *ideas* that are relative, which we ſignify by names that are thought poſitive; as *great* and *little* are truly *relations*. For here alſo having, by obſervation, ſettled in our minds the *ideas* of the bigneſs of ſeveral ſpecies of things, from thoſe we have been moſt accuſtomed to, we make them, as it were, the ſtandards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, ſuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been uſed to; and a little horſe, ſuch a one as comes not up to the ſize of that *idea*, which we have in our minds, to belong ordinarily to horſes: and that will be a great horſe to a Welſhman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; the two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken ſeveral ſized *ideas*, to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

§ 6. *Abſolute Terms often ſtand for Relations.* So likewiſe *weak* and *ſtrong*, are but *relative denominations* of power, compared to ſome *ideas* we have, at that time, of greater or leſs power. Thus, when we ſay a weak man, we mean one that has not ſo much ſtrength or power to move, as uſually men have, or uſually thoſe of his ſize have; which is a comparing his ſtrength to the *idea* we have of the uſual ſtrength of men, or men of ſuch a ſize. The like, when we ſay the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, ſignifying the diſproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And ſo abundance of words, in ordinary ſpeech, ſtand only for relations (and perhaps the greateſt part) which at firſt ſight ſeem to have no ſuch ſignification: *v. g.* the ſhip has neceſſary ſtores. *Neceſſary* and *ſtores* are both relative words; one having a relation to the accompliſhing the voyage intended, and the other to future uſe. All which relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in, *ideas* derived from *ſenſation* and *reflection*, is too obvious to need any explication.

CHAP. XXVII.

OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.

§ 1. *Wherein Identity conſiſts.*

ANOTHER occaſion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things; when conſidering any thing as exiſting at any determined time and place, we compare it with itſelf exiſting at another time, and thereon form the *ideas* of *identity* and *diverſity*. When we ſee any thing to be in any place in any inſtant of time, we are ſure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that ſame time exiſts in another place, how like and undiſtinguiſhable ſoever it may be in all other reſpects: and in this conſiſts *identity*, when the *idea* it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we conſider their former exiſtence, and to which we compare the preſent. For we never finding nor conceiving it poſſible, that two things of the ſame kind ſhould exiſt in the ſame place at the ſame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exiſts any where at any time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there itſelf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the ſame or no; it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time in ſuch a place, which it was certain at that inſtant was the ſame with itſelf, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of exiſtence, nor two things one beginning; it being impoſſible for two things of the ſame kind to be or exiſt in the ſame inſtant, in the very ſame place, or one and the ſame thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the ſame thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the ſame, but diverſe. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention uſed in having preciſe notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ 2. *Identity of Subſtances.*

We have the *ideas* but of three ſorts of ſubſtances; 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. *Bodies.* Firſt, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore, concerning his identity there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite ſpirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exiſt, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exiſts. Thirdly, The ſame will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or ſubtraction of matter being made, it is the ſame. For though theſe three ſorts of ſubſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt neceſſarily each of them exclude any of the ſame kind out of the ſame place: or elſe the notions and names of identity and diverſity would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch diſtinction of ſubſtances, or any thing elſe, one from another. For example: could two bodies be in the ſame place at the ſame time, then thoſe two parcels of matter muſt be one and the ſame, take them great or little; nay, all bodies muſt be one and the ſame. For, by the ſame reaſon that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be ſuppoſed, takes away the diſtinction of identity and diverſity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two or more ſhould be one, identity and diverſity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of uſe to the underſtanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in ſubſtances, the identity and diverſity of each particular exiſtence of them too will be by the ſame way determined: only as to things whoſe exiſtence is in ſucceſſion; ſuch as are the actions of finite beings, *v. g. motion* and *thought*, both which conſiſt in a continued train of ſucceſſion, concerning their diverſity, there can be no queſtion: becauſe each periſhing the moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times

exiſt in diſtant places; and therefore no motion or thought, conſidered as at different times, can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different beginning of exiſtence.

§ 3. Principium Individuationis.

FROM what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to diſcover what is ſo much inquired after, the *principium individuationis*; and that, it is plain, is exiſtence itſelf, which determines a being of any ſort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the ſame kind. This, though it ſeems eaſier to conceive in ſimple ſubſtances or modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied: *v. g.* let us ſuppoſe an atom, *i. e.* a continued body, under one immutable ſuperfices, exiſting in a determined time and place; it is evident that, conſidered in any inſtant of its exiſtence, it is in that inſtant the ſame with itſelf. For being at that inſtant what it is, and nothing elſe, it is the ſame, and ſo muſt continue as long as its exiſtence is continued; for ſo long it will be the ſame, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the ſame maſs, every one of thoſe atoms will be the ſame, by the foregoing rule: and whilſt they exiſt united together, the maſs, conſiſting of the ſame atoms, muſt be the ſame maſs, or the ſame body, let the parts be ever ſo differently jumbled. But if one of theſe atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the ſame maſs, or the ſame body. In the ſtate of living creatures, their identity depends not on a maſs of the ſame particles, but on ſomething elſe. For in them the variation of great parcels of matters alter not the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is ſtill the ſame oak: and a colt grown up to a horſe, ſometimes fat, ſometimes lean, is all the while the ſame horſe; though, in both theſe caſes, there may be a manifeſt change of the parts; ſo that truly they are not either of them the ſame maſſes of matter, though they be truly one of them the ſame oak, and the other the ſame horſe. The reaſon whereof is,

that in theſe two caſes, a maſs of matter, and a living body, *identity* is not applied to the ſame thing.

§ 4. *Identity of Vegetables.*

We muſt therefore conſider wherein an oak differs from a maſs of matter, and that ſeems to me to be in this: that the one is only the coheſion of particles of matter any how united, the other ſuch a diſpoſition of them as conſtitutes the parts of an oak; and ſuch an organization of thoſe parts as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which conſiſts the vegetable life. That being then one plant, which has ſuch an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the ſame plant as long as it partakes of the ſame life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that ſort of plants. For this organization being at any one inſtant in any one collection of *matter*, is in that particular concrete diſtinguiſhed from all other, and is that individual life, which exiſting conſtantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the ſame continuity of inſenſibly ſucceeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the ſame plant, and all the parts of it parts of the ſame plant, during all the time that they exiſt united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts ſo united.

§ 5. *Identity of Animals.*

The caſe is not ſo much different in *brutes*, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an animal, and continues it the ſame. Something we have like this in machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For example, What is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or conſtruction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a ſufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this machine one continued body, all whoſe organized parts were repaired, increaſed or diminiſhed, by a conſtant addition or ſeparation of inſenſible parts, with one common life, we

ſhould have ſomething very much like the body of an animal, with this difference, that in an animal the fitneſs of the organization, and the motion wherein life conſiſts, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

§ 6. *Identity of Man.*

THIS alſo ſhows wherein the identity of the ſame *man* conſiſts, *viz.* in nothing but a participation of the ſame continued life, by conſtantly fleeting particles of matter, in ſucceſſion vitally united to the ſame organized body. He that ſhall place the *identity* of man in any thing elſe, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one inſtant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in ſeveral ſucceſſively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an *embryo*, one of years, mad and ſober, the ſame man, by any ſuppoſition, that will not make it poſſible for Seth, Iſmael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Auſtin, and Cæſar Borgia, to be the ſame man. For if the *identity* of ſoul alone makes the ſame man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter, why the ſame individual ſpirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be poſſible that thoſe men, living in diſtant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the ſame man: which way of ſpeaking muſt be, from a very ſtrange uſe of the word *man*, applied to an *idea*, out of which body and ſhape are excluded. And that way of ſpeaking would agree yet worſe with the notions of thoſe philoſophers who allow of tranſmigration, and are of opinion that the ſouls of men may, for their miſcarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beaſts, as fit habitations, with organs ſuited to the ſatisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, nobody could be ſure that the ſoul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet ſay that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.

§ 7. *Identity ſuited to the* Idea.

IT is not therefore unity of ſubſtance that comprehends

all ſorts of *identity*, or will determine it in every caſe: but to conceive and judge of it aright, we muſt conſider what *idea* the word it is applied to ſtands for; it being one thing to be the ſame *ſubſtance*, another the ſame *man*, and a third the ſame *perſon*, if *perſon*, *man*, and *ſubſtance* are three names ſtanding for three different *ideas*; for ſuch as is the *idea* belonging to that name, ſuch muſt be the *identity*: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great deal of that confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming difficulties, eſpecially concerning *perſonal identity*, which therefore we ſhall in the next place a little conſider.

§ 8. *Same Man.*

An animal is a living, organized body; and conſequently the ſame animal, as we have obſerved, is the ſame continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious obſervation puts it paſt doubt, that the *idea* in our minds, of which the ſound *man* in our mouths is the ſign, is nothing elſe but of an animal of ſuch a certain form: ſince I think I may be confident, that whoever ſhould ſee a creature of his own ſhape and make, though it had no more reaſon all its life than a *cat* or a *parrot*, would call him ſtill a *man*; or whoever ſhould hear a *cat* or a *parrot* diſcourſe, reaſon and philoſophize, would call or think it nothing but a *cat* or a *parrot*; and ſay the one was a dull, irrational *man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *parrot*. A relation we have in an author of great note, is ſufficient to countenance the ſuppoſition of a rational *parrot*. His words * are:

"I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own "mouth, the account of a common, but much credited "ſtory, that I had heard ſo often from many others, of "an old *parrot* he had in Braſil during his government "there, that ſpoke, and aſked and anſwered common

* Memoirs of what paſſed in Chriſtendom, from 1672 to 1679. p. 57—392.

" queſtions like a reaſonable creature; ſo that thoſe of " his train there generally concluded it to be witchery " or poſſeſſion; and one of his chaplains, who lived " long afterwards in Holland, would never, from that " time, endure a *parrot*, but ſaid they all had a devil in " them. I had heard many particulars of this ſtory, " and aſſevered by people hard to be diſcredited, which " made me aſk Prince Maurice what there was of it. " He ſaid, with his uſual plainneſs and dryneſs in talk, " there was ſomething true, but a great deal falſe, of " what had been reported. I deſired to know of him " what there was of the firſt? He told me ſhort and " coldly, that he had heard of ſuch an old *parrot* " when he came to Braſil; and though he believed " nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he " had ſo much curioſity as to ſend for it: that it was " a very great and a very old one; and when it came " firſt into the room where the prince was, with a " great many Dutchmen about him, it ſaid preſently, " *What a company of white men are here!* They aſked " it, what it thought that man was, pointing to the " prince? It anſwered, *Some general or other.* When " they brought it cloſe to him, he aſked it, * *D'ou* " *venez vous?* It anſwered, *De Marinnan.* The Prince, " *A qui eſtes vous?* The parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince, " *Que fais tu la?* Parrot, *Je garde les poulles.* The " prince laughed, and ſaid, *Vous gardes les poulles?* " The parrot anſwered, *Ouy moy, & je ſcai bien faire;* " and made the chuck four or five times that people " uſe to make to chickens when they call them. I ſet " down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, " juſt as Prince Maurice ſaid them to me. I aſked " him in what language the *parrot* ſpoke, and he ſaid, " in Braſilian; I aſked whether he underſtood Braſil- " ian? He ſaid, no; but he had taken care to have

* " Whence come ye?" It anſwered, " From Marinnan." The prince, " To whom do you belong?" The parrot, " To a Portugueſe." Prince, " What do you there?" Parrot, " I look after the chickens." The Prince laughed, and ſaid, " You look after the chickens!" The parrot anſwered, " Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it."

" two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that " ſpoke Braſilian, and the other a Braſilian that ſpoke " Dutch; that he aſked them ſeparately and pri- " vately, and both of them agreed in telling him juſt " the ſame thing that the *parrot* had ſaid. I could " not but tell this odd ſtory, becauſe it is ſo much " out of the way, and from the firſt hand, and what " may paſs for a good one: for, I dare ſay, this " prince at leaſt believed himſelf in all he told me, " having ever paſſed for a very honeſt and pious man: " I leave it to naturaliſts to reaſon, and to other men " to believe as they pleaſe upon it. However, it is " not, perhaps, amiſs to relieve or enliven a buſy ſcene " ſometimes with ſuch digreſſions, whether to the pur- " poſe or no."

Same Man.

I HAVE taken care that the reader ſhould have the ſtory at large, in the author's own words, becauſe he ſeems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that ſo able a man as he, who had ſufficiency enough to warrant all the teſtimonies he gives of himſelf, ſhould take ſo much pains in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin ſo cloſe not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince, in whom he acknowledges very great honeſty and piety, a ſtory which, if he himſelf thought incredible, he could not but alſo think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this ſtory, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a *parrot*; and I aſk any one elſe, who thinks ſuch a ſtory fit to be told, whether if this *parrot*, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it, as this one did, whether, I ſay, they would not have paſſed for a race of *rational animals*: but yet whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not *parrots*? For I preſume it is not the *idea* of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the *idea* of a *man* in moſt people's ſenſe, but of a body, ſo and ſo ſhaped, joined to it; and if that be the *idea* of a *man*, the ſame ſucceſſive body not ſhifted all at once, muſt, as

well as the ſame immaterial ſpirit, go to the making of the ſame *man*.

§ 9. *Perſonal Identity.*

THIS being premiſed, to find wherein *perſonal identity* conſiſts, we muſt conſider what *perſon* ſtands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reaſon and reflection, and can conſider itſelf as itſelf, the ſame thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that conſciouſneſs which is inſeparable from thinking, and, as it ſeems to me, eſſential to it; it being impoſſible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we ſee, hear, ſmell, taſte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do ſo. Thus it is always as to our preſent ſenſations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himſelf that which he calls *ſelf*; it not being conſidered in this caſe, whether the ſame *ſelf* be continued in the ſame or divers ſubſtances. For, ſince conſciouſneſs always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls *ſelf*, and thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other thinking things; in this alone conſiſts *perſonal identity*, *i. e.* the ſameneſs of a rational being: and as far as this conſciouſneſs can be extended backwards to any paſt action or thought, ſo far reaches the identity of that *perſon*; it is the ſame *ſelf* now it was then; and it is by the ſame *ſelf* with this preſent one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§ 10. *Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal Identity.*

BUT it is farther inquired, whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance? This few would think they had reaſon to doubt of, if theſe perceptions, with their conſciouſneſs, always remained preſent in the mind, whereby the ſame thinking thing would be always conſciouſly preſent, and as would be thought evidently the ſame to itſelf. But that which ſeems to make the difficulty is this, that this conſciouſneſs being interrupted always by forgetfulneſs, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our paſt actions, before our eyes in one view, but even the beſt

memories loſing the ſight of one part whilſt they are viewing another; and we ſometimes, and that the greateſt part of our lives, not reflecting on our paſt ſelves, being intent on our preſent thoughts, and in ſound ſleep, having no thoughts at all, or at leaſt none with that conſciouſneſs which remarks our waking thoughts: I ſay, in all theſe caſes, our conſciouſneſs being interrupted, and we loſing the ſight of our paſt *ſelves*, doubts are raiſed whether we are the ſame thinking thing, *i. e.* the ſame ſubſtance or no. Which, however reaſonable or unreaſonable, concerns not *perſonal identity* at all: the queſtion being, what makes the ſame *perſon*, and not whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance, which always thinks in the ſame perſon; which in this caſe matters not at all: different ſubſtances by the ſame conſciouſneſs (where they do partake in it) being united into one perſon, as well as different bodies by the ſame life are united into one animal, whoſe *identity* is preſerved, in that change of ſubſtances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the ſame conſciouſneſs that makes a man be himſelf, to himſelf, *perſonal identity* depends on that only, whether it be annexed ſolely to one individual ſubſtance, or can be continued in a ſucceſſion of ſeveral ſubſtances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the *idea* of any paſt action with the ſame conſciouſneſs it had of it at firſt, and with the ſame conſciouſneſs it has of any preſent action; ſo far it is the ſame *perſonal ſelf*. For it is by the conſciouſneſs it has of its preſent thoughts and actions that it is *ſelf* to *itſelf* now, and ſo will be the ſame *ſelf*, as far as the ſame conſciouſneſs can extend to actions paſt or to come; and would be by diſtance of time, or change of ſubſtance, no more two *perſons*, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yeſterday, with a long or a ſhort ſleep between: the ſame conſciouſneſs uniting thoſe diſtant actions into the ſame *perſon*, whatever ſubſtances contributed to their production.

§ 11. *Perſonal Identity in Change of Subſtances.* That this is ſo, we have ſome kind of evidence in our

very bodies, all whoſe particles, whilſt vitally united to this ſame thinking, conſcious ſelf, ſo that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conſcious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our *ſelves*; *i. e.* of our thinking, conſcious *ſelf*. Thus the *limbs* of his body are to every one a part of *himſelf*: he ſympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby ſeparate it from that conſciouſneſs he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himſelf*, any more than the remoteſt part of matter. Thus we ſee the *ſubſtance* whereof *perſonal ſelf* conſiſted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of perſonal *identity*; there being no queſtion about the ſame perſon, though the limbs, which but now were a part of it be cut off.

§ 12. *Whether in the Change of thinking Subſtances.* But the queſtion is, "whether, if the ſame ſub-"ſtance which thinks be changed, it can be the ſame "perſon; or remaining the ſame, it can be different "perſons?"

And to this I anſwer, firſt, This can be no queſtion at all to thoſe who place thought in a purely material animal conſtitution, void of an immaterial ſubſtance. For whether their ſuppoſition be true or no, it is plain they conceive perſonal identity preſerved in ſomething elſe than identity of ſubſtance; as animal identity is preſerved in identity of life, and not of ſubſtance. And therefore thoſe who place thinking in an immaterial ſubſtance only, before they can come to deal with theſe men, muſt ſhow why perſonal identity cannot be preſerved in the change of immaterial ſubſtances or variety of particular immaterial ſubſtances, as well as animal identity is preſerved in the change of material ſubſtances, or variety of particular bodies; unleſs they will ſay, it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame life in brutes, as it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame perſon in men; which the Carteſians, at leaſt, will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

§ 13.

But next, as to the firſt part of the queſtion, "whether "if the ſame thinking ſubſtance (ſuppoſing immaterial "ſubſtances only to think) be changed, it can be the "ſame perſon?" I anſwer, That cannot be reſolved but by thoſe who know what kind of ſubſtances they are that do think, and whether the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another. I grant, were the ſame conſciouſneſs the ſame individual action, it could not; but it being but a preſent repreſentation of a paſt action, why it may not be poſſible that that may be repreſented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be ſhown. And therefore, how far the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions is annexed to any individual agent, ſo that another cannot poſſibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking ſubſtances, who cannot think without being conſcious of it. But that which we call the *ſame conſciouſneſs*, not being the ſame individual act, why one intellectual ſubſtance may not have repreſented to it, as done by itſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other agent; why, I ſay, ſuch a repreſentation may not poſſibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as ſeveral repreſentations in dreams are, which yet, whilſt dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is ſo, will, by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking ſubſtances, be beſt reſolved into the goodneſs of God, who, as far as the happineſs or miſery of any of his ſenſible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of their's transfer from one to another that conſciouſneſs which draws reward or puniſhment with it. How far this may be an argument againſt thoſe who would place thinking in a ſyſtem of fleeting animal ſpirits, I leave to be conſidered. But yet, to return to the queſtion before us, it muſt be allowed, that if the ſame conſciouſneſs (which, as has

been ſhown, is quite a different thing from the ſame numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another, it will be poſſible that two thinking ſubſtances may make but one perſon. For the ſame conſciouſneſs being preſerved, whether in the ſame or different ſubſtances, the perſonal identity is preſerved.

§ 14.

As to the ſecond part of the queſtion, "whether the "ſame immaterial ſubſtance remaining, there may be "two diſtinct perſons?" which queſtion ſeems to me to be built on this, whether the ſame immaterial being, being conſcious of the actions of its paſt duration, may be wholly ſtripped of all the conſciouſneſs of its paſt exiſtence, and loſe it beyond the power of ever retrieving again; and ſo as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a conſciouſneſs that cannot reach beyond this new ſtate. All thoſe who hold pre-exiſtence are evidently of this mind, ſince they allow the ſoul to have no remaining conſciouſneſs of what it did in that pre-exiſtent ſtate, either wholly ſeparate from body, or informing any other body; and if they ſhould not, it is plain experience would be againſt them. So that perſonal identity reaching no farther than conſciouſneſs reaches, a pre-exiſtent ſpirit not having continued ſo many ages in a ſtate of ſilence, muſt needs make different perſons. Suppoſe a *Chriſtian Platoniſt* or *Pythagorean* ſhould, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the ſeventh day, think his ſoul hath exiſted ever ſince; and ſhould imagine it has revolved in ſeveral human bodies, as I once met with one, who was perſuaded his had been the ſoul of *Socrates* (how reaſonably I will not diſpute; this I know, that in the poſt he filled, which was no inconſiderable one, he paſſed for a very rational man, and the preſs has ſhown that he wanted not parts or learning) would any one ſay, that he, being not conſcious of any of *Socrates's* actions or thoughts, could be the ſame perſon with *Socrates?* let any one reflect upon himſelf, and conclude that he has in himſelf an immaterial ſpirit, which is that which

thinks in him, and in the conſtant change of his body keeps him the ſame; and is that which he calls himſelf: let him alſo ſuppoſe it to be the ſame ſoul that was in *Neſtor* or *Therſites*, at the ſiege of *Troy* (for ſouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the ſuppoſition has no apparent abſurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the ſoul of any other man: but he now having no conſcioufneſs of any of the actions either of Neſtor or Therſites, does or can he conceive himſelf the ſame perſon with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himſelf, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever exiſted? So that this conſcioufneſs not reaching to any of the actions of either of thoſe men, he is no more one *ſelf* with either of them, than if the ſoul or immaterial ſpirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exiſt, when it began to inform his preſent body; though it were ever ſo true, that the ſame ſpirit that informed Neſtor's or Therſites's body, were numerically the ſame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the ſame perſon with Neſtor, than if ſome of the particles of matter that were once a part of Neſtor, were now a part of this man; the ſame immaterial ſubſtance, without the ſame conſcioufneſs, no more making the ſame perſon by being united to any body, than the ſame particle of matter, without conſcioufneſs united to any body, makes the ſame perſon. But let him once find himſelf conſcious of any of the actions of Neſtor, he then finds himſelf the ſame perſon with Neſtor.

§ 15.

And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the ſame perſon at the reſurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the ſame which he had here, the ſame conſcioufneſs going along with the ſoul that inhabits it. But yet the ſoul alone, in the change of bodies, would ſcarce to any one, but to him that makes the ſoul the *man*, be enough to make the ſame *man*. For ſhould the ſoul of a prince, carrying

with it the conſciouſneſs of the prince's paſt life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as ſoon as deſerted by his own ſoul, every one ſees he would be the ſame perſon with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would ſay it was the ſame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I gueſs, to every body determine the man in this caſe; wherein the ſoul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the ſame cobler to every one beſides himſelf. I know that, in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, the ſame perſon, and the ſame man, ſtand for one and the ſame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and to apply what articulate ſounds to what *ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleaſes. But yet when we will inquire what makes the ſame *ſpirit*, *man*, or *perſon*, we muſt fix the *ideas* of *ſpirit*, *man*, or *perſon* in our minds; and having reſolved with ourſelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the *ſame*, and when not.

§ 16. *Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame Perſon.*

But though the ſame immaterial ſubſtance or ſoul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatſoever ſtate, make the ſame man; yet it is plain, conſciouſneſs, as far as ever it can be extended, ſhould it be to ages paſt, unites exiſtences and actions very remote in time, into the ſame perſon, as well as it does the exiſtences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: ſo that whatever has the conſciouſneſs of preſent and paſt actions, is the ſame perſon to whom they both belong. Had I the ſame conſciouſneſs that I ſaw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I ſaw an overflowing of the *Thames* laſt winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that ſaw the *Thames* overflowed laſt winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the ſame *ſelf*, place that *ſelf* in what ſubſtance you pleaſe, than that I who write this am the ſame *myſelf* now whilſt I write (whether I conſiſt of all the ſame ſubſtance, material or imma-

terial, or no) that I was yeſterday. For as to this point of being the ſame *ſelf*, it matters not whether this preſent *ſelf* be made up of the ſame or other ſubſtances; I being as much concerned, and as juſtly accountable for any action that was done a thouſand years ſince, appropriated to me now by this ſelf-conſciouſneſs, as I am for what I did the laſt moment.

§ 17. *Self depends on Conſciouſneſs.*

SELF is that conſcious, thinking thing (whatever ſubſtance made up of, whether ſpiritual or material, ſimple or compounded, it matters not) which is ſenſible, or conſcious of pleaſure and pain, capable of happineſs or miſery, and ſo is concerned for *itſelf*, as far as that conſciouſneſs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilſt comprehended under that conſciouſneſs, the little finger is as much a part of *himſelf*, as what is moſt ſo. Upon ſeparation of this little finger, ſhould this conſciouſneſs go along with the little finger, and leave the reſt of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the *perſon*, the *ſame perſon*; and ſelf then would have nothing to do with the reſt of the body. As in this caſe it is conſciouſneſs that goes along with the ſubſtance, when one part is ſeparate from another, which makes the ſame *perſon*, and conſtitutes this inſeparable *ſelf*; ſo it is in reference to ſubſtances remote in time. That with which the *conſciouſneſs* of this preſent, thinking thing can join itſelf, makes the ſame *perſon*, and is one *ſelf* with it, and with nothing elſe; and ſo attributes to it *ſelf*, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. *Objects of Reward and Puniſhment.*

IN this *perſonal identity*, is founded all the right and juſtice of reward and puniſhment; happineſs and miſery being that for which every one is concerned for *himſelf*, and not mattering what becomes of any ſubſtance, not joined to, or affected with, that conſciouſneſs. For as it is evident in the inſtance I gave but now, if the conſciouſneſs went along with the little finger, when it was cut off, that would be the ſame *ſelf* which was concerned for the

whole body yeſterday, as making part of it *itſelf*, whoſe actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the ſame body ſhould ſtill live, and immediately from the ſeparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar conſciouſneſs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of *itſelf*, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19.

THIS may ſhow us wherein *perſonal identity* conſiſts, not in the identity of ſubſtance, but, as I have ſaid, in the identity of *conſciouſneſs*; wherein, if Socrates and the preſent mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the ſame perſon: if the ſame Socrates waking and ſleeping do not partake of the ſame *conſciouſneſs*, Socrates waking and ſleeping is not the ſame perſon. And to puniſh Socrates waking for what ſleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conſcious of, would be no more of right, than to puniſh one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed; for ſuch twins have been ſeen.

§ 20.

BUT yet poſſibly it will ſtill be objected, ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the memory of ſome parts of my life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that perhaps I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; yet am I not the ſame perſon that did thoſe actions, had thoſe thoughts that I once was conſcious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I anſwer, That we muſt here take notice what the word *I* is applied to; which, in this caſe, is the man only. And the ſame man being preſumed to be the ſame perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame man to have diſtinct, incommunicable conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame man would at different times make different perſons; which, we ſee, is the ſenſe of mankind in the ſolemneſt declaration of their opinions; human laws not puniſhing the *mad man* for the *ſober man's* actions, nor the *ſober man* for what the

mad man did, thereby making them two perſons: which is ſomewhat explained by our way of ſpeaking in *Engliſh*, when we ſay ſuch an one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſide himſelf*; in which phraſes it is inſinuated, as if thoſe who now, or at leaſt firſt uſed them, thought that *ſelf* was changed, the *ſelf*-ſame perſon was no longer in that man.

§. 21. *Difference between Identity of Man and Perſon.* BUT yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the ſame individual man, ſhould be two perſons. To help us a little in this, we muſt conſider what is meant by Socrates, or the ſame individual man.

Firſt, It muſt be either the ſame individual, immaterial, thinking ſubſtance; in ſhort, the ſame numerical ſoul, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, Or the ſame animal, without any regard to an immaterial ſoul.

Thirdly, Or the ſame immaterial ſpirit united to the ſame animal.

Now take which of theſe ſuppoſitions you pleaſe, it is impoſſible to make perſonal identity to conſiſt in any thing but conſciouſneſs, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the firſt of them, it muſt be allowed poſſible, that a man born of different women, and in diſtant times, may be the ſame man. A way of ſpeaking, which whoever admits, muſt allow it poſſible for the ſame man to be two diſtinct perſons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the ſecond and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the ſame man any way, but by the ſame conſciouſneſs; and ſo making *human identity* to conſiſt in the ſame thing wherein we place *perſonal identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the ſame man to be the ſame perſon. But then they who place *human identity* in conſciouſneſs only, and not in ſomething elſe, muſt conſider how they will make the infant Socrates the ſame man with Socrates after the reſurrection. But whatſoever to ſome men makes a *man*, and conſequently the ſame individual man, wherein perhaps few are

agreed, perſonal identity can by us be placed in nothing but conſciouſneſs (which is that alone which makes what we call *ſelf*) without involving us in great abſurdities.

§ 22.

But is not a man drunk and ſober the ſame perſon, why elſe is he puniſhed for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame perſon, as a man that walks, and does other things in his ſleep, is the ſame perſon, and is anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human laws puniſh both, with a juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge; becauſe, in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and ſo the ignorance in drunkenneſs or ſleep is not admitted as a plea. For though puniſhment be annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs, and the drunkard perhaps be not conſcious of what he did; yet human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him, but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of; but ſhall receive his doom, his conſcience accuſing or excuſing him.

§ 23. *Conſciouſneſs, alone makes Self.*

Nothing but conſciouſneſs can unite remote exiſtences into the ſame perſon, the identity of ſubſtance will not do it. For whatever ſubſtance there is, however framed, without conſciouſneſs there is no perſon: and a carcaſs may be a perſon, as well as any ſort of ſubſtance be ſo without conſciouſneſs.

Could we ſuppoſe two diſtinct, incommunicable conſciouſneſſes acting the ſame body, the one conſtantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other ſide, the ſame conſciouſneſs acting by intervals two diſtinct bodies: I aſk in the firſt caſe, whether the *day* and the *night-man* would not be two as diſtinct perſons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*? And whether, in the ſecond caſe, there would not be one perſon in two diſtinct bodies, as

much as one man is the ſame in two diſtinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to ſay, that this ſame, and this diſtinct conſciouſneſs, in the caſes abovementioned, is owing to the ſame and diſtinct, immaterial ſubſtances, bringing it with them to thoſe bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the caſe; ſince it is evident the *perſonal identity* would equally be determined by the conſciouſneſs, whether that conſciouſneſs were annexed to ſome individual, immaterial ſubſtance or no. For granting, that the thinking ſubſtance in man muſt be neceſſarily ſuppoſed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial, thinking thing may ſometimes part with its paſt conſciouſneſs, and be reſtored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulneſs men often have of their paſt actions: and the mind many times recovers the memory of a paſt conſciouſneſs, which it had loſt for twenty years together. Make theſe intervals of memory and forgetfulneſs to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two perſons with the ſame immaterial ſpirit, as much as in the former inſtance two perſons with the ſame body. So that *ſelf* is not determined by identity or diverſity of ſubſtance, which it cannot be ſure of, but only by identity of conſciouſneſs.

§ 24.

INDEED it may conceive the ſubſtance, whereof it is now made up, to have exiſted formerly, united in the ſame conſcious being: but conſciouſneſs removed, that ſubſtance is no more it *ſelf*, or makes no more a part of it, than any other ſubſtance; as is evident in the inſtance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whoſe heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any conſciouſneſs, it is no more of a man's ſelf, than any other matter of the univerſe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial ſubſtance, which is void of that conſciouſneſs whereby I am my *ſelf* to my *ſelf*: if there be any part of its exiſtence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that preſent conſciouſneſs whereby I am now my *ſelf*, it is in that part of its exiſtence no more my *ſelf*, than any other immaterial being. For whatſoever any ſubſtance has thought or done, which I

cannot recollect, and by my conſciouſneſs make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any where exiſting.

§ 25.

I AGREE, the more probable opinion is, that this conſciouſneſs is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual, immaterial ſubſtance.

But let men, according to their diverſe hypotheſes, reſolve of that as they pleaſe. This every intelligent being, ſenſible of happineſs or miſery, muſt grant, that there is ſomething that is *himſelf* that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this *ſelf* has exiſted in a continued duration more than one inſtant, and therefore it is poſſible may exiſt, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be ſet to its duration; and may be the ſame *ſelf*, by the ſame conſciouſneſs continued on for the future. And thus, by this conſciouſneſs, he finds himſelf to be the *ſame ſelf* which did ſuch or ſuch an action ſome years ſince, by which he comes to be happy or miſerable now. In all which account of *ſelf*, the ſame numerical ſubſtance is not conſidered as making the ſame *ſelf*; but the ſame continued conſciouſneſs, in which ſeveral ſubſtances, may have been united, and again ſeparated from it, which, whilſt they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this conſciouſneſs then reſided, made a part of that ſame *ſelf*. Thus any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is conſcious in us, makes a part of our *ſelves*: but on ſeparation from the vital union, by which that conſciouſneſs is communicated, that which a moment ſince was part of our *ſelves*, is now no more ſo, than a part of another man's *ſelf* is a part of me; and it is not impoſſible, but in a little time may become a real part of another perſon. And ſo we have the ſame numerical ſubſtance become a part of two different perſons; and the ſame perſon preſerved under the change of various ſubſtances. Could we ſuppoſe any ſpirit wholly ſtripped of all its memory or conſciouſneſs

of paſt actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and ſometimes of them all; the union or ſeparation of ſuch a ſpiritual ſubſtance would make no variation of perſonal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any ſubſtance, vitally united to the preſent thinking being, is a part of that very *ſame ſelf* which now is: any thing united to it by a conſciouſneſs of former actions, makes alſo a part of the *ſame ſelf*, which is the ſame both then and now.

§ 26. *Perſon a Forenſic Term.*

PERSON, as I take it, is the name of this *ſelf*. Wherever a man finds what he calls *himſelf*, there I think another may ſay is the *ſame perſon*. It is a forenſic term appropriating actions and their merit; and ſo belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happineſs and miſery. This perſonality extends it *ſelf* beyond preſent exiſtence to what is paſt, only by conſciouſneſs, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *ſelf* paſt actions, juſt upon the ſame ground, and for the ſame reaſon that it does the preſent. All which is founded in a concern for happineſs, the unavoidable concomitant of conſciouſneſs; that which is conſcious of pleaſure and pain, deſiring that that ſelf that is conſcious ſhould be happy. And therefore whatever paſt actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that preſent *ſelf* by conſciouſneſs, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleaſure or pain, *i. e.* reward or puniſhment, on the account of any ſuch action, is all one as to be made happy or miſerable in its firſt being, without any demerit at all. For ſuppoſing a man puniſhed now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no conſciouſneſs at all, what difference is there between that puniſhment, and being created miſerable? And therefore conformable to this the Apoſtle tells us, that at the great day, when every one ſhall *receive according to his doings, the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open*. The ſentence ſhall be juſtified by the conſciouſneſs all perſons ſhall have, that they *themſelves*, in what bodies ſoever they appear, or what ſubſtances ſo-

ever that conſciouſneſs adheres to, are the *ſame* that committed thoſe actions, and deſerve that puniſhment for them.

§ 27.

I AM apt enough to think I have, in treating of this ſubject, made ſome ſuppoſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome readers, and poſſibly they are ſo in themſelves. But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as our *ſelves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain ſyſtem of fleeting animal ſpirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleaſed God, that no one ſuch ſpirit ſhall ever be united to any but one ſuch body, upon the right conſtitution of whoſe organs its memory ſhould depend; we might ſee the abſurdity of ſome of thoſe ſuppoſitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning theſe matters) the ſoul of a man, for an immaterial ſubſtance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can, from the nature of things, be no abſurdity at all to ſuppoſe, that the ſame ſoul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we ſuppoſe a part of a ſheep's body yeſterday ſhould be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and in that union make a vital part of *Melibæus* himſelf, as well as it did of his ram.

§ 28. *The Difficulty from ill uſe of Names.*

To conclude: whatever ſubſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt, during its exiſtence, neceſſarily be the ſame: whatever compoſitions of ſubſtances begin to exiſt, during the union of thoſe ſubſtances, the concrete muſt be the ſame: whatſoever mode begins to exiſt, during its exiſtence it is the ſame: and ſo if the compoſition be of diſtinct ſubſtances and different modes, the ſame rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obſcurity that has been about this matter, rather riſes from the names ill uſed, than from any obſcurity in

things themſelves. For whatever makes the ſpecific *idea* to which the name is applied, if that *idea* be ſteadily kept to, the diſtinction of any thing into the ſame, and diverſe, will eaſily be conceived, and there can ariſe no doubt about it.

§ 29. *Continued Exiſtence makes Identity.*

For ſuppoſing a rational ſpirit be the *idea* of a *man*, it is eaſy to know what is the *ſame man*; viz. the *ſame ſpirit*, whether ſeparate or in a body, will be the *ſame man*. Suppoſing a rational ſpirit vitally united to a body, of a certain conformation of parts to make a *man*, whilſt that rational ſpirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting, ſucceſſive body, remains, it will be the *ſame man*. But if to any one the *idea* of a *man* be but the vital union of parts in a certain ſhape; as long as that vital union and ſhape remain, in a concrete no otherwiſe the ſame, but by a continued ſucceſſion of fleeting particles, it will be the ſame *man*. For whatever be the compoſition, whereof the complex *idea* is made, whenever exiſtence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the ſame exiſtence, continued, preſerves it the ſame individual under the ſame denomination. (1)

(1) The doctrine of identity and diverſity contained in this chapter, the biſhop of Worceſter pretends to be inconſiſtent with the doctrines of the Chriſtian faith, concerning the reſurrection of the dead. His way of arguing from it, is this; He ſays, The reaſon of believing the reſurrection of the ſame body, upon Mr. Locke's grounds, is from the idea of identity. To which our author * anſwers: Give me leave, my lord, to ſay, that the reaſon of believing any article of the Chriſtian faith (ſuch as your lordſhip is here ſpeaking of) to me, and upon my grounds, is its being a part of divine revelation: upon this ground I believed it, before I either writ that chapter of identity and diverſity, and before I ever thought of thoſe propoſitions which your lordſhip quotes out of that chapter; and upon the ſame ground I believe it ſtill; and not from my idea of identity. This

* In his 3d letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

ſaying of your lordſhip's, therefore, being a propoſition neither ſelf-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large ſuperſtructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But, my lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to repreſent to your lordſhip, that I thought you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was inconſiſtent with the articles of the Chriſtian faith. But that which your lordſhip inſtances in here, is not, that I yet know, an article of the Chriſtian faith. The reſurrection of the dead I acknowledge to be an article of the Chriſtian faith: but that the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, is an article of the Chriſtian faith, is what, I confeſs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teſtament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Chriſtian faith) I find our Saviour and the apoſtles to preach the reſurrection of the dead, and the reſurrection from the dead, in many places: but I do not remember any place where the reſurrection of the ſame body is ſo much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the caſe, I do not remember in any place of the New Teſtament (where the general reſurrection at the laſt day is ſpoken of) any ſuch expreſſion as the reſurrection of the body, much leſs of the ſame body.

I ſay the general reſurrection at the laſt day: becauſe, where the reſurrection of ſome particular perſons, preſently upon our Saviour's reſurrection, is mentioned, the words are *, The graves were opened, and many bodies of ſaints, which ſlept, aroſe, and came out of the graves after his reſurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared to many: of which peculiar way of ſpeaking of this reſurrection, the paſſage itſelf gives a reaſon in theſe words, appeared to many, i. e. thoſe who ſlept appeared, ſo as to be known to be riſen. But this could not be known, unleſs they brought with them the evidence, that they were thoſe who had been dead; whereof there were theſe two proofs, their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the ſame to thoſe who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been thoſe who had been dead ſo long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone,

* Matth. xxvii. 52, 53.

thoſe to whom they appeared might have known them to be men; but could not have known they were riſen from the dead, becauſe they never knew they had been dead. All that, by their appearing, they could have known, was, that they were ſo many living ſtrangers, of whoſe reſurrection they knew nothing. It was neceſſary therefore, that they ſhould come in ſuch bodies, as might in make and ſize, &c. appear to be the ſame they had before, that they might be known to thoſe of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable they were ſuch as were newly dead, whoſe bodies were not yet diſſolved and diſſipated; and therefore, it is particularly ſaid here (differently from what is ſaid of the general reſurrection) that their bodies aroſe; becauſe they were the ſame that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they roſe.

But your lordſhip endeavours to prove it muſt be the ſame body: and let us grant that your lordſhip, nay, and others too, think you have proved it muſt be the ſame body; Will you therefore ſay, that he holds what is inconſiſtent with an article of faith, who having never ſeen this your lordſhip's interpretation of the ſcripture, nor your reaſons for the ſame body, in your ſenſe of ſame body; or, if he has ſeen them, yet not underſtanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the ſcripture propoſes to him, viz. That at the laſt day the dead ſhall be raiſed, without determining whether it ſhall be with the very ſame bodies or no?

I know your lordſhip pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of ſcripture into articles of faith. And if you do not, he that believes the dead ſhall be raiſed, believes that article of faith which the ſcripture propoſes; and cannot be accuſed of holding any thing inconſiſtent with it, if it ſhould happen, that what he holds, is inconſiſtent with another propoſition, viz. That the dead ſhall be raiſed with the ſame bodies, in your lordſhip's ſenſe, which I do not find propoſed in Holy Writ as an article of faith.

But your lordſhip argues, It muſt be the ſame body; which, as you explain ſame body*, is not the ſame individual particles of matter, which were united at the point of death; nor the ſame particles of matter, that the ſinner had at the time of the commiſſion of his ſins: but that it muſt be the ſame material ſubſtance which was vitally united to

* 2d Anſ.

the ſoul here; i. e. as I underſtand it, the ſame individual particles of matter, which were, ſome time or other during his life here, vitally united to his ſoul.

Your firſt argument to prove, that it muſt be the ſame body in this ſenſe of the ſame body, is taken from theſe words of our Saviour, * All that are in the graves ſhall hear his voice, and ſhall come forth. † From whence your lordſhip argues, That theſe words, all that are in their graves, relate to no other ſubſtance than what was united to the ſoul in life; becauſe a different ſubſtance cannot be ſaid to be in the graves, and to come out of them. Which words of your lordſhip's, if they prove any thing, prove that the ſoul too is lodged in the grave, and raiſed out of it at the laſt day. For your lordſhip ſays, Can a different ſubſtance be ſaid to be in the graves, and come out of them? So that, according to this interpretation of theſe words of our Saviour, No other ſubſtance being raiſed, but what hears his voice; and no other ſubſtance hearing his voice, but what being called, comes out of the grave; and no other ſubſtance coming out of the grave, but what was in the grave; any one muſt conclude, that the ſoul, unleſs it be in the grave, will make no part of the perſon that is raiſed; unleſs, as your lordſhip argues againſt me ‡, You can make it out, that a ſubſtance which never was in the grave, may come out of it, or that the ſoul is no ſubſtance.

But ſetting aſide the ſubſtance of the ſoul, another thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your interpretation of our Saviour's words be neceſſarily to be received as their true ſenſe, is, That it will not be very eaſily reconciled to your ſaying ‖, you do not mean by the ſame body, The ſame individual particles which were united at the point of death. And yet, by this interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other particles but ſuch as were united at the point of death; becauſe you mean no other ſubſtance but what comes out of the grave; and no ſubſtance, no particles come out, you ſay, but what were in the grave; and I think, your lordſhip will not ſay, that the particles that were ſeparate from the body by perſpiration before the point of death, were laid up in the grave.

But your lordſhip, I find, has an anſwer to this, viz. § That by comparing this with other places, you find that the words [of our Saviour above quoted] are to be under-

* John v. 28, 29. † 2d Anſ. ‡ ib. ‖ ib. § ib.

ſtood of the ſubſtance of the body, to which the ſoul was united, and not to (I ſuppoſe your lordſhip writ, of) theſe individual particles, i. e. thoſe individual particles that are in the grave at the reſurrection. For ſo they muſt be read, to make your lordſhip's ſenſe entire, and to the purpoſe of your anſwer here: and then, methinks, this laſt ſenſe of our Saviour's words given by your lordſhip, wholly overturns the ſenſe which we have given of them above, where from thoſe words you preſs the belief of the reſurrection of the ſame body, by this ſtrong argument, that a ſubſtance could not, upon hearing the voice of Chriſt, come out of the grave, which was never in the grave. There (as far as I can underſtand your words) your lordſhip argues, that our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of the particles in the grave, unleſs, as your lordſhip ſays, one can make it out, that a ſubſtance which never was in the grave, may come out of it. And here your lordſhip expreſsly ſays, That our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of the ſubſtance of that body, to which the ſoul was [at any time] united, and not to thoſe individual particles that are in the grave. Which put together, ſeems to me to ſay, That our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of thoſe particles only that are in the grave, and not of thoſe particles only which are in the grave, but of others alſo, which have at any time been vitally united to the ſoul, but never were in the grave.

The next text your lordſhip brings to make the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your ſenſe, an article of faith, are theſe words of St. Paul; * For we muſt all appear before the judgment ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. To which your lordſhip ſubjoins † this queſtion: Can theſe words be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done? Anſwer. A man may ſuſpend his determining the meaning of the apoſtle to be, that a ſinner ſhall ſuffer for his ſins in the very ſame body wherein he committed them; becauſe St. Paul does not ſay he ſhall have the very ſame body when he ſuffers, that he had when he ſinned. The apoſtle ſays indeed, done in his body. The body he had, and did things in, at five or fifteen, was, no doubt, his body, as much as that, which he did things in at fifty, was his body, though his body were not the very

* 2 Cor. v. 10. † 2d Anſ.

ſame body at thoſe different ages: and ſo will the body, which he ſhall have after the reſurrection, be his body, though it be not the very ſame with that, which he had at five, or fifteen, or fifty. He that at threeſcore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is puniſhed for what he did in his body, though the body he has, i. e. his body at threeſcore, be not the ſame, i. e. made up of the ſame individual particles of matter, that that body was, which he had forty years before. When your lordſhip has reſolved with yourſelf, what that ſame immutable he is, which at the laſt judgment ſhall receive the things done in his body, your lordſhip will eaſily ſee, that the body he had when an embryo in the womb, when a child playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-rid dying of a conſumption, and at laſt, which he ſhall have after his reſurrection, are each of them his body, though neither of them be the ſame body, the one with the other.

But farther, to your lordſhip's queſtion, Can theſe words be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done? I anſwer, Theſe words of St. Paul may be underſtood of another material ſubſtance, than that body in which theſe things were done, becauſe your lordſhip teaches me, and gives me a ſtrong reaſon ſo to underſtand them. Your lordſhip ſays, * That you do not ſay the ſame particles of matter, which the ſinner had at the very time of the commiſſion of his ſins, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day. And your lordſhip gives this reaſon for it; † For then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body, conſidering the continued ſpending of particles by perſpiration. Now, my lord, if the apoſtle's words, as your lordſhip would argue, cannot be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done; and no body, upon the removal or change of ſome of the particles that at any time make it up, is the ſame material ſubſtance, or the ſame body; it will, I think, thence follow, that either the ſinner muſt have all the ſame individual particles vitally united to his ſoul when he is raiſed, that he had vitally united to his ſoul when he ſinned; or elſe St. Paul's words here cannot be underſtood to mean the ſame body in which the things were done. For if there were other particles of matter in the body, wherein the things

* 2d Anſ. † Ib.

were done, than in that which is raiſed, that which is raiſed cannot be the ſame body in which they were done: unleſs that alone, which has juſt all the ſame individual particles when any action is done, being the ſame body wherein it was done, that alſo, which has not the ſame individual particles wherein that action was done, can be the ſame body wherein it was done; which is in effect to make the ſame body ſometimes to be the ſame, and ſometimes not the ſame.

Your lordſhip thinks it ſuffices to make the ſame body, to have not all, but no other particles of matter, but ſuch as were ſometime or other vitally united to the ſoul before; but ſuch a body, made up of part of the particles ſome time or other vitally united to the ſoul, is no more the ſame body wherein the actions were done in the diſtant parts of the long ſinner's life, than that is the ſame body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the ſame particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example, A ſinner has acted here in his body an hundred years; he is raiſed at the laſt day, but with what body? The ſame, ſays your lordſhip, that he acted in; becauſe St. Paul ſays, he muſt receive the things done in his body. What therefore muſt his body at the reſurrection conſiſt of? Muſt it conſiſt of all the particles of matter that have ever been vitally united to his ſoul? For they, in ſucceſſion, have all of them made up his body wherein he did theſe things: No, ſays your lordſhip, * that would make his body too vaſt; it ſuffices to make the ſame body in which the things were done, that it conſiſts of ſome of the particles, and no other, but ſuch as were, ſome time during his life, vitally united to his ſoul. But according to this account, his body at the reſurrection being, as your lordſhip ſeems to limit it, near the ſame ſize it was in ſome part of his life, it will be no more the ſame body in which the things were done in the diſtant parts of his life, than that is the ſame body, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual matter that then made it up, is now wanting. For example, Let his body at fifty years old conſiſt of a million of parts: five hundred thouſand at leaſt of thoſe parts will be different from thoſe which made up his body at ten years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical particles, that made up his body at fifty, or any other ſeaſon of his life, or to gather them promiſcuouſ-

* 2d Anſ.

ly out of thoſe which at different times have ſucceſſively been vitally united to his ſoul, they will no more make the ſame body, which was his, wherein ſome of his actions were done, than that is the ſame body, which has but half the ſame particles: and yet all your lordſhip's argument here for the ſame body, is, becauſe St. Paul ſays it muſt be his body, in which theſe things were done; which it could not be, if any other ſubſtance were joined to it, i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body, which were not vitally united to the ſoul when the action was done.

Again, your lordſhip ſays, * "That you do not ſay the ſame individual particles [ſhall make up the body at the reſurrection] which were united at the point of death, for there muſt be a great alteration in them in a lingering diſeaſe, as if a fat man falls into a conſumption." Becauſe, it is likely, your lordſhip thinks theſe particles of a decrepit, waſted, withered body, would be too few, or unfit to make ſuch a plump, ſtrong, vigorous, well ſized body, as it has pleaſed your lordſhip to proportion out in your thoughts to men at the reſurrection; and therefore ſome ſmall portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's ſoul, ſhall be reaſſumed to make up his body to the bulk your lordſhip judges convenient; but the greateſt part of them ſhall be left out, to avoid the making his body more vaſt than your lordſhip thinks will be fit, as appears by theſe your lordſhip's words immediately following, viz. † "That you do not ſay the ſame particles the ſinnner had at the very time of commiſſion of his ſins; for then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body."

But then, pray, my lord, what muſt an embryo do, who dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his ſoul, has no particles of matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his body of that ſize and proportion which your lordſhip ſeems to require in bodies at the reſurrection? Or muſt we believe he ſhall remain content with that ſmall pittance of matter, and that yet imperfect body to eternity, becauſe it is an article of faith to believe the reſurrection of the very ſame body, i. e. made up of only ſuch particles as have been vitally united to the ſoul? For it muſt be ſo, as your lordſhip ſays, ‡ "That life is the reſult of the union of ſoul and body," it will follow, that the body of an embryo dying in the womb may be very little,

* 2d Anſ. † ib. ‡ ib.

not the thouſandth part of any ordinary man. For ſince from the firſt conception and beginning of formation it has life, and "life is the reſult of the union of the ſoul with the body;" an embryo, that ſhall die either by the untimely death of the mother, or by any other accident, preſently after it has life, muſt, according to your lordſhip's doctrine, remain a man not an inch long to eternity; becauſe there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his ſoul, to make him bigger, and no other can be made uſe of to that purpoſe: though what greater congruity the ſoul hath with any particles of matter which were once vitally united to it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath with particles of matter which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that ſhould be demanded.

By theſe and not a few other the like conſequences, one may ſee what ſervice they do to religion, and the Chriſtian doctrine, who raiſe queſtions, and make articles of faith about the reſurrection of the ſame body, where the ſcripture ſays nothing of the ſame body; or if it does, it is with with no ſmall reprimand * to thoſe who make ſuch an inquiry. "But ſome men will ſay, How are the dead raiſed up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou ſoweſt, is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that body that ſhall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of ſome other grain. But God giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him." Words, I ſhould think, ſufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or againſt the ſame body's being raiſed at the laſt day. It ſuffices, that all the dead ſhall be raiſed, and every one appear and anſwer for the things done in his life, and receive according to the things he has done in his body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has ſaid nothing inconſiſtent herewith, I preſume may and muſt be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection of the dead.

But your lordſhip, to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body to be an article of faith, farther aſks, † "How could it be ſaid, if any other ſubſtance be joined to the ſoul at the reſurrection, as its body, that they were the things done in or by the body?" Anſ. Juſt as it may be ſaid of a man at an hundred years old, that hath then another ſubſtance joined to his ſoul, than he had at twenty; that the murder or

* 1 Cor. xv. 35, &c. † 2d Anſ.

drunkenneſs he was guilty of at twenty, were things done in the body: how "by the body" comes in here, I do not ſee.

Your lordſhip adds, "and St. Paul's diſpute about the manner of raiſing the body, might ſoon have ended, if there were no neceſſity of the ſame body." Anſ. When I underſtand what argument there is in theſe words to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body, without the mixture of one new atom of matter, I ſhall know what to ſay to it. In the mean time this I underſtand, that St. Paul would have put as ſhort an end to all diſputes about this matter, if he had ſaid, that there was a neceſſity of the ſame body, or that it ſhould be the ſame body.

The next text of ſcripture you bring for the ſame body is, * "If there be no reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt raiſed." From which your lordſhip argues, † "It ſeems then other bodies are to be raiſed as his was." I grant other dead, as certainly raiſed as Chriſt was; for elſe his reſurrection would be of no uſe to mankind. But I do not ſee how it follows, that they ſhall be raiſed with the ſame body, as Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body, as your lordſhip infers in theſe words annexed; "And can there be any doubt, whether his body was the ſame material ſubſtance which was united to his ſoul before?" I anſwer, None at all; nor that it had juſt the ſame diſtinguiſhing lineaments and marks, yea, and the ſame wounds that it had at the time of his death. If therefore your lordſhip will argue from other bodies being raiſed as his was, That they muſt keep proportion with his in fameneſs; then we muſt believe, that every man ſhall be raiſed with the ſame lineaments and and other notes of diſtinction he had at the time of his death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, becauſe our Saviour was ſo raiſed; which ſeems to me ſcarce reconcileable with what your lordſhip ſays, ‡ of a fat man falling into a conſumption, and dying.

But whether it will conſiſt or no with your lordſhip's meaning in that place, this to me ſeems a conſequence that will need to be better proved, viz. That our bodies muſt be raiſed the ſame, juſt as our Saviour's was: becauſe St. Paul ſays, "if there be no reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt riſen." For it may be a good conſequence, Chriſt is riſen, and therefore there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good conſequence,

* 2 Cor. xv. 16. † 2d Anſ. ‡ Ibid.

Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body he had at his death, therefore all men ſhall be raiſed with the ſame body they had at their death, contrary to what your lordſhip ſays concerning a fat man dying of a conſumption. But the caſe I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and thoſe to be raiſed at the laſt day.

1. His body ſaw not corruption, and therefore to give him another body new moulded, mixed with other particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the grave, whole and intire as it was laid there, had been to deſtroy his body to frame him a new one without any need. But why with the remaining particles of a man's body long ſince diſſolved and moulded into duſt and atoms (whereof poſſibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and entered into other concretions; even in the bodies of other men) other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not ſerve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did in the compaſs of his life make his body, I think no reaſon can be given.

This may ſerve to ſhow, why, though the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his reſurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man dead and rotten in his grave, or burnt, may at the laſt day have ſeveral new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience: ſince whatever matter is vitally united to his ſoul is his body, as much as is that which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his life.

2. In the next place, the ſize, ſhape, figure, and lineaments of our Saviour's body, even to his wounds, into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and his hand, were to be kept in the raiſed body of our Saviour, the ſame they were at his death, to be a conviction to his diſciples, to whom he ſhewed himſelf, and who were to be witneſſes of his reſurrection, that their maſter, the very ſame man, was crucified, dead, and buried, and raiſed again; and therefore he was handled by them, and eat before them after he was riſen, to give them in all points full ſatisfaction that it was really he, the ſame, and not another, nor a ſpectre or apparition of him: though I do not think your lordſhip will thence argue, that becauſe others are to be raiſed as he was, therefore it is neceſſary to believe, that becauſe he eat after his reſurrection, others at the laſt day ſhall eat and

drink after they are raiſed from the dead; which ſeems to me as good an argument, as becauſe his undiſſolved body was raiſed out of the grave, juſt as it there lay intire, without the mixture of any new particles; therefore the corrupted and conſumed bodies of the dead, at the reſurrection, ſhall be new framed only out of thoſe ſcattered particles which were once vitally united to their ſouls, without the leaſt mixture of any one ſingle atom of new matter. But at the laſt day, when all men are raiſed, there will be no need to be aſſured of any one particular man's reſurrection. It is enough that every one ſhall appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done in his former life; but in what ſort of body he ſhall appear, or of what particles made up, the ſcripture having ſaid nothing, but that it ſhall be a ſpiritual body raiſed in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.

Your lordſhip aſks, * "Were they [who ſaw our Saviour after his reſurrection] witneſſes only of ſome material ſubſtance then united to his ſoul?" In anſwer, I beg your lordſhip to conſider, whether you ſuppoſe our Saviour was to be known to be the ſame man (to the witneſſes that were to ſee him, and teſtify his reſurrection) by his ſoul, that could neither be ſeen or known to be the ſame; or by his body, that could be ſeen, and by the diſcernible ſtructure and marks of it, be known to be the ſame? When your lordſhip has reſolved that, all that you ſay in that page will anſwer itſelf. But becauſe one man cannot know another to be the ſame, but by the outward viſible lineaments, and ſenſible marks he has been wont to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, will your lordſhip therefore argue, That the Great Judge, at the laſt day, who gives to each man, whom he raiſes, his new body, ſhall not be able to know who is who, unleſs he give to every one of them a body, juſt of the ſame figure, ſize, and features, and made up of the very ſame individual particles he had in his former life? Whether ſuch a way of arguing for the reſurrection of the ſame body, to be an article of faith, contributes much to the ſtrengthening the credibility of the article of the reſurrection of the dead, I ſhall leave to the judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving the reſurrection of the ſame body, to be an article of faith, your lordſhip ſays, † "But the apoſtle inſiſts upon the reſurrection of Chriſt, not mere-

* 2d Anſ. † Ib.

ly as an argument of the poſſibility of ours, but of the certainty of it; * becauſe he roſe, as the firſt-fruits; Chriſt the firſt fruits, afterwards they that are Chriſt's at his coming. Anſ. No doubt, the reſurrection of Chriſt is a proof of the certainty of our reſurrection. But is it therefore a proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, conſiſting of the ſame individual particles which concurred to the making up of our body here, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter? I confeſs I ſee no ſuch conſequence.

But your lordſhip goes on: †"St. Paul was aware of the objections in men's minds about the reſurrection of the ſame body;" and it is of great conſequence as to this article, to ſhow upon what grounds he proceeds. "But ſome men will ſay how are the dead raiſed up, and with what body do they come?" Firſt, he ſhows, that the ſeminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation." Anſwer. I do not perfectly underſtand, what it is "for the ſeminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation:" or elſe, perhaps, I ſhould better ſee how this here tends to the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe.

It continues, ‡ "They ſow bare grain of wheat, or of ſome other grain, but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him, and to every ſeed his own body. Here, ſays your lordſhip, is an identity of the material ſubſtance ſuppoſed." It may be ſo. But to me a diverſity of the material ſubſtance, i. e. of the component particles, is here ſuppoſed, or in direct words ſaid. For the words of St. Paul taken all together, run thus, § "that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that body which ſhall be, but bare grain;" and ſo on, as your lordſhip has ſet down in the remainder of them. From which words of St. Paul, the natural argument ſeems to me to ſtand thus: If the body that is put in the earth in ſowing, is not that body which ſhall be, then the body that is put in the grave, is not that, i. e. the ſame body that ſhall be.

But your lordſhip proves it to be the ſame body by theſe three Greek words of the text, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, which your lordſhip interprets thus, ‖ "That proper body which be-

* 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23. † 2d. Anſ. ‡ Ibid. ‖ Ibid.
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longs to it." Answer. Indeed by those Greek words τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, whether our translators have rightly rendered them "his own body," or your lordship more rightly "that proper body which belongs to it." I formerly understood no more but this, that in the production of wheat, and other grain from seed, God continued every species distinct; so that from grains of wheat sown, root, stalk, blade, ear, grains of wheat were produced, and not those of barley; and so of the rest, which I took to be the meaning of "to every seed his own body." No, says your lordship, these words prove, That to every plant of wheat, and to every grain of wheat produced in it, is given the proper body that belongs to it, which is the same body with the grain that was sown. Answer. This, I confess, I do not understand; because I do not understand how one individual grain can be the same with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual grains; for such sometimes is the increase.

But your lordship proves it. For, says your lordship, * "Every seed having that body in little, which is afterwards so much enlarged; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination; but it hath its proper organical parts, which make it the same body with that which it grows up to. For although grain be not divided into lobes, as other seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most accurate observations, that upon separating the membranes, these seminal parts are discerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn. In which words I crave leave to observe, that your lordship supposes that a body may be enlarged by the addition of an hundred or a thousand times as much in bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the same body; which, I confess, I cannot understand.

But in the next place, if that could be so; and that the plant, in its full growth at harvest, increased by a thousand or a million of times as much new matter added to it, as it had when it lay in little, concealed in the grain that was sown, was the very same body; yet I do not think that your lordship will say, that every minute, insensible, and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains, contained in that little organized seminal plant, is every one of them the very same with that grain which contains that whole seminal plant, and all those invisible grains in it. For then it will follow, that one grain is the same with an hundred,

* 2d Anf.

and an hundred diſtinct grains the ſame with one: which I ſhall be able to aſſent to, when I can conceive, that all the wheat in the world is but one grain.

For I beſeech you, my lord, conſider what it is St. Paul here ſpeaks of: it is plain he ſpeaks of that which is ſown and dies, i. e. the grain that the huſbandman takes out of his barn to ſow in his field. And of this grain St. Paul ſays, "that it is not that body that ſhall be." Theſe two, viz. "that which is ſown, and that body that ſhall be" are all the bodies that St. Paul here ſpeaks of to repreſent the agreement or difference of men's bodies after the reſurrection, with thoſe they had before they died. Now, I crave leave to aſk your lordſhip, which of theſe two is that little inviſible ſeminal plant, which your lordſhip here ſpeaks of? Does your lordſhip mean by it the grain that is ſown? But that is not what St. Paul ſpeaks of; he could not mean this embryonated little plant, for he could not denote it by theſe words, "that which thou ſoweſt," for that he ſays muſt die: but this little embryonated plant, contained in the ſeed that is ſown, dies not: or does your lordſhip mean by it, "the body that ſhall be?" But neither by theſe words, "the body that ſhall be," can St. Paul be ſuppoſed to denote this inſenſible little embryonated plant; for that is already in being, contained in the ſeed that is ſown, and therefore could not be ſpoken of under the name of the body that ſhall be. And therefore, I confeſs, I cannot ſee of what uſe it is to your lordſhip to introduce here this third body, which St. Paul mentions not, and to make that the ſame, or not the ſame with any other, when thoſe which St. Paul ſpeaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, theſe two viſible ſenſible bodies, the grain ſown, and the corn grown up to ear; with neither of which this inſenſible embryonated plant can be the ſame body, unleſs an inſenſible body can be the ſame body with a ſenſible body, and a little body can be the ſame body with one ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand times as big as itſelf. So that yet, I confeſs, I ſee not the reſurrection of the ſame body proved, from theſe words of St. Paul, to be an article of faith.

Your lordſhip goes on: * "St. Paul indeed ſaith, That we ſow not that body that ſhall be; but he ſpeaks not of the identity, but the perfection of it." Here my underſtanding fails me again: for I cannot underſtand St. Paul to ſay, That the ſame identical ſenſible grain of wheat,

* 2d Anſ.

which was ſown at ſeed-time, is the very ſame with every grain of wheat in the ear at harveſt, that ſprang from it: yet ſo I muſt underſtand it, to make it prove, that the ſame ſenſible body, that is laid in the grave, ſhall be the very ſame with that which ſhall be raiſed at the reſurrection. For I do not know of any ſeminal body in little, contained in the dead carcaſs of any man or woman, which, as your lordſhip ſays, in ſeeds, having its proper organical parts, ſhall afterwards be enlarged, and at the reſurrection grow up into the ſame man. For I never thought of any ſeed, or ſeminal parts, either of plant or animal, "ſo wonderfully improved by the Providence of God," whereby the ſame plant or animal ſhould beget itſelf; nor ever heard, that it was by Divine Providence deſigned to produce the ſame individual, but for the producing of future and diſtinct individuals, for the continuation of the ſame ſpecies.

Your lordſhip's next words are, * "And although there be ſuch a difference from the grain itſelf, when it comes up to be perfect corn, with root, ſtalk, blade, and ear, that it may be ſaid to outward appearance not not to be the ſame body; yet with regard to the ſeminal and organical parts it is as much the ſame, as a man grown up, is the ſame with the embryo in the womb." Anſwer. It does not appear by any thing I can find in the text, that St. Paul here compared the body produced, with the ſeminal and organical parts contained in the grain it ſprang from, but with the whole ſenſible grain that was grown. Microſcopes had not then diſcovered the little embryo plant in the ſeed: and ſuppoſing it ſhould have been revealed to St. Paul (though in the ſcripture we find little revelation of natural philoſophy) yet an argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no manner of uſe to them; nor ſerve at all either to inſtruct or convince them. But granting that thoſe St. Paul writ to, knew it as well as Mr. Lewenhoek; yet your lordſhip thereby proves not the raiſing of the ſame body; your lordſhip ſays, it is as much the ſame [I crave leave to add body] "as a man grown up is the ſame" (ſame what, I beſeech your lordſhip?) "with the embryo in the womb." For that the body of the embryo in the womb, and body of the man grown up, is the ſame body, I think no one will ſay; unleſs he can perſuade himſelf, that a body that is not the hundredth part of another, is the ſame with that other; which

* 2d Anſ.

I think no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas of thinking and reaſoning, he has learnt to ſay, that a part and the whole are the ſame.

Your lordſhip goes on, * "And although many arguments may be uſed to prove, that a man is not the ſame, becauſe life, which depends upon the courſe of the blood, and the manner of reſpiration, and nutrition, is ſo different in both ſtates; yet that man would be thought ridiculous, that ſhould ſeriouſly affirm, That it was not the ſame man. And your lordſhip ſays, I grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants, alters not the identity: and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant." Anſwer. My lord, I think the queſtion is not about the ſame man, but the ſame body. For though I do ſay, † (ſomewhat differently from what your lordſhip ſets down as my words here) "That "that which has ſuch an organization, as is fit to receive "and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the "wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of a plant, in which conſiſts "the vegetable life, continues to be the ſame plant, as long "as it partakes of the ſame life, though that life be commu"nicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the "living plant:" yet I do not remember, that I any where ſay, That a plant, which was once no bigger than an oaten ſtraw, and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about, is the ſame body, though it be ſtill the ſame plant.

The well-known tree in Epping Foreſt, called the King's Oak, which from not weighing an ounce at firſt, grew to have many tons of timber in it, was all along the ſame oak, the very ſame plant; but nobody, I think, will ſay that it was the ſame body when it weighed a ton, as it was when it weighed but an ounce, unleſs he has a mind to ſignalize himſelf by ſaying, That that is the ſame body, which has a thouſand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the ſame; which is no better than to ſay, That a thouſand different particles are but one and the ſame particle, and one and the ſame particle is a thouſand different particles; a thouſand times a greater abſurdity, than to ſay half is whole, or the whole is the ſame with the half; which will be improved ten thouſand times yet farther, if a man ſhall ſay (as your lordſhip ſeems to me to argue here) That that great oak is the very ſame body with the acorn it ſprang from, becauſe there was in that acorn an oak in little, which was afterwads (as your

* 2d Anſw. † Eſſay, b. 2. c. 27. §. 4.

lordſhip expreſſes it) ſo much enlarged, as to make that mighty tree. For this embryo, if I may ſo call it, or oak in little, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thouſandth part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thouſandth part of the grown oak, it will be very extraordinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the ſame body, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one particle of an hundred thouſand, or a million, is the ſame in the one body that it was in the other. From which way of reaſoning, it will follow, that a nurſe and her ſucking child have the ſame body, and be paſt doubt, that a mother and her infant have the ſame body. But this is a way of certainty found out to eſtabliſh the articles of faith, and to overturn the new method of certainty that your lordſhip ſays "I have ſtarted, which is apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

And now I deſire your lordſhip to conſider of what uſe it is to you in the preſent caſe, to quote out of my Eſſay theſe words, "That partaking of one common life, makes "the identity of a plant;" ſince the queſtion is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body; it being a very different thing to be the ſame plant, and to be the ſame body. For that which makes the ſame plant, does not make the ſame body; the one being the partaking in the ſame continued vegetable life, the other the conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles of matter. And therefore your lordſhip's inference from my words above quoted, in theſe which you ſubjoin *, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one, viz. "So that in things capable of any ſort of life, the identity is conſiſtent with a continued ſucceſſion of parts; and ſo the wheat grown up, is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown." For I believe, if my words, from which you infer, "And ſo the wheat grown up is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown," were put into a ſyllogiſm, this would hardly be brought to be the concluſion.

But your lordſhip goes on with conſequence upon conſequence, though I have not eyes acute enough every where to ſee the connexion, till you bring it to the reſurrection of the ſame body. The connexion of your lordſhip's words † is as followeth; "And thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the reſurrection, is conſiſtent with its identity, if its organization and life be the ſame; and this is a real identity of the body, which depends not upon conſciouſneſs. From

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid.

whence it follows, that to make the ſame body, no more is required, but reſtoring life to the organized parts of it." If the queſtion were about raiſing the ſame plant, I do not ſay but there might be ſome appearance for making ſuch an inference from my words as this, "Whence it follows, that to make the ſame plant, no more is required, but to reſtore life to the organized parts of it." But this deduction, wherein, from thoſe words of mine that ſpeak only of the identity of a plant, your lordſhip infers, there is no more required to make the ſame body, than to make the ſame plant, being too ſubtle for me, I leave to my reader to find out.

Your lordſhip goes on and ſays, * That I grant likewiſe, "That the identity of the ſame man conſiſts in a participa- "tion of the ſame continued life, by conſtantly fleeting parti- "cles of matter in ſucceſſion, vitally united to the ſame organ- "ized body." Anſwer. I ſpeak in theſe words of the identity of the ſame man, and your lordſhip thence roundly concludes; "ſo that there is no difficulty of the ſameneſs of the body." But your lordſhip knows, that I do not take theſe two ſounds, man and body, to ſtand for the ſame thing, nor the identity of the man to be the ſame with the identity of the body.

But let us read out your lordſhip's words. † "So that there is no difficulty as to the ſameneſs of the body, if life were continued; and if, by Divine Power, life be reſtored to that material ſubſtance which was before united, by a reunion of the ſoul to it, there is no reaſon to deny the identity of the body, not from the conſciouſneſs of the ſoul, but from that life which is the reſult of the union of the ſoul and body."

If I underſtand your lordſhip right, you in theſe words, from the paſſages above quoted out of my book, argue, that from thoſe words of mine it will follow, That it is or may be the ſame body, that is raiſed at the reſurrection. If ſo, my lord, your lordſhip has then proved, That my book is not inconſiſtent with, but conformable to this article of the reſurrection of the ſame body, which your lordſhip contends for, and will have to be an article of faith: for though I do by no means deny that the ſame bodies ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day, yet I ſee nothing your lordſhip has ſaid to prove it to be an article of faith.

But your lordſhip goes on with your proofs and ſays, ‡ "But St. Paul ſtill ſuppoſes, that it muſt be that material ſubſtance to which the ſoul was before united. For ſaith he, "it is ſown in corruption, it is raiſed in incorruption,"

* 2d Anſwer. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

it is ſown in diſhonour, it is raiſed in glory: it is ſown in weakneſs, it is raiſed in power: it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a ſpiritual body." Can ſuch a material ſubſtance, which was never united to the body, be ſaid to be ſown in corruption, and weakneſs, and diſhonour? Either, therefore, he muſt ſpeak of the ſame body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended." I anſwer, "Can ſuch a material ſubſtance, which was never laid in the grave, be ſaid to be ſown," &c.? For your lordſhip ſays, * "You do not ſay the ſame individual particles, which were united at the point of death, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day;" and no other particles are laid in the grave, but ſuch as are united at the point of death; either therefore your lordſhip muſt ſpeak of another body, different from that which was ſown, which ſhall be raiſed, or elſe your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.

But whatever be your meaning, your lordſhip proves it to be St. Paul's meaning, That the ſame body ſhall be raiſed, which was ſown, in theſe following words, † "For what does all this relate to a conſcious principle?" Anſ. The ſcripture being expreſs, that the ſame perſon ſhould be raiſed and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his body; it was very well ſuited to common apprehenſions (which refined not about "particles that had been vitally united to the ſoul") to ſpeak of the body which each one was to have after the reſurrection, as he would be apt to ſpeak of it himſelf. For it being his body both before and after the reſurrection, every one ordinarily ſpeaks of his body as the ſame, though in a ſtrict and philoſophical ſenſe, as your lordſhip ſpeaks, it be not the very ſame. Thus it is no impropriety of ſpeech to ſay, "this body of mine, which was formerly ſtrong and plump, is now weak and waſted," though in ſuch a ſenſe as you are ſpeaking here, it be not the ſame body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, which appears not to have been thought of. The apoſtle directly propoſes nothing for or againſt the ſame body, as neceſſary to be believed: that which he is plain and direct in, is his oppoſing and condemning ſuch curious queſtions about the body, which could ſerve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and neceſſary for them to believe, viz. a day of judgment and retribution to men in a future ſtate; and therefore it is no wonder, that mentioning their bodies, he ſhould uſe a way

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid.

of ſpeaking ſuited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard poſitively to conclude any thing for the determining of this queſtion (eſpecially againſt expreſſions in the ſame diſcourſe that plainly incline to the other ſide) in a matter which, as it appears, the apoſtle thought not neceſſary to determine, and the ſpirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's curioſity in.

But your lordſhip ſays, * "The apoſtle ſpeaks plainly of that body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be reſtored with more noble qualities." I wiſh your lordſhip had quoted the words of St. Paul, wherein he ſpeaks plainly of that numerical body that was once quickened; they would preſently decide this queſtion. But your lordſhip proves it by theſe following words of St. Paul: "For this corruption muſt put on incorruption, and this mortal muſt put on immortality;" to which your lordſhip adds, "that you do not ſee how he could more expreſsly affirm the identity of this corruptible body, with that after the reſurrection." How expreſsly it is affirmed by the apoſtle, ſhall be conſidered by and by. In the mean time, it is paſt doubt, that your lordſhip beſt knows what you do or do not ſee. But this I would be bold to ſay, that if St. Paul had any where in this chapter (where there are ſo many occaſions for it, if it had been neceſſary to have been believed) but ſaid in expreſs words that the ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed, every one elſe, who thinks of it, will ſee he had more expreſsly affirmed the identity of the bodies which men now have, with thoſe they ſhall have after the reſurrection.

The remainder of your lordſhip's period † is; "And that without any reſpect to the principle of ſelf-conſciouſneſs." Anſ. Theſe words, I doubt not, have ſome meaning, but I muſt own I know not what; either towards the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, or to ſhow, that anything I have ſaid concerning ſelf-conſciouſneſs, is inconſiſtent: for I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, that the identity of body conſiſted in ſelf-conſciouſneſs.

From your preceding words, your lordſhip concludes thus: ‡ "And ſo if the ſcripture be the ſole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it." My lord, to make the concluſion unqueſtionable, I humbly conceive the words muſt run thus: "And ſo if the ſcripture, and your lordſhip's interpretation of it be the ſole foundation of our faith, the reſurrection of the ſame body is an article of it." For,

* 2d. Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

with ſubmiſſion, your lordſhip has neither produced expreſs words of ſcripture for it, nor ſo proved that to be the meaning of any of thoſe words of ſcripture which you have produced for it, that a man who reads and ſincerely endeavours to underſtand the ſcripture, cannot but find himſelf obliged to believe, as expreſsly, "that the ſame bodies of the dead," in your lordſhip's ſenſe, ſhall be raiſed, as "that the dead ſhall be raiſed." And I crave leave to give your lordſhip this one reaſon for it. He who reads with attention this diſcourſe of St. Paul * where he diſcourſes of the reſurrection, will ſee, that he plainly diſtinguiſhes between the dead that ſhall be raiſed, and the bodies of the dead. For it is νεκροὶ, πάντες, οἱ are the nominative caſes to † ἐγερθήσονται, ζωοποιηθήσονται, ἐγερθήσονται, all along, and not σώματα, bodies; which one may with reaſon think would ſomewhere or other have been expreſſed, if all this had been ſaid to propoſe it as an article of faith, that the very ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed. The ſame manner of ſpeaking the ſpirit of God obſerves all through the New Teſtament, where it is ſaid, ‡ "raiſe the dead, quicken or make alive the dead, the reſurrection of the dead." Nay, theſe very words of our Saviour, § urged by your lordſhip for the reſurrection of the ſame body, run thus, Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται, οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πράξαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως. Would not a well-meaning ſearcher of the ſcriptures be apt to think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach, and propoſe it as an article of faith, neceſſary to be believed by every one, that the very ſame bodies of the dead ſhould be raiſed; would not, I ſay, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant ſo, the words ſhould rather have been, πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. "all the bodies that are in the graves," rather than "all who are in the graves;" which muſt denote perſons, and not preciſely bodies?

Another evidence, that St. Paul makes a diſtinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead, ſo that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. xv. to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, are theſe words of the apoſtle, ‖ "But ſome men will ſay, how are the dead raiſed? And with what bodies do they come?" Which words, "dead" and

* 1 Cor. xv. † V. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32. 35, 52.
‡ Matt. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xvi. 7. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Theſſ. iv. 14. 16.
§ John v. 28, 29. ‖ Ver. 35.

"they," if ſuppoſed to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, the queſtion will run thus: "How are the dead bodies raiſed? And with what bodies do the dead bodies come?" Which ſeems to have no very agreeable ſenſe.

This therefore being ſo, that the Spirit of God keeps ſo expreſsly to this phraſe, or form of ſpeaking in the New Teſtament, "of raiſing, quickening, riſing, reſurrection, &c. of the dead," where the reſurrection of the laſt day is ſpoken of; and that the body is not mentioned, but in anſwer to this queſtion, "With what bodies ſhall thoſe dead, who are raiſed, come?" ſo that by the dead cannot preciſely be meant the dead bodies: I do not ſee but a good chriſtian, who reads the ſcripture with an intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the reſurrection, may acquit himſelf of his duty therein, without entering into the inquiry, whether the dead ſhall have the very ſame bodies or no? Which ſort of inquiry the apoſtle, by the appellation he beſtows here on him that makes it, ſeems not much to encourage. Nor, if he ſhall think himſelf bound to determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead raiſed at the laſt day, will he, by the remainder of St. Paul's anſwer, find the determination of the Apoſtle to be much in favour of the very ſame body; unleſs the being told, that the body ſown, is not that body that ſhall be; that the body raiſed is as different from that which was laid down, as the fleſh of man is from the fleſh of beaſts, fiſhes, and birds; or as the ſun, moon, and ſtars are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, ſpiritual, immortal body; and laſtly, as different as a body that is fleſh and blood, is from a body that is not fleſh and blood: "for fleſh and blood cannot, ſays St. Paul, in this very place, * inherit the kingdom of God:" unleſs, I ſay, all this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be ſuppoſed to be the way to deliver this as an article of faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. "That the dead ſhould be raiſed with the very ſame bodies that they had before in this life;" which article propoſed in theſe or the like plain and expreſs words, could have left no room for doubt in the meaneſt capacities, nor for conteſt in the moſt perverſe minds.

Your lordſhip adds in the next words, † "And ſo it hath been always underſtood by the chriſtian church, viz. That the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of

* V. 50. † 2d Anſ.

the ſame body, is an article of faith." Anſwer, What the chriſtian church has always underſtood, is beyond my knowledge. But for thoſe who coming ſhort of your lordſhip's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith from the underſtanding of all the whole chriſtian church, ever ſince the preaching of the goſpel, (who make the far greater part of chriſtians, I think I may ſay nine hundred ninety and nine of a thouſand) but are forced to have recourſe to the ſcripture to find them there, I do not ſee, that they will eaſily find there this propoſed as an article of faith, that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the ſame body; but that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead, without explicitly determining, That they ſhall be raiſed with bodies made up wholly of the ſame particles which were once vitally united to their ſouls in their former life, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter; which is that which your lordſhip means by the ſame body.

But ſuppoſing your lordſhip to have demonſtrated this to be an article of faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not ſee, that all that your lordſhip has ſaid here, makes it ſo much as probable; What is all this to me? Yes, ſays your lordſhip in the following words, * "My idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection. But any material ſubſtance united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body."

This is an argument of your lordſhip's which I am obliged to anſwer to. But is it not fit I ſhould firſt underſtand it, before I anſwer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is, "to make a thing not to be neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection." But to help myſelf out the beſt I can, with a gueſs, I will conjecture (which, in diſputing with learned men, is not very ſafe) your lordſhip's meaning is, that "my idea of perſonal identity makes it not neceſſary," that for the raiſing the ſame perſon, the body ſhould be the ſame.

Your lordſhip's next word is "but;" to which I am ready to reply, But what? What does my idea of perſonal identity do? For ſomething of that kind the adverſative particle "but" ſhould, in the ordinary conſtruction of our language, introduce, to make the propoſition clear and intelligible: but here is no ſuch thing. "But," is one of your lordſhip's

* 2d Anſ.

privileged particles, which I muſt not meddle with, for fear your lordſhip complain of me again, "as ſo ſevere a critic, that for the leaſt ambiguity in any particle fill up pages in my anſwer, to make my book look conſiderable for the bulk of it." But ſince this propoſition here, "my idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection: but any material ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body," is brought to prove my idea of perſonal identity inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection; I muſt make it out in ſome direct ſenſe or other, that I may ſee whether it be both true and concluſive. I therefore venture to read it thus: "My idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary at the reſurrection; but allows, that any material ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body. Ergo, my idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection of the ſame body."

If this be your lordſhip's ſenſe in this paſſage, as I here have gueſſed it to be, or elſe I know not what it is, I anſwer,

1. That my idea of perſonal identity does not allow, that any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body, I ſay no ſuch thing in my book, nor any thing from whence it may be inferred; and your lordſhip would have done me a favour to have ſet down the words where I ſay ſo, or thoſe from which you infer ſo, and ſhowed how it follows from any thing I have ſaid.

2. Granting, that it were a conſequence from my idea of perſonal identity, that "any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body;" this would not prove that my idea of perſonal identity was inconſiſtent with this propoſition, "that the ſame body ſhall be raiſed," but, on the contrary, affirms it: ſince, if I affirm, as I do, that the ſame perſon ſhall be raiſed, and it be a conſequence of my idea of perſonal identity, that "any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body;" it follows, that if the ſame perſon be raiſed, the ſame body muſt be raiſed; and ſo I have herein ſaid nothing inconſiſtent with the reſurrection of the ſame body, but have ſaid more for it than your lordſhip. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the ſcripture it is revealed, that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to an-

swer for what they have done in their bodies. If therefore whatever matter be joined to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, it is demonstration, that if the same persons are raised, they have the same bodies.

How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection, is beyond my conception. "Yes," says your lordship, * "it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary."

3. I answer, therefore, Thirdly, That this is the first time I ever learnt, that "not necessary" was the same with "inconsistent." I say, that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter, is not necessary to the making of the same person; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the resurrection of the same person, the same numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your lordship infer from hence? To wit, this: Therefore he who thinks, that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person, cannot believe, that the same person shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles of matter, if God should reveal, that it shall be so, viz. That the same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they had before. Which is all one as to say, that he who thought the blowing of ram's horns was not necessary in itself to the falling down of the walls of Jericho, could not believe, that they should fall upon the blowing of ram's horns, when God had declared it should be so.

Your lordship says, "my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection:" the reason you ground it on, is this, because it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same person. Let us grant your lordship's consequence to be good, what will follow from it? No less than this, that your lordship's notion (for I dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous things as ideas) of personal identity, is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. The demonstration of it is thus; your lordship says, † "It is not necessary that the body, to be raised at the last day, should consist of the same particles of matter which were united at the point of death; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption: you do not say the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body, consider-

* 2d Anf. † Ibid.

ing the continual ſpending of particles by perſpiration." And again, here your lordſhip ſays, * "You allow the notion of perſonal identity to belong to the ſame man under ſeveral changes of matter." From which words it is evident, that your lordſhip ſuppoſes a perſon in this world may be continued and preſerved the ſame in a body not conſiſting of the ſame individual particles of matter; and hence it demonſtratively follows, That let your lordſhip's notion of perſonal identity be what it will, it makes "the ſame body not to be neceſſary to the ſame perſon;" and therefore it is by your lordſhip's rule inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection. When your lordſhip ſhall think fit to clear your own notion of perſonal identity from this inconſiſtency with the article of the reſurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of perſonal identity will be thereby cleared too. Till then, all inconſiſtency with that article, which your lordſhip has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your lordſhip's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to ſay, my lord, that whatſoever is not neceſſary, does not thereby become inconſiſtent. It is not neceſſary to the ſame perſon, that his body ſhould always conſiſt of the ſame numerical particles; this is demonſtration, becauſe the particles of the bodies of the ſame perſons in this life change every moment, and your lordſhip cannot deny it: and yet this makes it not inconſiſtent with God's preſerving, if he thinks fit, to the ſame perſons, bodies conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles always from the reſurrection to eternity. And ſo likewiſe though I ſay any thing that ſuppoſes it not neceſſary, that the ſame numerical particles, which were vitally united to the ſoul in this life, ſhould be reunited to it at the reſurrection, and conſtitute the body it ſhall then have; yet it is not inconſiſtent with this, that God may, if he pleaſes, give to every one a body conſiſting only of ſuch particles as were before vitally united to his ſoul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that inconſiſtency which your lordſhip charges on it, and would perſuade the world it has with the article of the reſurrection of the dead.

Only before I leave it, I will ſet down the remainder of what your lordſhip ſays upon this head, that though I ſee not the coherence nor tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it againſt me; yet that nothing may be omitted that your lordſhip has thought fit to entertain your reader with on this new point, nor any one have reaſon to ſuſ-

* 2d Anſ.

pect, that I have paſſed by any word of your lordſhip's, (on this now firſt introduced ſubject) wherein he might find your lordſhip had proved what you had promiſed in your title-page. Your remaining words are theſe: * "The diſpute is not how far perſonal identity in itſelf may conſiſt in the very ſame material ſubſtance; for we allow the notion of perſonal identity to belong to the ſame man under ſeveral changes of matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the ſoul and body, and the life, which is conſequent upon it; and therefore in the reſurrection, the ſame material ſubſtance muſt be reunited, or elſe it cannot be called a reſurrection, but a renovation, i. e. it may be a new life, but not a raiſing the body from the dead." I confeſs, I do not ſee how what is here uſhered in by the words "and therefore," is a conſequence from the preceding words: but as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much queſtioned, that if the ſame man riſe who was dead, it may very properly be called the reſurrection of the dead: which is the language of the ſcripture.

I muſt not part with this article of the reſurrection, without returning my thanks to your lordſhip for making me † take notice of a fault in my Eſſay. When I wrote that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the ſcripure had mentioned, in expreſs terms, "the reſurrection of the body." But upon the occaſion your lordſhip has given me in your laſt letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared concerning the reſurrection, and finding no ſuch expreſs words in the ſcripture, as that "the body ſhall riſe or be raiſed, or the reſurrection of the body;" I ſhall in the next edition of it, change theſe words of my book, ‡ "The dead bodies of men ſhall riſe," into theſe of the ſcripture, "the dead ſhall riſe." Not that I queſtion, that the dead ſhall be raiſed with bodies; but in matters of revelation, I think it not only ſafeſt, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep cloſe to the words of the ſcripture, unleſs he will aſſume to himſelf the authority of one inſpired, or make himſelf wiſer than the Holy Spirit himſelf. If I had ſpoke of the reſurrection in preciſely ſcripture terms, I had avoided giving your lordſhip the occaſion of making || here ſuch a verbal reflection on my words; "What! not if there be an idea of identity as to the body?"

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Eſſay, B. 4. C. 18. §. 7. || 2d Anſ.

CHAP. XXVIII.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. *Proportional.*

BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and causality of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name, is some one simple *idea*; which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple *idea*, v. g. *whiter*, *sweeter*, *bigger*, *equal*, *more*, &c. These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple *idea*, in several subjects, may be called, if one will, *proportional*; and that these are only conversant about those simple *ideas* received from sensation or reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§ 2. *Natural.*

Secondly, Another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; *v. g. father* and *son*, *brothers*, *cousin-germans*, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several degrees; *countrymen*, *i. e.* those who were born in the same country, or tract of ground; and these I call *natural relations*; wherein we may observe, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals as well as men: but yet he is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names these relations should be

obſerved, and marked out in mankind; there being occaſion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under theſe relations: from whence alſo ariſe the obligations of ſeveral duties amongſt men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little or no cauſe to mind theſe relations, they have not thought fit to give them diſtinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us ſome light into the different ſtate and growth of languages; which, being ſuited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongſt them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various reſpects might be found among them, nor the different abſtract conſiderations might be framed about them. Where they had no philoſophical notions, there they had no terms to expreſs them: and it is no wonder men ſhould have framed no names for thoſe things they found no occaſion to diſcourſe of. From whence it is eaſy to imagine, why, as in ſome countries, they may have not ſo much as the name for a horſe; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horſes than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horſes, but alſo of their ſeveral relations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. *Inſtituted.*

THIRDLY, Sometimes the foundation of conſidering things, with reference to one another, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do ſomething. Thus a *general* is one that hath power to command an army: and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A *citizen*, or a *burgher*, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this ſort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in ſociety, I call *inſtituted* or *voluntary*; and may be diſtinguiſhed from the natural, in that they are moſt, if not all of them, ſome way or other alterable, and ſeparable from the perſons to whom they have ſometimes belonged, though neither of the ſubſtances, ſo related, be deſtroyed. Now, though

there are all reciprocal, as well as the rest, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: *v. g.* a *patron* and *client* are easily allowed to be relations, but a *constable* or *dictator* are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such; because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or constable, expressing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§ 4. *Moral.*

Fourthly, There is another sort of relation, which is the conformity, or disagreement, men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called *Moral* relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined *ideas*, and avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex *ideas*, are, as has been shown, so many *mixed modes*, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined *ideas* of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined *ideas* of them, and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of *ideas*. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions so made up are morally good or bad.

§ 5. *Moral Good and Evil.*

Good and evil, as hath been shown, B. II. Ch. 20. § 2.

and Ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the lawmaker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the lawmaker, is that we call reward and punishment.

§ 6. *Moral Rules.*

Of these moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be *three sorts*, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of itself without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all *law*, properly so called.

§ 7. *Laws.*

The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude, or obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The Divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of *opinion* or *reputation*, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

§ 8. *Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty.*

First, The *Divine* law, whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether pro-

mulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men ſhould govern themſelves, I think there is nobody ſo brutiſh as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: he has goodneſs and wiſdom to direct our actions to that which is beſt; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and puniſhments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touch-ſtone of *moral rectitude*, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the moſt conſiderable *moral good* or *evil* of their actions; that is, whether as *duties* or *ſins*, they are like to procure them happineſs or miſery from the hands of the Almighty.

§ 9. *Civil Law, the Meaſure of Crimes and Innocence.* SECONDLY, The *civil* law, the rule ſet by the commonwealth to the actions of thoſe who belong to it, is another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This law nobody overlooks; the rewards and puniſhments that enforce it being ready at hand, and ſuitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and poſſeſſions of thoſe who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who diſobeys: which is the puniſhment of offences committed againſt this law.

§ 10. *Philoſophical Law, the Meaſure of Virtue and Vice.*

THIRDLY, The *law of opinion or reputation.* Virtue and vice are names pretended and ſuppoſed every where to ſtand for actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are ſo applied, they ſo far are coincident with the *Divine law* above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is viſible, that theſe names *Virtue* and *Vice*, in the particular inſtances of their application, through the ſeveral nations and ſocieties of men in the world, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch actions, as in each country and ſociety are in reputation or diſcredit. Nor is it to be thought ſtrange, that men every where ſhould give the name of *Virtue* to

those actions, which amongst them are judged praise-worthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blameable: since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing *right*, to which they allowed not commendation: any thing *wrong*, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed *Virtue* and *Vice*, is the approbation of dislike, praise, or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place. For though men, uniting into politic societies, have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: and by this approbation and dislike, they establish among themselves what they will call *Virtue* and *Vice*.

§ 11.

THAT this is the common *measure of virtue and vice*, will appear to any one who considers, that though that passes for *vice* in one country, which is counted a *virtue*, or at least not *vice* in another, yet, every where, *virtue* and praise, *vice* and blame go together. *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called *Virtue**. *Virtue* and praise are so united, that they

* Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to mistake him, added what here follows: Of this the ingenious author of the discourse concerning the nature of man has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have closed his preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said, book ii. chap. 28, concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to

are called often by the ſame name. *Sunt ſua præmia laudi*, ſays *Virgil*; and ſo Cicero, *Nihil habet natura præſtantius, quam honeſtatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem,*

make virtue vice, and vice virtue, unleſs he had miſtaken my meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himſelf the trouble to conſider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief deſign of that chapter, plainly enough ſet down in the fourth ſection, and thoſe following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but ſhowing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make uſe of in moral relations, whether thoſe rules were true or falſe: and, purſuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place anſwers to virtue, and vice in ours; which alters not the nature of things, though men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the eſteem and faſhion of the place, or ſect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had ſaid, b. i. c. 3. §. 18. and in this preſent chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice: and if he had obſerved, that, in the place he quotes, I only report as matter of fact what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in ſaying, that one of the rules made uſe of in the world for a ground or meaſure of a moral relation, is that eſteem and reputation which ſeveral ſorts of actions find variouſly in the ſeveral ſocieties of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices: and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his old Engliſh dictionary, I dare ſay it no where tells him (if I ſhould appeal to it) that the ſame action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in diſrepute, paſſes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men beſtow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue, and virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in ſuch points, and to take the alarm, even at expreſſions, which ſtanding alone by themſelves might ſound ill, and be ſuſpected.

quam decus ; which, he tells you, are all names for the ſame thing, *Tuſc. l.* 2. This is the language of the Heathen philoſophers, who well underſtood wherein

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, theſe words of mine, in §. 11. of this chapter : " The exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute : ' Whatſoever things ' are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, if there ' be any virtue, if there be any praiſe,' &c. Phil. iv. 8." without taking notice of thoſe immediately preceding, which introduce them, and run thus : " whereby in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preſerved ; ſo that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers, &c." by which words, and the reſt of that ſection, it is plain that I brought that paſſage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general meaſure of what men call virtue and vice, throughout the world, was the reputation and faſhion of each particular ſociety within itſelf ; but to ſhow, that though it were ſo, yet, for reaſons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the moſt part much vary from the law of nature : which is that ſtanding and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde conſidered this, he would have found it little to his purpoſe to have quoted that paſſage in a ſenſe I uſed it not ; and would, I imagine, have ſpared the explication he ſubjoins to it, as not very neceſſary. But I hope this ſecond edition will give him ſatisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now ſo expreſſed, as to ſhow him there was no cauſe of ſcruple.

Though I am forced to differ from him in thoſe apprehenſions he has expreſſed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had ſaid about virtue and vice ; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he ſays in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning natural inſcription and innate notions. I ſhall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to ſtate the queſtion as he pleaſes, eſpecially when he ſtates it ſo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have ſaid : for, according to him, innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of ſeveral other circumſtances, in order to the ſoul's exerting them ; all that

their notions of *virtue* and *vice* consisted. And though perhaps, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out that what was thought praise-worthy in one place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different societies, *virtues* and *vices* were changed; yet, as to the

he says for innate, imprinted, impressed notions (for of innate ideas he says nothing at all) amounts at last only to this: that there are certain propositions, which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of.; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my first book. For I suppose by the soul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or else the soul's exerting of notions will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this case, it misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the soul exerts them, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the concurrence of those circumstances, which this ingenious author thinks necessary in order to the soul's exerting them, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I find him express it thus; "these natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation." Here he says they exert themselves, as p. 78. that the soul exerts them. When he has explained to himself or others what he means by the soul's exerting innate notions, or their exerting themselves, and what that previous cultivation and circumstances, in order to their being exerted, are; he will, I suppose, find there is so little of controversy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that exerting of notions, which I in a more vulgar style call knowing, that I have reason to think he brought in my name upon this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done wherever he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.

main, they for the moſt part kept the ſame every where. For ſince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with eſteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and diſcountenance the contrary; it is no wonder, that eſteem and diſcredit, virtue and vice, ſhould in a great meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath eſtabliſhed: there being nothing that ſo directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has ſet them; and nothing that breeds ſuch miſchiefs and confuſion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all ſenſe and reaſon, and their own intereſt, which they are ſo conſtantly true to, could not generally miſtake in placing their commendation and blame on that ſide that really deſerved it not. Nay, even thoſe men, whoſe practice was otherwiſe, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at leaſt in others, the faults they themſelves were guilty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preſerved. So that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: *Whatſoever is lovely, whatſoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe*, &c. Phil. iv. 8.

§ 12. *Its Enforcements, Commendation, and Diſcredit.* If any one ſhall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the *law* whereby men judge of *virtue* and *vice*, to be nothing elſe but the conſent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law; eſpecially wanting that, which is ſo neceſſary and eſſential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may ſay, that he who imagines commendation and diſgrace not to be ſtrong motives to men, to accommodate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeems little ſkilled in the nature or hiſtory of mankind: the greateſt part whereof he ſhall find to govern themſelves chiefly, if not ſolely, by this law of

fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws, some, nay perhaps most men, seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break that law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been reconciled to: but nobody, that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

§ 13. *These three Laws the Rules of Moral Good and Evil.* These three then, *First*, The law of God; *Secondly*, The law of politic societies; *Thirdly*, The law of fashion, or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of these laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

§ 14. *Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules.* Whether the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion

of the country, or the will of a lawmaker, the mind is eaſily able to obſerve the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or diſagrees with the rule; and ſo hath a notion of *moral goodneſs* or *evil*, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple *ideas*, the conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the action, that the ſimple *ideas* belonging to it may correſpond to thoſe which the law requires. And thus we ſee how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in, theſe ſimple *ideas* we have received from ſenſation or reflection. For example, let us conſider the complex *idea* we ſignify by the word murder; and when we have taken it aſunder, and examined all the particulars, we ſhall find them to amount to a collection of ſimple *ideas* derived from reflection or ſenſation, *viz. Firſt*, From reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the *ideas* of willing, conſidering, purpoſing before hand, malice, or wiſhing ill to another; and alſo of life, or perception, and ſelf-motion. *Secondly*, From ſenſation we have the collection of thoſe ſimple ſenſible *ideas* which are to be found in a man, and of ſome action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which ſimple *ideas* are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of ſimple *ideas* being found by me to agree or diſagree with the eſteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by moſt men there worthy praiſe or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a ſupreme inviſible lawmaker for my rule; then, as I ſuppoſed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, ſin or duty: and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legiſlative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. So that whenceſoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what ſtandard ſoever we frame in our minds the *ideas* of virtues or vices, they conſiſt only, and are made up of collections of ſimple *ideas*, which we originally received from ſenſe or reflection, and

their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.

§ 15.

To conceive rightly of *moral actions* we must take notice of them under this twofold consideration. *First*, As they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple *ideas*. Thus *drunkenness*, or *lying*, signify such or such a collection of simple *ideas*, which I call mixed modes: and in this sense they are as much *positive absolute ideas*, as the drinking of a horse, or speaking of a parrot. *Secondly*, Our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are *relative*, it being their conformity to, or disagreement with, some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode, or particular sort of action, by particular *ideas*, distinguished from all others, is called *duelling*: which, when considered, in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name sin; to the law of fashion, in some countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime. In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may as easily be observed, as it is in substances, where one name, *v. g. man*, is used to signify the thing; another, *v. g. father*, to signify the relation.

§ 16. *The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.* But because very frequently the positive *idea* of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity; therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of, and there is often no *distinction* made *between the positive* idea of the action, *and the reference it has to a rule*. By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term, those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often misled in their judgment of actions.

Thus, the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called *ſtealing*; but that name being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called ſtealing, as an ill action, diſagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his ſword from a madman, to prevent his doing miſchief, though it be properly denominated *ſtealing*, as the name of ſuch a *mixed mode*; yet when compared to the law of God, and conſidered in its relation to that ſupreme rule, it is no ſin or tranſgreſſion, though the name *ſtealing* ordinarily carries ſuch an intimation with it.

§ 17. *Relations innumerable.*

And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which therefore I call *moral relations*.

It would make a volume to go over all ſorts of *relations*; it is not therefore to be expected, that I ſhould here mention them all. It ſuffices to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhow by theſe, what the *ideas* are we have of this comprehenſive conſideration, called *relation*: which is ſo *various*, and the occaſions of it ſo *many* (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eaſy to reduce it to rules, or under juſt heads. Thoſe I have mentioned, I think, are ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee from whence we get our *ideas* of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been ſaid, give me leave to obſerve;

§ 18. *All Relations terminate in ſimple* Ideas.

First, That it is evident, that *all relation terminates in*, and is ultimately founded on, thoſe *ſimple ideas* we have *got from ſenſation or reflection*: ſo that all we have in our thoughts ourſelves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would ſignify to others, when we uſe words ſtanding for relations, is nothing but ſome ſimple *ideas*, or collections of ſimple *ideas*, compared one with another. This is ſo manifeſt in that ſort called *proportional*, that nothing can be more: for when a man ſays, honey is ſweeter than wax, it is plain that his thoughts

in this relation terminate in this ſimple *idea*, ſweetneſs, which is equally true of all the reſt; though where they are compounded or decompounded, the ſimple *ideas* they are made up of are, perhaps, ſeldom taken notice of. *V. g.* when the word father is mentioned: *firſt*, There is meant that particular ſpecies, or collective *idea*, ſignified by the word man. *Secondly*, Thoſe ſenſible ſimple *ideas* ſignified by the word generation: and, *thirdly*, The effects of it, and all the ſimple *ideas* ſignified by the word child. So the word friend being taken for a man, who loves and is ready to do good to another, has all theſe following *ideas* to the making of it up; *firſt*, All the ſimple *ideas* comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. *Secondly*, The *idea* of love. *Thirdly*, The *idea* of readineſs or diſpoſition. *Fourthly*, The *idea* of action, which is any kind of thought or motion. *Fifthly*, The *idea* of good, which ſignifies any thing that may advance his happineſs, and terminates at laſt, if examined, in particular ſimple *ideas*; of which the word *good* in general ſignifies any one, but, if removed from all ſimple *ideas* quite, it ſignifies nothing at all. And thus alſo all moral words terminate at laſt, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of ſimple *ideas*: the immediate ſignification of relative words, being very often other ſuppoſed known relations; which, if traced one to another, ſtill end in ſimple *ideas*.

§ 19. *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.*

Secondly, That in relations, we have for the moſt part, if not always, *as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of thoſe ſimple* ideas *wherein it is founded.* Agreement or diſagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear *ideas*, as of any other whatſoever; it being but the diſtinguiſhing ſimple *ideas*, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no diſtinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear *idea* of ſweetneſs, light or extenſion, I have too, of equal, or more or leſs of each of theſe: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, *viz. Sempronia*, I know what it is for another man to be born of the ſame woman, *Sempronia*; and ſo have as

clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that *Sempronia* dug *Titus* out of the parſley-bed (as they uſed to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the ſame manner, ſhe dug *Caius* out of the parſley-bed, I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the ſkill of a midwife: the notion that the ſame woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births (though I were ignorant or miſtaken in the manner of it) being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumſtance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their deſcent from the ſame perſon, without knowing the particular circumſtances of that deſcent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the *ideas* of particular *relations* are capable of being as clear and diſtinct in the minds of thoſe, who will duly conſider them, as thoſe of mixed modes, and more determinate than thoſe of ſubſtances; yet the names belonging to *relation*, are often of as doubtful and uncertain ſignification, as thoſe of ſubſtances or mixed modes, and much more than thoſe of ſimple *ideas*; becauſe relative words being the marks of this compariſon, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an *idea* only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different compariſons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correſpond with thoſe of others uſing the ſame names.

§ 20. *The Notion of the Relation is the ſame, whether the Rule any Action is compared to, be true or falſe.* THIRDLY, That in theſe I call *moral relations*, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or falſe. For if I meaſure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I meaſure be longer or ſhorter than that ſuppoſed yard, though perhaps the yard I meaſure by be not exactly the ſtandard; which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I miſtaken in it; yet the agreement or diſagreement obſervable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Though meaſuring by a wrong rule, I ſhall thereby be

brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED *IDEAS.*

§ 1. Ideas *some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.*

HAVING shown the original of our *ideas*, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances, and relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of *ideas*. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are *clear*, and others *obscure*; some *distinct* and others *confused*.

§ 2. *Clear and obscure, explained by Sight.*

THE perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is meant by *clear* and *obscure* in our *ideas*, by reflecting on what we call *clear* and *obscure* in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of *obscure* to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours, which are observable in it, and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner our *simple ideas* are *clear*, when they are such as the objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are *clear ideas*. So far as

they either want any thing of the original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time; so far are they *obscure*. *Complex ideas*, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are *clear*, when the *ideas* that go to their composition are clear; and the number and order of those simple *ideas*, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§ 3. *Causes of Obscurity.*

THE *causes* of *obscurity* in simple *ideas*, seem to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter: if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression: in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be *obscure*. This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer.

§ 4. *Distinct and confused, what.*

As a *clear idea* is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, so a *distinct idea* is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a *confused idea* is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

§ 5. *Objection.*

IF no *idea* be *confused*, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hard, may any one say, to find any where a *confused idea*. For let any *idea* be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other *ideas*, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceived to be so. No *idea* therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which

it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for from all other it is evidently different.

§ 6. *Confusion of* Ideas, *is in reference to their names.* To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the *confusion ideas* are at any time chargeable with, we must consider, that things ranked under distinct names, are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked, and discoursed of apart upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now, every *idea* a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other *ideas* but itself; that which makes it *confused*, is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expressed by: the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different names, is quite lost.

§ 7. *Defaults which make Confusion.* THE *defaults which* usually *occasion* this *confusion*, I think, are chiefly these following:

First, complex Ideas *made up of too few simple ones.* *FIRST*, When any complex *idea* (for it is complex *ideas* that are most liable to confusion) is made up of *too small a number of simple ideas*, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an *idea* made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused *idea* of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. So that such an *idea*, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms contributes to make the *ideas* we would express by them confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused *ideas* are

such as render the use of words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct names. When the *ideas*, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

§ 8. *Secondly, or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.*

Secondly, Another fault which makes our *ideas* confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any *idea* are in number enough; yet they are so *jumbled together*, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprising pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not, for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused. I answer, That which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: *v. g.* When it is said to be the picture of a man, or *Cæsar*, then any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to belong more to the name man, or *Cæsar*, than to the name baboon, or *Pompey*; which are supposed to stand for different *ideas* from those signified by man, or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or *Cæsar*, i. e. that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or *Pompey*, i. e.

from the *ideas* signified by those names. Just thus it is with our *ideas*, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under some ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.

§ 9. *Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.*

THIRDLY, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our *ideas*, is, when any one of them is *uncertain* and *undetermined*. Thus we may observe men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precise signification, change the *idea* they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his *idea* of *church* or *idolatry*, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of *ideas*, that makes it up, is said to have a confused *idea* of idolatry or the church: though this be still for the same reason as the former, *viz*, because a mutable *idea* (if we will allow it to be one *idea*) cannot belong to one name rather than another; and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for.

§ 10. *Confusion, without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.*

BY what has been said, we may observe how much names, as supposed steady signs of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the *occasion of denominating* ideas *distinct or confused*, by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of its *ideas* to such names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I say of words, in the third book, has been read and considered. But without taking notice of such a reference of *ideas*, to distinct names, as the signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a *confused idea* is. And therefore when a man designs, by any name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing, distinct from all others; the complex

idea he annexes to that name, is the more distinct, the more particular the *ideas* are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all *ideas* belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.

§ 11. *Confusion concerns always two* Ideas.

CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, *concerns always two ideas*: and those most, which most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any *idea* to be *confused*, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from: and that will always be found an *idea* belonging to another name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other *idea* which the different names import.

§ 12. *Causes of Confusion.*

THIS, I think, is the *confusion* proper to *ideas*, which still carries with it a secret reference to names. At least, if there be any other confusion of *ideas*, this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses: *ideas*, as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are supposed two different *ideas* marked by two different names, which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be *confusion*: and where any *ideas* are distinct, as the *ideas* of those two sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no *confusion*. *The way to prevent it*, is, to collect and unite into one complex *idea*, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them so united in a determinate number and order, ap-

ply steadily the same name. But this neither accommodating men's ease or vanity, or serving any design but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no *ideas*, serves both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no small part of the *confusion* to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some *ideas* are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple *ideas* under one name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex *idea* such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these, follows *confusion* in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent *confusion* in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses, in the following book, I shall here say no more of it.

§ 13. *Complex* Ideas *may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.*

Our *complex ideas* being made up of collections, and so variety of simple ones, *may* accordingly *be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another.* In a man who speaks of a *chiliædron*, or a body of a thousand sides, the *idea* of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct; so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex *idea*, which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct *idea* of a *chiliædron*; though it be plain he has no precise *idea* of its figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 sides; the

not observing whereof, causes no small error in men's thoughts and confusion in their discourses.

§ 14. *This, if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.* He that thinks he has a distinct *idea* of the figure of a *chiliædron*, let him for trial-sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter, *viz.* gold or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 sides: he will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two *ideas* one from another, by the number of sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these *ideas*, which is contained in their numbers; as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, *&c.* But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two *ideas*, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could, if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five sides. In which in complete *ideas*, we are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar names. For being satisfied in that part of the *idea*, which we have clear, and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure; we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure part of its signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

§ 15. *Instance in Eternity.*

Having frequently in our mouths the name *eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive *idea* of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our *idea*. It is true, that he that thinks so may have a clear *idea* of duration; he may also have a very clear *idea* of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear *idea* of the comparison of that great one with still a greater: but it not being possible for him to include in his *idea* of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole

extent together of a duration where he supposes no end, that part of his *idea*, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other *infinite*, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.

§ 16. *Divisibility of Matter.*

In matter we have no clear *ideas* of the smallness of parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses: and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, though we have clear *ideas* of division and divisibility, and have also clear *ideas* of parts made out of a whole by division; yet we have but very obscure and confused *ideas* of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct *ideas* of, is of what division in general or abstractly is, and the relation of *totum* and *pars*: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think we have no clear nor distinct *idea* at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *idea* (bating still the number which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1,000,000 part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his *ideas*, to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed, since a division carried on so far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division into two halfs does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct *ideas* of the different bulk or extension of these bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies *in infinitum*, our *idea* of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity. For that *idea*, which is to represent only bigness, must be very obscure

and confuſed, which we cannot diſtinguiſh from one ten times as big, but only by number; ſo that we have clear diſtinct *ideas*, we may ſay, of ten and one, but no diſtinct *ideas* of two ſuch extenſions. It is plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite diviſibility of body, or extenſion, our diſtinct and clear *ideas* are only of numbers; but the clear diſtinct *ideas* of extenſion, after ſome progreſs of diviſion, are quite loſt: and of ſuch minute parts we have no diſtinct *ideas* at all; but it returns as all our *ideas* of infinite do, at laſt to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diſtinct *idea* of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear *idea* of diviſion, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear *idea* of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear *idea* of an infinite number, by being able ſtill to add new numbers to any aſſigned number we have: endleſs diviſibility giving us no more a clear and diſtinct *idea* of actually infinite parts, than endleſs addibility (if I may ſo ſpeak) gives us a clear and diſtinct *idea* of an actually infinite number: they both being only in a power ſtill increaſing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein conſiſts the infinity) we have but an obſcure, imperfect, and confuſed *idea*; from or about which we can argue or reaſon with no certainty or clearneſs, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have no ſuch diſtinct *idea* as we have of 4 or 100: but only this relative obſcure one, that compared to any other, it is ſtill bigger: and we have no more a clear poſitive *idea* of it when we ſay or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we ſhould ſay it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and ſo proceeds, ſhall as ſoon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And ſo likewiſe in eternity, he that has an *idea* of but four years, has as much a poſitive complete *idea* of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity beyond either of

these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; *i. e.* neither of them has any clear positive *idea* of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on; or if he please, doubles the increase as often as he will: the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our *ideas* which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our *idea* of *extension*, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of those *ideas* of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct *idea* of that space: it becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused *ideas* in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused, always leading us into confusion.

CHAP. XXX.

OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.

§ 1. *Real* Ideas *are conformable to their Archetypes.* BESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning *ideas*, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent, and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are,

First, Either real or fantastical.

Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, True or false.

First, By *real ideas*, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. *Fantastical* or *Chimerical*, I call such as have no founda-

tion in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of *ideas* before-mentioned, we shall find that,

§ 2. *Simple* Ideas *all real.*

First, Our *simple* ideas *are all real*, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than the pain is; yet those *ideas* of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real *ideas* in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the marks whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our *ideas* do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not: it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple *ideas* are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple *ideas* (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple *idea*, more than what it has received.

§ 3. *Complex* Ideas *are voluntary Combinations.*

Though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple *ideas*; yet, I think, we may say, it is not so in respect of its complex *ideas*; for those being combinations of simple *ideas* put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those complex *ideas*

how elſe comes it to paſs that one man's *idea* of gold, or juſtice, is different from another's? but becauſe he has put in or left out of his ſome ſimple *idea*, which the other has not. The queſtion then is, which of theſe are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I ſay, That,

§ 4. *Mixed Modes made of conſiſtent* Ideas, *are real.* SECONDLY, *Mixed modes and relations*, having no other *reality* but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to thoſe kinds of *ideas* to make them *real*, but that they be ſo framed, that there be a poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *ideas* themſelves being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and ſo *cannot be chimerical*, unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *ideas*. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language aſſigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would ſignify them to others, ſo bare poſſibility of exiſting is not enough; they muſt have a conformity to the ordinary ſignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical: as if a man would give the name of juſtice to that *idea*, which common uſe calls liberality. But this fantaſticalneſs relates more to propriety of ſpeech, than reality of *ideas*: for a man to be undiſturbed in danger, ſedately to conſider what is fitteſt to be done, and to execute it ſteadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex *idea* of an action which may exiſt. But to be undiſturbed in danger, without uſing one's reaſon or induſtry, is what is alſo poſſible to be; and ſo is as real an *idea* as the other. Though the firſt of theſe having the name *courage* given to it, may, in reſpect of that name, be a right or wrong *idea*; but the other, whilſt it has not a common received name of any known language aſſigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itſelf.

§ 5. Ideas *of Subſtances are real, when they agree with the Exiſtence of things.*

THIRDLY, Our *complex* ideas *of ſubſtances* being made all

of them in reference to things exiſting without us, and intended to be repreſentations of ſubſtances, as they really are, are no farther *real*, than as they are ſuch combinations of ſimple *ideas*, as are really united, and coexiſt in things without us. On the contrary thoſe are *fantaſtical* which are made up of ſuch collections of ſimple *ideas* as were never really united, never were found together in any ſubſtance; *v. g.* a rational creature, conſiſting of a horſe's head, joined to a body of human ſhape, or ſuch as the *Centaurs* are deſcribed: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fuſible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, conſiſting, as to ſenſe, all of ſimilar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether ſuch ſubſtances as theſe can poſſibly exiſt or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, theſe *ideas* of ſubſtances being made conformable to a pattern exiſting that we know, and conſiſting of ſuch collections of *ideas*, as no ſubſtance ever ſhowed us united together, they ought to paſs with us for barely imaginary: but much more are thoſe complex *ideas* ſo, which contain in them any inconſiſtency or contradiction of their parts.

CHAP. XXXI.

OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Adequate* Ideas *are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their Archetypes.*

OF our real *ideas*, ſome are adequate, and ſome are inadequate. Thoſe I call *adequate*, which perfectly repreſent thoſe archetypes which the mind ſuppoſes them taken from; which it intends them to ſtand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate ideas* are ſuch, which are but a partial or incomplete repreſentation of thoſe archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

§ 2. *Simple* Ideas, *all adequate.*

FIRST, That *all our ſimple* ideas *are adequate.* Becauſe being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things,

fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the *ideas* which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those *ideas* in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the *idea* so produced is a real *idea* (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple *idea*); and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple *ideas* are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple *ideas* are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those *ideas* were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the *idea* of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire more than a power to excite these *ideas* in us; and therefore are called *qualities* in, or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such *ideas* in us, I must, in that sense, be understood when I speak of secondary *qualities*, as being in things; or of their *ideas*, as being in the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensation or *ideas* in us: since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the *ideas* of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or the sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the *ideas*, would be really in the world as they

are, whether there were any ſenſible being to perceive them or no: and therefore we have reaſon to look on thoſe as the real modifications of matter, and ſuch as are the exciting cauſes of all our various ſenſations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I ſhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to ſhow what complex *ideas* are *adequate*, and what not.

§ 3. *Modes are all adequate.*

SECONDLY, Our *complex* ideas *of modes*, being voluntary collections of ſimple *ideas* which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or ſtanding patterns exiſting any where, *are* and cannot but be *adequate ideas*. Becauſe they not being intended for copies of things really exiſting, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of *ideas*, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they ſhould: ſo that the mind acquieſces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *idea* of a figure, with three ſides meeting in three angles, I have a complete *idea*, wherein I require nothing elſe to make it perfect. That the mind is ſatisfied with the perfection of this its *idea*, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any underſtanding hath, or can have a more complete or perfect *idea* of that thing it ſignifies by the word *triangle*, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, than itſelf has in that complex *idea* of three ſides, and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be eſſential to it, or neceſſary to complete it, wherever or however it exiſts. But in our *ideas* of *ſubſtances* it is otherwiſe. For there deſiring to copy things as they really do exiſt, and to repreſent to ourſelves that conſtitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our *ideas* attain not that perfection we intend; we find they ſtill want ſomething we ſhould be glad were in them; and ſo are all *inadequate*. But *mixed modes* and *relations*, being archetypes without patterns, and ſo having nothing to repreſent but themſelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being ſo to itſelf. He that at firſt put together the *idea* of danger perceived, abſence of diſorder from

fear, ſedate conſideration from what was juſtly to be done, and executing of that without diſturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex *idea* made up of that combination; and intending to be nothing elſe, but what it is, nor to have in it any other ſimple *ideas*, but what it hath, it could not alſo but be an *adequate idea*: and laying this up in his memory, with the name *courage* annexed to it, to ſignify it to others, and denominate from thence any action he ſhould obſerve to agree with it, had thereby a ſtandard to meaſure and denominate actions by as they agreed to it. This *idea* thus made, and laid up for a pattern, muſt neceſſarily be *adequate*, being referred to nothing elſe but itſelf, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that firſt made this combination.

§ 4. *Modes in reference to ſettled Names, may be inadequate.*

INDEED another coming after, and in converſation learning from him the word *courage*, may make any *idea*, to which he gives that name *courage*, different from what the firſt author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he uſes it. And in this caſe, if he deſigns that his *idea* in thinking ſhould be conformable to the other's *idea*, as the name he uſes in ſpeaking is conformable in ſound to his, from whom he learned it, his *idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*: becauſe in this caſe, making the other man's *idea* the pattern of his *idea* in thinking, as the other man's word or ſound is the pattern of his in ſpeaking, his *idea* is ſo far defective and *inadequate*, as it is diſtant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to expreſs and ſignify by the name he uſes for it; which name he would have to be a ſign of the other man's *idea* (to which, in its proper uſe, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correſpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5.

THEREFORE theſe *complex* ideas *of modes*, when they are referred by the mind, and intend to correſpond to the

ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they *may be* very deficient, wrong and *inadequate*; because they agree not to that, which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which respect only, any *idea* of *modes* can be wrong, imperfect or *inadequate*. And on this account our *ideas* of *mixed modes* are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking, than knowing right.

§ 6. Ideas *of Substances, as referred to real Essences, not adequate.*

Thirdly, What *ideas we have of substances*, I have above shown. Now those *ideas* have in the mind a double reference; 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind, of things that do exist by *ideas* of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and archetypes, are imperfect and *inadequate*.

First, It is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the *ideas* that are in men's minds, they must consequently refer their *ideas* to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of substances, which each individual, in its several kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he called himself a man, with any other meaning, than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows,

that the *ideas* they have in their minds, being referred to real eſſences, as to archetypes which are unknown, muſt be ſo far from being *adequate*, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any repreſentation of them at all. The complex *ideas* we have of ſubſtances, are, as it has been ſhown, certain collections of ſimple *ideas* that have been obſerved or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex *idea* cannot be the real eſſence of any ſubſtance; for then the properties we diſcover in that body, would depend on that complex *idea*, and be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connection with it be known: as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are diſcoverable, are deducible from, the complex *idea* of three lines, including a ſpace. But *it is* plain, that in our complex *ideas* of ſubſtances, are not contained ſuch *ideas*, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *idea* men have of *iron*, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardneſs; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableneſs. But yet this property has no neceſſary connection with that complex *idea*, or any part of it: and there is no more reaſon to think that malleableneſs depends on that colour, weight and hardneſs, than that colour, or that weight depends on its malleableneſs. And yet, though we know nothing of theſe real eſſences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men ſhould attribute the ſorts of things to ſuch eſſences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by moſt men, ſuppoſed to have a real eſſence, whereby it is *gold*; and from whence thoſe qualities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar colour, weight, hardneſs, fuſibility, fixedneſs, and change of colour upon a ſlight touch of mercury, *&c.* This eſſence, from which all theſe properties flow, when I inquire into it, and ſearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot diſcover; the fartheſt I can go, is only to preſume, that it being nothing but body, its real eſſence, or internal conſtitution, on which theſe qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, ſize and connection of its ſolid parts; of neither

of which, having any distinct perception at all, can I have any *idea* of its essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness, a greater weight than any thing I know of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size and arrangement or connection of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular *form*: I am farther from having any *idea* of its real essence, than I was before: for I have an *idea* of figure, size and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the figure, size and posture of the solid parts of that body, is its essence, something called *substantial form*; of that I confess, I have no *idea* at all, but only of the sound *form*, which is far enough from an *idea* of its real essence, or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences, I confess I have no distinct *ideas* at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7.

Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name already in use, and denominate it *gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal essence; by having of which essence, this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that essence, must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the

idea to which that name is given, must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it. Which essence, since they, who so use the names, know not, their ideas *of substances* must be *all adequate* in that respect, as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should.

§ 8. Ideas *of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities are all inadequate.*

Secondly, Those who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world, by putting together the *ideas* of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *ideas* of those substances they would thus copy into their minds; nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities, and powers of substances, whereof we make their complex *ideas*, are so many and various, that no man's complex *idea* contains them all. That our abstract *ideas* of substances do not contain in them all the simple *ideas* that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex *idea* of any substance, all the simple *ideas* they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their specific names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific *ideas* of the sorts of substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple *ideas* which are to be found in them: but these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific *idea* more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways *our* ideas *of substances* are deficient and *inadequate*. The simple *ideas*, whereof we make our complex ones of substances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers, which being relations to other substances can never be sure that we know all the powers that any one body, till we have tried what changes

it is fitted to give to, or receive from other substances, in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate *ideas* of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§ 9.

Whosoever first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word *gold*, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real essence or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his *idea* of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex *idea* of that species. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that *idea* we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the *ideas* of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in *aq. regia*, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts. These, or parts of these, put together, usually make the complex *idea* in men's minds, of that sort of body we call *gold*.

§ 10.

But no one, who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this called *gold* has infinite other properties, not contained in that *complex idea*. Some who have examined this species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in *gold*, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour or weight: and, it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would an hundred times as many *ideas* go to the complex *idea* of *gold*, as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes which that one body

is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one, who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a *triangle*; though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

§ 11. Ideas *of Substances as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*

So that *all our complex* Ideas *of substances are* imperfect and *inadequate*. Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex *ideas* of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our *ideas* be of an *ellipsis*, if we had no other *idea* of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas having in our plain *idea* the whole essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

§. 12. *Simple* Ideas ἴκλωτα, *and adequate.*

THUS the mind has three sorts of abstract *ideas* or nominal essences:

FIRST, *Simple* ideas, which are ἴκλωτα, or *copies*; but yet certainly *adequate*. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light (I speak according to the common notion of light) to produce in me the sensation which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power, in something without the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such *idea* in itself, and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power, that simple *idea* is real and *adequate*: the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power; which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that power; or else, that power would produce a different *idea*.

§ 13. Ideas *of Substances are* ἐκτυπα, *inadequate.*

SECONDLY, The *complex* Ideas *of substances are ectypes, copies* too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever collection of simple *ideas* it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance: since not having tried all the operations, of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in other substances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* collection of all its active and passive capacities; and so *not* have an *adequate* complex *idea* of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations, which is that sort of complex *idea* of substances we have. And after all, if we could have, and actually had in our complex *idea*, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an *idea* of the essence of that thing. For since the powers or qualities that are observable by us, are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities, cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *ideas* of substances are not *adequate*; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no *idea* of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.

§ 14. Ideas *of Modes and Relations, are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

THIRDLY, *Complex* ideas *of modes and relations, are* originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple *ideas*, that the mind itself puts together, and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist, and so are designed only for, and belong only to such modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex *ideas*. The *ideas* therefore of modes and relations cannot but be *adequate*.

CHAP. XXXII.

OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions.* THOUGH truth and falsehood belong in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet *ideas* are oftentimes termed *true* or *false* (as what words are there, that are not us'ed with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations)? Though, I think, that when the *ideas* themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination; as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our *ideas* being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or *false*, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be *true* or *false*.

§ 2. *Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.* INDEED both *ideas* and words *may* be said to be *true in a metaphysical sense* of the word truth, as all other things, that any way exist, are said to be true, *i. e.* really to be such as they exist. Though in things called *true*, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to our *ideas*, looked upon as the standards of that truth, which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.

§ 3. *No* Idea, *as an Appearance in the mind, true or false.* BUT it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine whether our *ideas* are capable of being *true* or *false*; but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say, that the *ideas* in our minds being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are *false*; the *idea* of a [illegible]ing no more falsehood in it, when it appeareth, than the name centaur has falsehood

in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper. For truth or falſehood lying always in ſome affirmation, or negation, mental or verbal, our *ideas* are *not capable*, any of them, *of being falſe*, till the mind paſſes ſome judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them.

§ 4. Ideas *referred to any thing, may be true or falſe.* WHENEVER the mind refers any of its *ideas* to any thing extraneous to them, they are then *capable to be called true or falſe.* Becauſe the mind in ſuch a reference makes a tacit ſuppoſition of their conformity to that thing; which ſuppoſition, as it happens to be *true* or *falſe*, ſo the *ideas* themſelves come to be denominated. The moſt uſual caſes wherein this happens, are theſe following:

§ 5. *Other men's* Ideas *real Exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real Eſſences, are what men uſually refer their* Ideas *to.*

FIRST, When the mind ſuppoſes any *idea* it has, *conformable to* that in *other men's* minds, called by the ſame common name; *v. g.* when the mind intends or judges its *ideas* of *juſtice, temperance, religion*, to be the ſame with what other men give thoſe names to.

SECONDLY, When the mind ſuppoſes any *idea* it has in itſelf, to be *conformable to ſome real exiſtence.* Thus the two *ideas*, of a man and a centaur, ſuppoſed to be the ideas of real ſubſtances, are the one *true*, and the other *falſe*; the one having a conformity to what has really exiſted, the other not.

THIRDLY, When the mind *refers* any of its *ideas* to the real conſtitution and *eſſence* of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greateſt part, if not all our *ideas* of ſubſtances, are *falſe.*

§ 6. *The Cauſe of ſuch References.*

THESE ſuppoſitions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own *ideas.* But yet, if we will examine it, we ſhall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abſtract complex *ideas.* For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding that, if it ſhould proceed by and dwell upon any particular things, its progreſs would be very ſlow, and its work endleſs: therefore to ſhorten its way to knowledge, and make ex-

perception more comprehenſive; the firſt thing it does, as the foundation of the eaſier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themſelves that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them ſo into ſorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with aſſurance extend to all of that ſort; and ſo advance by larger ſteps in that, which is its great buſineſs, knowledge. This, as I have elſewhere ſhowed, is the reaſon why we collect things under comprehenſive *ideas*, with names annexed to them, into *genera* and *ſpecies*, *i. e.* into kinds and ſorts.

§ 7.

If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and obſerve what courſe it uſually takes in its way to knowledge; we ſhall, I think, find that the mind having got any *idea*, which it thinks it may have uſe of, either in contemplation or diſcourſe, the firſt thing it does, is to abſtract it, and then get a name to it; and ſo lay it up in its ſtorehouſe, the memory, as containing the eſſence of a ſort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often obſerve, that when any one ſees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he preſently aſks what it is, meaning by that inquiry, nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the ſpecies, or the eſſence of it: whereof it is indeed uſed as the mark, and is generally ſuppoſed annexed to it.

§ 8.

But this abſtract *idea* being ſomething in the mind between the thing that exiſts, and the name that is given it; it is in our *ideas*, that both the rightneſs of our knowledge, and the propriety or intelligibleneſs of our ſpeaking, conſiſts. And hence it is, that men are ſo forward to ſuppoſe, that the abſtract *ideas* they have in their minds, are ſuch as agree to the things exiſting without them, to which they are referred; and are the ſame alſo, to which the names they give them do, by the uſe and propriety of that language, belong. For without this *double conformity* of their *ideas*, they find

they ſhould both think amiſs of things in themſelves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§ 9. *Simple* Ideas *may be falſe, in reference to others of the ſame Name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.*

FIRST, then, I ſay, that *when the truth of our* ideas *is judged of, by the conformity they have to the* ideas *which other men have, and commonly ſignify by the ſame name, they may be any of them falſe.* But yet *ſimple ideas are leaſt of all liable to be miſtaken;* becauſe a man by his ſenſes, and every day's obſervation, may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf what the ſimple *ideas* are, which their ſeveral names that are in common uſe ſtand for; they being but few in number, and ſuch as if he doubts or miſtakes in, he may eaſily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is ſeldom, that any one miſtakes in his names of ſimple *ideas;* or applies the name *red*, to the *idea green;* or the name *ſweet*, to the *idea bitter;* much leſs are men apt to confound the names of *ideas*, belonging to different ſenſes; and call a colour by the name of a taſte, *&c.* whereby it is evident, that the ſimple *ideas* they call by any name, are commonly the ſame that others have and mean when they uſe the ſame names.

§ 10. Ideas *of Mixed Modes moſt liable to be falſe in this Senſe.*

COMPLEX ideas *are much more liable to be falſe in this reſpect; and the complex* ideas *of mixed modes, much more than thoſe of ſubſtances:* becauſe in ſubſtances (eſpecially thoſe which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) ſome remarkable ſenſible qualities, ſerving ordinarily to diſtinguiſh one ſort from another, eaſily preſerve thoſe, who take any care in the uſe of their words, from applying them to ſorts of ſubſtances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not ſo eaſy to determine of ſeveral actions, whether they are to be called *juſtice* or *cruelty*, *liberality* or *prodigality*. And ſo in referring our *ideas* to thoſe of other men, called by the ſame names, ours may be *falſe;* [illegible] in our minds, which we expreſs by the [illegible] may perhaps be that which ought to have

§ 11. *Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.*

BUT whether or no, our *ideas* of mixed modes are more liable than any ſort to be different from thoſe of other men, which are marked by the ſame names; this at leaſt is certain, That *this ſort of falſehood is much more familiarly attributed to our* ideas *of mixed modes than to any other.* When a man is thought to have a falſe *idea* of *juſtice*, or *gratitude*, or *glory*, it is for no other reaſon, but that his agrees not with the *ideas* which each of thoſe names are the ſigns of in other men.

§ 12. *And why.*

THE *reaſon* whereof ſeems to me to be this, That the abſtract *ideas* of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of ſuch a preciſe collection of ſimple *ideas*: and ſo the eſſence of each ſpecies being made by men alone, whereof we have no other ſenſible ſtandard exiſting any where, but the name itſelf, or the definition of that name: we have nothing elſe to refer theſe our *ideas* of mixed modes to, as a ſtandard to which we would conform them, but the *ideas* of thoſe who are thought to uſe thoſe names in their moſt proper ſignifications; and ſo as our *ideas* conform or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe. And thus much concerning the *truth* and *falſehood* of our *ideas*, in reference to their names.

§ 13. *As referred to real Exiſtences none of our* Ideas *can be falſe, but thoſe of Subſtances.*

SECONDLY, As to the truth and falſehood of our *ideas*, in reference to the *real exiſtence* of things, when that is made the ſtandard of their truth, none of them can be termed falſe, but only our complex *ideas* of ſubſtances.

§ 14. *Firſt, Simple* Ideas *in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.*

FIRST, Our ſimple *ideas* being barely ſuch perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by eſtabliſhed laws and ways, ſuitable to his wiſdom and goodneſs, though incomprehenſible to us, their truth conſiſts in nothing elſe but in ſuch appearances as are produced in us, and muſt be ſuitable to thoſe powers he has placed in external objects, or elſe they could not be produced in us; and

thus anſwering thoſe powers, they are what they ſhould be, *true ideas*. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of *falſehood*, if the mind (as in moſt men I believe it does) judges theſe *ideas* to be in the things themſelves. For God, in his wiſdom, having ſet them as marks of diſtinction in things, whereby we may be able to diſcern one thing from another, and ſo chooſe any of them for our uſes, as we have occaſion; it alters not the nature of our ſimple *idea*, whether we think that the *idea* of blue be in the violet itſelf, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itſelf. For that texture in the object, by a regular and conſtant operation, producing the ſame *idea* of blue in us, it ſerves us to diſtinguiſh, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diſtinguiſhing mark, as it is really in the *violet*, be only a peculiar texture of parts, elſe that very colour, the *idea* whereof (which is in us) is the exact reſemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *blue*, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that cauſes in us that *idea*: ſince the name *blue*, notes properly nothing, but that mark of diſtinction that is in a *violet*, diſcernible only by our eyes, whatever it conſiſts in, that being beyond our capacities diſtinctly to know, and perhaps would be of leſs uſe to us, if we had faculties to diſcern.

§ 15. *Though one Man's* Idea *of blue ſhould be different from another's.*

NEITHER would it carry any imputation of *falſehood* to our ſimple *ideas*, if by the different ſtructure of our organs it were ſo ordered, that *the ſame object ſhould produce in ſeveral men's minds different ideas* at the ſame time; *v. g.* if the *idea* that a *violet* produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the ſame that a *marygold* produced in another man's, and *vice verſa*. For ſince this could never be known, becauſe one man's mind could not paſs into another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced by thoſe organs; neither the *ideas* hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded,

or any *falsehood* be in either. For all things that had the texture of a *violet*, producing constantly the *idea* which he called *blue*: and those which had the texture of a *marygold*, producing constantly the *idea* which he has constantly called *yellow*: whatever those appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the names *blue* and *yellow*, as if the appearances, or *ideas* in his mind, received from those two flowers, were exactly the same with the *ideas* in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible *ideas* produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life, and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

§ 16. *First, Simple* Ideas *in this Sense not false, and why.* From what has been said concerning our simple *ideas*, I think it evident, that our *simple* ideas can *none of them* be *false in respect of things* existing without us. For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our senses such appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, such as it is, suitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it represents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be *false*. *Blue*, or *yellow*, *bitter*, or *sweet*, can never be false *ideas*; these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied; but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the *ideas*; as if a man ignorant in the *English* tongue should call *purple scarlet*.

§ 17. *Secondly, Modes not false.*

SECONDLY, *Neither can* our *complex* ideas *of modes, in reference to the essence of any thing really existing, be false.* Because whatever complex *idea* I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern existing, and made by nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other *ideas* than what it hath; nor to represent any thing but such a complication of *ideas* as it does. Thus when I have the *idea* of such an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniences of life as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station requires, I have no *false idea*; but such an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and so is capable of neither *truth* or *falsehood.* But when I give the name *frugality*, or *virtue* to this action, then it may be called a *false idea*, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that *idea*, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of *frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the standard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. *Thirdly*, Ideas *of Substances when false.*

THIRDLY, Our *complex* ideas *of substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false.* That they are all *false*, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition, and consider them as collections of simple *ideas* in the mind, taken from combinations of simple *ideas* existing together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the supposed copies: and in this reference of them, to the existence of things, they *are false* ideas. 1. *When* they put together simple *ideas*, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size that exist together in a horse, is joined, in the same complex *idea*, the power of barking like a dog: which three *ideas*, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a *false idea* of an horse. 2. *Ideas* of substances are, in this respect, also *false*, when from any collection of simple

ideas that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other simple *idea* which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be said to have a false complex *idea*, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the *idea* of perfect absolute fixedness. For either way, the complex *idea* of gold being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex *idea*, that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect *idea* rather than a false one; since though it contains not all the simple *ideas* that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

§ 19. *Truth or Falsehood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.*

THOUGH, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have showed in what sense, and upon what ground our *ideas* may be sometimes called *true* or *false*; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases where any *idea* is called *true* or *false*, it is from some judgment that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is *true* or *false*. For *truth* or *falsehood*, being *never without some affirmation or negation*, express or tacit, it is not to be found but when signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use are either *ideas* or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. *Truth* lies in so joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and *falsehood* in the contrary, as shall be more fully showed hereafter.

§ 20. Ideas *in themselves neither true nor false.*

ANY *idea* then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any *ideas* in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this

alone be called *false*. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought *false*, being exact representations of something: nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or *ideas* of things they do not represent. But the mistake and *falsehood* is,

§ 21. *But are false*, 1. *When judged agreeable to another man's* Idea, *without being so.*

First, *When the mind*, having any idea, it *judges* and concludes *it the same that is in other men's minds signified by the same name*; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, though other *ideas* also are liable to it.

§ 22. 2. *When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.*

Secondly, When it having a complex *idea* made up of such a collection of simple ones, as nature never puts together, *it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing*; as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fusibility and fixedness of gold.

§ 23. 3. *When judged adequate without being so.*

Thirdly, When in its complex *idea* it has united a certain number of simple *ideas* that do really exist together in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, *it judges this to be a perfect complete* idea *of a sort of things which really it is not*; *v. g.* having joined the *ideas* of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy and fusible, it takes that complex *idea* to be the complete *idea* of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in *aqua regia* are as inseparable from those other *ideas* or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

§ 24. 4. *When judged to represent the real Essence.*

Fourthly, The mistake is yet greater, *when I judge that this complex* idea, *contains in it the real essence of any body existing*; when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitu-

tion. I say, only some few of those properties; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex *idea* of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a man, that has several ways tried and examined it, knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few *ideas*; three lines including a space make up that essence: but the properties that flow from this essence, are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass; though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

§ 25. Ideas *when false*.

To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the *idea* he has of it in his mind (which *idea* he has a power to call by what name he pleases) he may indeed make an *idea* neither answering the reality of things, nor agreeing to the *ideas* commonly signified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong or *false idea* of a thing, which is no otherwise known to him but by the *idea* he has of it: *v. g.* When I frame an *idea* of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a *false idea* of any thing because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *Man* or *Tartar*, and imagine it either to represent some real being without me, or to be the same *idea* that others call by the same name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a *false idea*; though indeed the *falsehood* lies not in the *idea*, but in that tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an *idea* in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name *Man* or *Tar-*

tar, belongs to it, I will call it *Man* or *Tartar*, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the *idea* any way *false*.

§ 26. *More properly to be called Right or Wrong.* UPON the whole matter, I think, that our *ideas*, as they are considered by the mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, *may* very fitly *be called right or wrong* ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them *true* or *false*, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though in propriety of speech, *truth* or *falsehood*, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The *ideas* that are in a man's mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other *ideas* are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

§ 1. *Something unreasonable in most Men.* THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

§ 2. *Not wholly from Self-love.*

THIS proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as day-light.

§ 3. *Nor from Education.*

THIS sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

§ 4. *A degree of madness.*

I SHALL be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as *madness*, when it is considered, that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for *Bedlam* than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation, on the greatest part of mankind, is, that inquiring a little by the by into the nature of madness, B. II. C. 11. § 13. I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable; if this be a taint

which so universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

§ 5. *From a wrong Connection of* Ideas.

SOME of our *ideas* have a natural correspondence and connection one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of *ideas* wholly owing to chance or custom: *ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together.

§ 6. *This Connection how made.*

THIS strong combination of *ideas*, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which seems to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus *ideas* seem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into their tract, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the *ideas* of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his unattentive

thoughts be elsewhere a-wandering. Whether the natural cause of these *ideas*, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of *ideas*.

§ 7. *Some Antipathies an Effect of it.*

THAT there are such associations of them made by custom in the minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connection of two *ideas*, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one *idea*. I say most of the antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person surfeiting with honey, no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very *idea* of it; other *ideas* of dislike, and sickness, and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed, but he knows from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey, when a child, all the same effects would have followed, but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§ 8.

I MENTION this not out of any great necessity there is this present argument, to distinguish nicely between

natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, (*viz.*) That those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connection of *ideas* in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the body, are by discreet people minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

§ 9. *A great Cause of Errors.*

THIS wrong connection in our minds, of *ideas* in themselves, loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.

§ 10. *Instances.*

THE *ideas* of *goblins* and *sprights*, have really no more to do with darkness, than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives: but darkness shall for ever afterwards bring with it those frightful *ideas*, and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§ 11.

A MAN receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over; and by ruminating on them strongly, or much in his mind, so cements those two *ideas* together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are

often begotten from slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§ 12.

A MAN has suffered pain or sickness in any place, he saw his friend die in such a room; though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *idea* of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§ 13. *Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind which Reason cannot.*

WHEN this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. *Ideas* in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable; use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment, and its loss from the *idea* of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these *ideas* is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

§ 14. *Farther Instances of the Effect of the Association of* Ideas.

A FRIEND of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness, by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received;

but whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the *idea* of that agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15.

MANY children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join those *ideas* together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the greatest pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental *ideas* which are annexed to them, and make them offensive: and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him, but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the *idea* of authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them?

§ 16.

INSTANCES of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learned to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learned. The *idea* of this remarkable piece of household-stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little beyond precise nature, I answer for myself, that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own know-

edge, as I report it: and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive persons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§ 17. *Its Influence on intellectual Habits.*

INTELLECTUAL habits and defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the *ideas* of being and matter be strongly joined, either by education or much thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the *idea* of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity?

Let the *idea* of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, shall, unexamined, be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.

§ 18. *Observable in different Sects.*

SOME such wrong and unnatural combinations of *ideas* will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them, to a man, should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of; some independent *ideas*, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their

minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one *idea*, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to *jargon*, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things rivetted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two *ideas*, that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them uncapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error; and the confusion of two different *ideas*, which a customary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

§ 19. *Conclusion.*

HAVING thus given an account of the original, sorts and extent of our *ideas*, with several other considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments or materials of our knowledge; the method I at first proposed to myself, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to show what use the understanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connection between *ideas* and words; and our abstract *ideas*, and general words have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions without considering, first, the nature, use and signification of language; which therefore must be the business of the next book.

BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.

§ 1. *Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.*

GOD having deſigned man for a ſociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a neceſſity to have fellowſhip with thoſe of his own kind, but furniſhed him alſo with language, which was to be the great inſtrument and common tie of ſociety. *Man* therefore had by nature his organs ſo faſhioned, as to be *fit to frame articulate ſounds*, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and ſeveral other birds, will be taught to make articulate ſounds diſtinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

§ 2. *To make them Signs of* Ideas.

BESIDES articulate ſounds therefore, it was farther neceſſary, that he ſhould be *able to uſe theſe ſounds as ſigns of internal conceptions*; and to make them ſtand as marks for the *ideas* within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

§ 3. *To make general Signs.*

BUT neither was this ſufficient to make words ſo uſeful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that ſounds can be made ſigns of *ideas*, unleſs thoſe *ſigns* can be ſo made uſe of, as *to comprehend ſeveral particular things*: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct name to be ſignified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement in the uſe of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular exiſtences: which advantageous uſe of ſounds was obtained only by the difference of the *ideas* they were made ſigns of; thoſe names becoming general, which are made to

ſtand for general *ideas*, and thoſe remaining particular, where the *ideas* they are uſed for are particular.

§ 4. *To make general Signs.*

Besides theſe names which ſtand for *ideas*, there be other words which men make uſe of, not to ſignify any *idea*, but the want or abſence of ſome *ideas* ſimple or complex, or all *ideas* together; ſuch as are *nihil* in Latin, and in Engliſh, *ignorance* and *barrenneſs*. All which negative or privative words, cannot be ſaid properly to belong to, or ſignify no *ideas*: for then they would be perfectly inſignificant ſounds; but they relate to poſitive *ideas*, and ſignify their abſence.

§ 5. *Words ultimately derived from ſuch as ſignify ſenſible Ideas.*

It may alſo lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our *words* have on common ſenſible *ideas*; and how thoſe, which are made uſe of to ſtand for actions and notions quite removed from ſenſe, *have their riſe from thence, and from obvious ſenſible* ideas *are tranſferred to more abſtruſe ſignifications*, and made to ſtand for *ideas* that come not under the cognizance of our ſenſes; *v. g.* to *imagine*, *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *adhere*, *conceive*, *inſtil*, *diſguſt*, *diſturbance*, *tranquillity*, &c. are all words taken from the operations of ſenſible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary ſignification, is breath; *angel*, a meſſenger: and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their ſources, we ſhould find, in all languages, the names, which ſtand for things that fall not under our ſenſes, to have had their firſt riſe from ſenſible *ideas*. By which we may give ſome kind of gueſs, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the firſt beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares ſuggeſted to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilſt to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themſelves, or any other *ideas* that came not under their ſenſes, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known *ideas* of ſenſation, by that

means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed names, to signify those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other *ideas*; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward sensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them: we having, as has been proved, no *ideas* at all, but what originally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within.

§ 6. *Distribution.*

But to understand better the use and force of language, as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that names, in the use of language, are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, *what the* species *and* genera *of things* are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness, or order, concerning knowledge: which being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with words than perhaps is suspected.

These considerations, therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters:

CHAP. II.

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.* MAN, though he has great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible *ideas*, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which, with so much ease and variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how *words*, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the *signs* of their *ideas*; not by any natural connection that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain *ideas*, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an *idea*. The use then of words is to be sensible marks of *ideas*; and the *ideas* they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.

§ 2. *Words are the sensible Signs of his* Ideas *who uses them.* THE use men have of these marks, being either to record their own thoughts for the assistance of their own memory, or as it were to bring out their *ideas*, and lay them before the view of others; *words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the* ideas *in the mind of him that uses them*, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly those *ideas* are collected from the things, which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his *ideas* to the hearer. That then which

words are the marks of, are the *ideas* of the ſpeaker: nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing elſe, but the *ideas* that he himſelf hath. For this would be to make them ſigns of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other *ideas*; which would be to make them ſigns, and not ſigns of his *ideas* at the ſame time; and ſo in effect to have no ſignification at all. Words being voluntary ſigns, they cannot be voluntary ſigns impoſed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them ſigns of nothing, ſounds without ſignification. A man cannot make his words the ſigns either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has ſome *ideas* of his own, he cannot ſuppoſe them to correſpond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he uſe any ſigns for them: for thus they would be the ſigns of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the ſigns of nothing. But when he repreſents to himſelf other men's *ideas* by ſome of his own, if he conſent to give them the ſame names that other men do, it is ſtill to his own *ideas*, to *ideas* that he has, and not to *ideas* that he has not.

§ 3. *Words are the ſenſible Signs of his* Ideas *who uſes them.*

This is ſo neceſſary in the uſe of language, that in this reſpect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and unlearned, uſe the *words* they ſpeak (with any meaning) all alike. They, *in every man's mouth ſtand for the* ideas *he has*, and which he would expreſs by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright ſhining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own *idea* of that colour, and nothing elſe: and therefore calls the ſame colour in a peacock's tail, gold. Another that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining yellow, great weight: and then the ſound gold, when he uſes it, ſtands for a complex *idea* of a ſhining yellow and very weighty ſubſtance. Another adds to thoſe qualities fuſibility: and then the word gold to him ſignifies a body, bright, yellow, fuſible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability: each of

theſe uſes equally the word gold, when they have occaſion to expreſs the *idea* which they have applied it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own *idea*; nor can he make it ſtand as a ſign of ſuch a complex *idea* as he has not.

§ 4. *Words often ſecretly referred, Firſt, to the* Ideas *in other men's minds.*

BUT though words, as they are uſed by men, can properly and immediately ſignify nothing but the *ideas* that are in the mind of the ſpeaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a ſecret reference to two other things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their words to be marks of the ideas *in the minds alſo of other men with whom they communicate:* for elſe they ſhould talk in vain, and could not be underſtood, if the ſounds they applied to one *idea*, were ſuch as by the hearer were applied to another; which is to ſpeak two languages. But in this men ſtand not uſually to examine whether the *idea* they and thoſe they diſcourſe with have in their minds, be the ſame: but think it enough that they uſe the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they ſuppoſe, that the *idea* they make it a ſign of, is preciſely the ſame, to which the underſtanding men of that country apply that name.

§ 5. *Secondly to the Reality of things.*

SECONDLY, Becauſe *men* would not be thought to talk *barely* of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they *often ſuppoſe the words to ſtand alſo for the reality of things.* But this relating more particularly to ſubſtances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to ſimple *ideas* and modes, we ſhall ſpeak of theſe two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and ſubſtances in particular: though give me leave here to ſay, that it is a perverting the uſe of words, and brings unavoidable obſcurity and confuſion into their ſignification, whenever we make them ſtand for any thing, but thoſe *ideas* we have in our own minds.

§ 6. *Words by uſe readily excite* Ideas.

CONCERNING words alſo it is farther to be conſidered,

First, That they being immediately the signs of men's *ideas*, and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts, *there comes by constant use* to be such a *connection between certain sounds*, and the ideas they *stand for*, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain *ideas*, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities; and in all substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

§ 7. *Words often used without signification.*

Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are *ideas* in the mind of the speaker, yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their significations perfectly; it *often* happens that *men*, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, *do set their thoughts more on words than things*. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the *ideas* are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the *idea*, and a designation that the one stand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.

§ 8. *Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.*

Words by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain *ideas* so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connection between them. But that they *signify* only men's peculiar *ideas*, and that *by a perfect arbitrary imposition*, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same *ideas* we

take them to be the ſigns of: and every man has ſo inviolable a liberty, to make words ſtand for what *ideas* he pleaſes, that no one hath the power to make others have the ſame *ideas* in their minds, that he has when they uſe the ſame words that he does. And therefore the great *Auguſtus* himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to ſay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what *idea* any ſound ſhould be a ſign of, in the mouths and common language of his ſubjects. It is true, common uſe by a tacit conſent appropriates certain ſounds to certain *ideas* in all languages, which ſo far limits the ſignification of that ſound, that unleſs a man applies it to the ſame *idea*, he does not ſpeak properly: and let me add, that unleſs a man's words excite the ſame *ideas* in the hearer which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he does not ſpeak intelligibly. But whatever be the conſequence of any man's uſing of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular ſenſe of the perſon to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their ſignification, in his uſe of them, is limited to his *ideas*, and they can be ſigns of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

OF GENERAL TERMS.

§ 1. *The greateſt part of Words general.*

ALL things that exiſt being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reaſonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, ſhould be ſo too; I mean, in their ſignification; but yet we find the quite contrary. The far *greateſt part of words*, that make all languages, *are general terms*; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reaſon and neceſſity.

§ 2. *For every particular thing to have a Name is impoſſible.*

FIRST, It is impoſſible that every particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar name. For the ſignification and

uſe of words, depending on that connection which the mind makes between its *ideas* and the ſounds it uſes as ſigns of them, it is neceſſary, in the application of names to things, that the mind ſhould have diſtinct *ideas* of the things, and retain alſo the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that *idea*. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain diſtinct *ideas* of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beaſt men ſaw, every tree and plant that affected the ſenſes, could not find a place in the moſt capacious underſtanding. If it be looked on as an inſtance of a prodigious memory, that ſome generals have been able to call every ſoldier in their army by his proper name, we may eaſily find a reaſon, why men have never attempted to give names to each ſheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much leſs to call every leaf of plants, or grain of ſand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

§ 3. *And uſeleſs.*

Secondly, If it were poſſible, *it would yet be uſeleſs*; becauſe it would not ſerve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not ſerve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names and uſe them in talk with others, only that they may be underſtood: which is then only done, when by uſe or conſent, the ſound I make by the organs of ſpeech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the *idea* I apply it to in mine, when I ſpeak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the *ideas* in my mind, the names of them could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thoſe very particular things which had fallen under my notice.

§ 4.

Thirdly, But yet granting this alſo feaſible (which I think is not) yet a *diſtinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great uſe for the improvement of knowledge*: which though founded in particular things, enlarges itſelf by general views; to which things reduced

into sorts under general names are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires; and therefore in these, men have, for the most part stopped; but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and their distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

§ 5. *What things have proper Names.*

Besides persons, countries, also cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like distinctions of place, have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and as it were set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have *proper names* for the one, as familiar as for the other, and *Bucephalus* would be a word as much in use as *Alexander*. And therefore we see that amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants; because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse, when he is out of sight.

§ 6. *How general Words are made.*

The next thing to be considered, is, *How general words come to be made*. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the signs of general *ideas*; and *ideas* become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other *ideas*, that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than

one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abſtract *idea*, is (as we call it) of that ſort.

§ 7.

But to deduce this a little more diſtinctly, it will not perhaps be amiſs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obſerve by what degrees we proceed, and by what ſteps we enlarge our *ideas* from our firſt infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *ideas*, of the perſons children converſe with (to inſtance in them alone) are like the perſons themſelves, only particular. The *ideas* of the nurſe, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, repreſent only thoſe individuals. The names they firſt gave to them are confined to theſe individuals; and the names of *nurſe* and *mamma*, the child uſes, determine themſelves to thoſe perſons. Afterwards, when time and a lager acquaintance have made them obſerve, that there are a great many other things in the world that in ſome common agreements of ſhape, and ſeveral other qualities, reſemble their father and mother, and thoſe perſons they have been uſed to, they frame an *idea*, which they find thoſe many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name *man* for example. And *thus they come to have a general name*, and a general *idea*. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex *idea* they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8.

By the ſame way that they come by the general name and *idea* of *man*, they eaſily *advance to more general names* and notions. For obſerving that ſeveral things that differ from their *idea* of *man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with *man*, by retaining only thoſe qualities, and uniting them into one *idea*, they have again another and more general *idea*; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenſive extenſion: which new *idea* is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the ſhape,

and some other properties signified by the name *man*, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name *animal*.

§ 9. *General natures are nothing but abstract* Ideas. THAT this is the *way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them*, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a man's self or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing else but such abstract and partial *ideas* of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his *idea* of *man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*, or his *idea* of *horse* from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex *ideas* of several particular existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex *ideas* signified by the names *man* and *horse*, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex *idea*, and giving the name *animal* to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave out of the *idea* of *animal*, sense and spontaneous motion; and the remaining complex *idea*, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term *vivens*. And not to dwell longer on this particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to *body*, *substance*, and at last to *being*, *thing*, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our *ideas* whatsoever. To conclude, this whole *mystery* of *genera* and *species*, which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract *ideas*, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, that every more general term stands for such an *idea*, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§ 10. *Why the* Genus *is ordinarily made uſe of in definitions.*

THIS may ſhow us the reaſon, *why, in the defining of words*, which is nothing, but declaring their ſignification, *we make uſe of the genus*, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceſſity, but only to ſave the labour of enumerating the ſeveral ſimple *ideas*, which the next general word or *genus* ſtands for: or, perhaps, ſometimes the ſhame of not being able to do it. But though defining by *genus* and *differentia* (I crave leave to uſe theſe terms of art, though originally Latin, ſince they moſt properly ſuit thoſe notions they are applied to) I ſay, though defining by the *genus* be the ſhorteſt way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beſt. This I am ſure, it is not the only, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary. For definition being nothing but making another underſtand by words, what *idea* the term defined ſtands for, a definition is beſt made by enumerating thoſe ſimple *ideas* that are combined in the ſignification of the term defined: and if inſtead of ſuch an enumeration, men have accuſtomed themſelves to uſe the next general term; it has not been out of neceſſity, or for greater clearneſs, but for quickneſs and diſpatch ſake. For, I think, that to one who deſired to know what *idea* the word *man* ſtood for, if it ſhould be ſaid, that man was a ſolid extended ſubſtance, having life, ſenſe, ſpontaneous motion, and the faculty of reaſoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term *man* would be as well underſtood, and the *idea* it ſtands for be at leaſt as clearly made known as when it is defined to be a *rational animal*: which by the ſeveral definitions of *animal*, *vivens*, and *corpus*, reſolves itſelf into thoſe enumerated *ideas*. I have, in explaining the term *man*, followed here the ordinary definition of the ſchools: which though, perhaps, not the moſt exact, yet ſerves well enough to my preſent purpoſe. And one may, in this inſtance, ſee what gave occaſion to the rule, that a definition muſt conſiſt of *genus* and *differentia*: and it ſuffices to ſhow us the little neceſſity there is of ſuch a rule, or advantage

in the ſtrict obſerving of it. For definitions, as has been ſaid, being only the explaining of one word by ſeveral others, ſo that the meaning or *idea* it ſtands for may be certainly known; languages are not always ſo made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its ſignification exactly and clearly expreſſed by two others. Experience ſufficiently ſatisfies us to the contrary; or elſe thoſe who have made this rule, have done ill, that they have given us ſo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§ 11. *General and univerſal are Creatures of the Underſtanding.*

To return to general words, it is plain by what has been ſaid, that *general* and *univerſal* belong not to the real exiſtence of things; but *are the inventions and creatures of the underſtanding*, made by it for its own uſe, and concern only ſigns, whether words or *ideas*. Words are general, as has been ſaid, when uſed for ſigns of general *ideas*, and ſo are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and *ideas* are general, when they are ſet up as the repreſentatives of many particular things; but univerſality belongs not to things themſelves, which are all of them particular in their exiſtence; even thoſe words and *ideas*, which in their ſignification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that reſt are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the underſtanding, of ſignifying or repreſenting many particulars. For the ſignification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them. (1)

(1) Againſt this the biſhop of Worceſter objects, and our author * anſwers as followeth; "however, ſaith the biſhop, "the abſtracted ideas are the work of the mind, yet they are "not mere creatures of the mind; as appears by an inſtance "produced of the eſſence of the ſun being in one ſingle in-"dividual; in which caſe it is granted, That the idea may

* In his firſt letter.

§ 12. *Abstract* Ideas *are the Essences of the* Genera *and* Species.

THE next thing therefore to be considered, is, *What kind of signification it is, that general words have.* For

" be so abstracted; that more suns might agree in it, and it " is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are " stars. So that here we have a real essence subsisting in one " individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and " the same essence remaining. But in this one sun there is " a real essence, and not a mere nominal, or abstracted es- " sence: but suppose there were more suns; would not each " of them have the real essence of the sun? For what is it " makes the second sun, but having the same real essence " with the first? If it were but a nominal essence, then the " second would have nothing but the name."

This, as I understand it, replies Mr. Locke, is to prove that the abstract general essence of any sort of things, or things of the same denomination, *v. g.* of man or marygold, hath a real being out of the understanding? which, I confess, I am not able to conceive. Your lordship's proof here brought out of my essay, concerning the sun, I humbly conceive, will not reach it; because what is said there, does not at all concern the real but nominal essence, as is evident from hence, that the idea I speak of there, is a complex idea; but we have no complex idea of the internal constitution or real essence of the sun. Besides, I say expressly, That our distinguishing substances into species, by names, is not at all founded on their real essences. So that the sun being one of these substances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your lordship, be supposed to mean by essence of the sun, the real essence of the sun, unless I had so expressed it. But all this argument will be at an end, when your lordship shall have explained what you mean by these words, " true sun." In my sense of them, any thing will be a true sun to which the name sun may be truly and properly applied, and to that substance or thing the name sun may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that combination of sensible qualities, by which any thing else, that is called sun, is distinguished from other substances, i. e. by the nominal essence: and thus our sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed star, not by a real essence that we do not know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the real essence or consti-

as it is evident, that they do not ſignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: ſo on the other ſide it is as evident, they do not ſignify a plurality; for man and men would

tution of one of the fixed ſtars to be the ſame with that of our ſun) but by a complex idea of ſenſible qualities co-exiſting, which, wherever they are found, make a true ſun. And thus I crave leave to anſwer your lordſhip's queſtion: "for "what is it makes the ſecond ſun to be a true ſun, but hav-"ing the ſame real eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a "nominal eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but "the name."

I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal eſſence, it would have ſomething beſides the name, viz. That nominal eſſence which is ſufficient to denominate it truly a ſun, or to make it be a true ſun, though we know nothing of that real eſſence whereon that nominal one depends. Your lordſhip will then argue, that that real eſſence is in the ſecond ſun, and makes the ſecond ſun. I grant it, when the ſecond ſun comes to exiſt, ſo as to be perceived by us to have all the ideas contained in our complex idea, i. e. in our nominal eſſence of a ſun. For ſhould it be true, (as is now believed by aſtronomers) that the real eſſence of the ſun were in any of the fixed ſtars, yet ſuch a ſtar could not for that be by us called a ſun, whilſt it anſwers not our complex idea, or nominal eſſence of a ſun. But how far that will prove, that the eſſences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them diſtinct from that of abſtract ideas in the mind, which are merely creatures of the mind, I do not ſee; and we ſhall farther inquire, in conſidering your lordſhip's following words. "Therefore," ſay you, "there muſt be a real eſ-"ſence in every individual of the ſame kind." Yes, and I beg leave of your lordſhip to ſay, of a different kind too. For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.

That every individual ſubſtance has real, internal, individual conſtitution, i. e. a real eſſence, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your lordſhip ſays, "Peter, James and John, are all true and real men." Anſ. Without doubt, ſuppoſing them to be men, they are true and real men, i. e. ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies belongs to them. And ſo three bobaques, are all true and real bobaques, ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies of animals belongs to them.

then ſignify the ſame, and the diſtinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be ſuperfluous and uſeleſs. That then which general words ſignify, is a ſort of things; and each of them does that, by being a

For I beſeech your lordſhip to conſider, whether in your way of arguing, by naming them, Peter, James and John, names familiar to us, as appropriated to individuals of the ſpecies man, your lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe them men, and then very ſafely aſk, whether they be not all true and real men? But if I ſhould aſk your lordſhip, whether Weweena, Chuckery and Couſheda, were true and real men or no? Your lordſhip would not be able to tell me, till, I having pointed out to your lordſhip the individuals called by thoſe names, your lordſhip, by examining whether they had in them thoſe ſenſible qualities which your lordſhip has combined into that complex idea to which you give the ſpecific name man, determined them all, or ſome of them, to be the ſpecies which you call man, and ſo be true and real man: which when your lordſhip has determined, it is plain you did it by that which is only the nominal eſſence, as not knowing the real one. But your lordſhip farther aſks, "What is it makes "Peter, James and John real men? Is it the attributing "the general name to them? No, certainly; but that the "true and real eſſence of a man is in every one of them."

If, when your lordſhip aſks, "What makes them men?" your lordſhip uſed the word making in the proper ſenſe for the efficient cauſe, and in that ſenſe it were true, that the eſſence of a man, i. e. the ſpecific eſſence of that ſpecies made a man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this ſpecific eſſence had a reality beyond that of being only a general abſtract idea in the mind. But when it is ſaid, that it is the true and real eſſence of a man in every one of them that makes Peter, James and John true and real men, the true and real meaning of theſe words is no more, but that the eſſence of that ſpecies, i. e. the properties anſwering the complex abſtract idea to which the ſpecific name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the reaſon why they are called men. Your lordſhip adds, "and we muſt be as certain of this, as we are that they "are men."

How, I beſeech your lordſhip, are we certain that they are men, but only by our ſenſes, finding thoſe properties in them

ſign of an abſtract *idea* in the mind, to which *idea*, as things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that ſort. Whereby it is evident, that the *eſſences* of

which anſwer the abſtract complex idea, which is in our minds, of the ſpecific idea to which we have annexed the ſpecific name man? This I take to be the true meaning of what your lordſhip ſays in the next words, viz. "They take "their denomination of being men from that common nature "or eſſence which is in them;" and I am apt to think, theſe words will not hold true in any other ſenſe.

Your lordſhip's fourth inference begins thus; "That the "general idea is not made from the ſimple ideas by the mere "act of the mind abſtracting from circumſtances, but from "reaſon and conſideration of the nature of things."

I thought, my lord, that reaſon and conſideration had been acts of the mind, mere acts of the mind, when any thing was done by them. Your lordſhip gives a reaſon for it, viz. "For, when we ſee ſeveral individuals that have the ſame "powers and properties, we thence infer, that there muſt be "ſomething common to all, which makes them of one kind."

I grant the inference to be true; but muſt beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have ſaid, and it agrees with what your lordſhip here ſays, * That "the mind, in "making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, only follows nature, "and puts no ideas together, which are not ſuppoſed to "have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a ſheep "with the ſhape of an horſe; nor the colour of lead with "the weight and fixedneſs of gold, to be the complex ideas "of any real ſubſtances; unleſs he has a mind to fill his "head with chimeras, and his diſcourſes with unintelligible "words. Men obſerving certain qualities always joined "and exiſting together, therein copied nature, and of ideas "ſo united, made their complex ones of ſubſtance, &c." Which is very little different from what your lordſhip here ſays, that it is from our obſervation of individuals, that we come to infer, "that there is ſomething common to them "all." But I do not ſee how it will thence follow, that the general or ſpecific idea is not made by the mere act of

* B. 3. C. 6. § 28, 29.

the ſorts, or (if the Latin word pleaſes better) *ſpecies* of things, are nothing elſe but theſe abſtract *ideas*. For the having the eſſence of any ſpecies, being that which makes any thing to be of that ſpecies, and the conform-

the mind. No, ſays your lordſhip, "There is ſomething "common to them all, which makes them of one kind; and "if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them "all of one kind muſt not be a nominal, but real eſſence."

This may be ſome objection to the name of nominal eſſence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing deſigned by it. There is an internal conſtitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your lordſhip and I are agreed of, and this we call the real eſſence. There are alſo certain complex ideas, or combinations of theſe properties in men's minds, to which they commonly annex ſpecific names, or names of ſorts or kinds of things. This, I believe, your lordſhip does not deny. Theſe complex ideas, for want of a better name, I have called nominal eſſences; how properly, I will not diſpute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then, I muſt, to expreſs myſelf, uſe this. Now, my lord, body, life, and the power of reaſoning, being not the real eſſence of a man, as I believe your lordſhip will agree, will your lordſhip ſay, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein they are found, of the kind called man, and not of the kind called baboon, becauſe the difference of theſe kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not ſee how animal rationale can be enough really to diſtinguiſh a man from an horſe; for that is but the nominal, not real eſſence of that kind, deſigned by the name man: and yet I ſuppoſe, every one thinks it real enough to make a real difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, to MAKE things of one kind and not of another (which, as I have ſhowed, ſignifies no more but ranking of them under different ſpecific names) but their real unknown conſtitutions, which are the real eſſences we are ſpeaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we ſhould have really different kinds of ſubſtances, or diſtinct names for them, unleſs we could diſtinguiſh them by theſe differences, of which we have no diſtinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily anſwered me, if I ſhould demand, wherein lies the real difference in the internal con-

ity to the *idea* to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have

stitution of a stag from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and nobody questions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different.

Your lordship farther says, "And this difference doth not "depend upon the complex ideas of substances, whereby men "arbitrarily join modes together in their minds." I confess, my lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex ideas of substances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are these: "For let them mistake "in their complication of ideas, either in leaving out or put-"ting in what doth not belong to them; and let their ideas "be what they please, the real essence of a man, and an "horse, and a tree, are just what they were."

The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, that things are here taken to be distinguished by their real essences; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your lordship, does your lordship mean, when you say, "The real essence "of a man, and an horse, and a tree," but that there are such kinds already set out by the signification of these names, man, horse, tree? And what, I beseech your lordship, is the signification of each of these specific names, but the complex idea it stands for? And that complex idea is the nominal essence, and nothing else. So that taking man, as your lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of individuals, all which agree in that common complex idea, which that specific name stands for, it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals comprehended under the specific name man, in your use of it, would be just the same; let others leave out or put into their complex idea of man what they please; because the real essence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

For I take it for granted, that in using the name man, in

a right to the name of that ſpecies, is all one. As for example, to be a *man*, or of the ſpecies *man*, and to have right to the name *man*, is the ſame thing. Again, to be a *man*, or of the ſpecies *man*, and have the eſſence

this place, your lordſhip uſes it for that complex idea which is in your lordſhip's mind of that ſpecies. So that your lordſhip, by putting it for, or ſubſtituting it in the place of that complex idea where you ſay the real eſſence of it is juſt as it was, or the very ſame as it was, does ſuppoſe the idea it ſtands for to be ſteadily the ſame. For, if I change the ſignification of the word man, whereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame individuals which in your lordſhip's ſenſe it does, but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that to your lordſhip are men in your ſignification of the word man, or take in others to which your lordſhip does not allow the name man; I do not think you will ſay, that the real eſſence of man in both theſe ſenſes is the ſame. And yet your lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, "Let men miſtake in the complication of their "ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not "belong to them;" and let their ideas be what they pleaſe, the real eſſence of the individuals comprehended under the names annexed to theſe ideas, will be the ſame: for ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what your lordſhip aims at. For as your lordſhip puts it by the name of man, or any other ſpecific name, your lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that that name ſtands for, and not for the ſame idea, at the ſame time.

For example, my lord, let your lordſhip's idea, to which you annex the ſign man, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of ſuch a ſhape; let a third man's idea be of an animal of ſuch a ſize and ſhape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth's be an animal with a body of ſuch a ſhape, and an immaterial ſubſtance, with a power of reaſoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial ſubſtance. It is plain every one of theſe will call his a man, as well as your lordſhip; and yet it is as plain that men, as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex ideas, cannot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal conſtitution, i. e. the ſame real eſſence. The truth is, every diſtinct abſtract idea with a name to it, makes a real diſtinct kind, whatever the real eſſence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true what your lordſhip ſays in

of a *man*, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a *man*, or have a right to the name *man*, but what has a conformity to the abstract *idea* the name *man* stands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the species *man*, but what has the essence of that species, it follows, that the abstract *idea*, for which the name

the next words, "And let the nominal essences differ never "so much, the real common essence or nature of the several "kinds, are not at all altered by them," i. e. That our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real constitutions that are in things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, thet the change of ideas, to which we annex them, can and does alter the signification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by these names we rank and sort them into. Your lordship farther adds, "And these real "essences are unchangeable," i. e. the internal constitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beseech your lordship, are the internal constitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal constitution, or real essence of a species; which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific name, v. g. of man, horse, or tree, is annexed to, or made the sign of the same abstract complex idea, under which I rank several individuals; it is impossible but the real constitution on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal essence depends, must be the same, i. e. in other words, where we find all the same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal constitution from which those properties flow.

But your lordship proves the real essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in these following words: "For, however there may happen some variety in individu- "als by particular accidents, yet the essences of men, and "horses, and trees, remain always the same; because they do "not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Cre- "ator, who hath made several sorts of beings."

It is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular things existing do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator: but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does depend, and wholy depend, on the ideas of men.

ſtands, and the eſſence of the ſpecies is one and the ſame. From whence it is eaſy to obſerve, that the eſſences of the ſorts of things, and conſequently the ſorting of this, is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, that abſtracts and makes thoſe general *ideas*.

§ 13. *They are the workmanſhip of the Underſtanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things.*

I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much leſs to deny, that nature in the production of things makes ſeveral of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, eſpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by ſeed. But yet, I think, we may ſay the *ſorting* of them under names *is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, taking occaſion from the ſimilitude* it obſerves amongſt them to make abſtract general *ideas*, and ſet them up in the mind with names annexed to them as patterns or forms (for in that ſenſe the word form has a very proper ſignification) to which as particular things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be of that ſpecies, have that denomination, or are put into that *claſſis*. For when we ſay, this is a *man*, that a *horſe*; this *juſtice*, that *cruelty*; this a *watch*, that a *jack*; what do we elſe but rank things under different ſpecific names, as agreeing to thoſe abſtract *ideas*, of which we have made thoſe names the ſigns? and what are the eſſences of thoſe ſpecies ſet out and marked by names, but thoſe abſtract *ideas* in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exiſt, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connection with particular beings, thoſe abſtract *ideas* are the *medium* that unites them: ſo that the eſſences of ſpecies, as diſtinguiſhed and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but thoſe preciſe abſtract *ideas* we have in our minds. And therefore the ſuppoſed real eſſences of ſubſtances, if different from our abſtract *ideas*, cannot be the eſſences of the ſpecies we rank things into. For two ſpecies may be one as rationally, as two different eſſences be the eſſence of one ſpecies: and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a *horſe* or *lead*, without making either of

them to be of another ſpecies? In determining the ſpecies of things by our abſtract *ideas*, this is eaſy to reſolve: but if any one will regulate himſelf herein by ſuppoſed real eſſences, he will, I ſuppoſe, be at a loſs; and he will never be able to know when any thing preciſely ceaſes to be of the ſpecies of a *horſe* or *lead*.

§ 14. *Each diſtinct abſtract* Idea *is a diſtinct Eſſence.* Nor will any one wonder, that I ſay theſe *eſſences*, or abſtract *ideas* (which are the meaſures of name, and the boundaries of ſpecies) are *the workmanſhip of the underſtanding*, who conſiders, that at leaſt the complex ones are often, in ſeveral men, different collections of ſimple *ideas*; and therefore that is *covetouſneſs* to one man, which is not ſo to another. Nay, even in ſubſtances, where their abſtract *ideas* ſeem to be taken from the things themſelves, they are not conſtantly the ſame; no not in that ſpecies which is moſt familiar to us, and with which we have the moſt intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the *fœtus* born of a woman were a *man*, even ſo far as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nouriſhed and baptized: which could not be, if the abſtract *idea* of eſſence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of ſimple *ideas*, which the underſtanding puts together, and then abſtracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth *every diſtinct abſtract* idea *is a diſtinct eſſence:* and the names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct *ideas*, are the names of things eſſentially different. Thus a circle is as eſſentially different from an oval, as a ſheep from a goat: and rain is as eſſentially different from ſnow, as water from earth; that abſtract *idea* which is the eſſence of one, being impoſſible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abſtract *ideas*, that in any part vary one from another, with two diſtinct names annexed to them, conſtitute two diſtinct ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, *ſpecies*, as eſſentially different as any two the moſt remote, or oppoſite in the world.

§ 15. *Real and nominal Eſſence.*

But ſince the *eſſences* of things are thought, by ſome, (and

not without reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the *several significations of the word essence.*

First, *Essence* may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in substances unknown, constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their *essence.* This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; *essentia*, in its primary notation, signifying properly, *being.* And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the *essence* of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about *genus* and *species*, the word *essence* has almost lost its primary signification: and instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *genus* and *species.* It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple *ideas* co-existing must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts or *species*, only as they agree to certain abstract *ideas*, to which we have annexed those names; the *essence* of each *genus*, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract *idea*, which the general or *sortal* (if I may have leave so to call it from *sort*, as I do *general* from *genus*) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word *essence* imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of *essences*, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the *real*, the other the *nominal essence.*

§ 16. *Constant connection between the name and nominal Essence.*

Between the nominal essence, and the name, there is so *near a connection*, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this *essence*, whereby it answers that abstract *idea*, whereof that name is the sign.

§ 17. *Suppoſition that Species are diſtinguiſhed by their real Eſſences, uſeleſs.*

CONCERNING the real eſſences of corporeal ſubſtances, (to mention theſe only) there are, if I miſtake not, two opinions. The one is of thoſe, who, uſing the word *eſſence* for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain number of thoſe *eſſences*, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and ſo become of this or that *ſpecies*. The other and more rational opinion, is of thoſe who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown conſtitution of their inſenſible parts; from which flow thoſe ſenſible qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them one from another, according as we have occaſion to rank them into ſorts under common denominations. The former of theſe opinions, which ſuppoſes theſe *eſſences*, as a certain number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things, that exiſt, are caſt, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monſters, in all the ſpecies of animals, and of changelings, and other ſtrange iſſues of human birth, carry with them difficulties not poſſible to conſiſt with this *hypotheſis*: ſince it is as impoſſible, that two things, partaking exactly of the ſame real *eſſence*, ſhould have different properties, as that two figures partaking of the ſame real eſſence of a circle ſhould have different properties. But were there no other reaſon againſt it, yet the *ſuppoſition of eſſences that cannot be known*, and the making them nevertheleſs to be that which diſtinguiſhes the ſpecies of things is ſo *wholly uſeleſs*, and unſerviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourſelves with ſuch *eſſences* of the ſorts or ſpecies of things as come within the reach of our knowledge: which when ſeriouſly conſidered, will be found, as I have ſaid, to be nothing elſe but thoſe abſtract complex *ideas*, to which we have annexed diſtinct general names.

§ 18. *Real and nominal Essence the same in simple* Ideas *and Modes, different in Substances.*

Essences being thus distinguished into *nominal* and *real*, we may farther observe, that *in* the species of *simple* ideas *and modes*, they *are always the same*; but *in substances always quite different*. Thus a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal *essence* of a triangle; it being not only the abstract *idea* to which the general name is annexed, but the very *essentia* or being of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein these two *essences* are apparently different. For it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be *gold*, or gives it a right to that name which is therefore its nominal *essence*: since nothing can be called *gold* but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of *essences*, belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

§ 19. *Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.*

That such *abstract* ideas, *with names to them*, as we have been speaking of, *are essences*, may farther appear by what we are told concerning *essences*, *viz.* that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their author, are all liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus that which was grass to-day, is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and within a few days after becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real *essence*, *i. e.* that constitution, whereon the properties of these several things depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them. But *essences* being taken for *ideas*,

eſtabliſhed in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are ſuppoſed to remain ſteadily the ſame, whatever mutations the particular ſubſtances are liable to. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, the *ideas* to which *man* and *horſe* are annexed, are ſuppoſed nevertheleſs to remain the ſame: and ſo the *eſſences* of thoſe ſpecies are preſerved whole and undeſtroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of thoſe *ſpecies*. By this means, the *eſſence* of a *ſpecies* reſts ſafe and entire, without the exiſtence of ſo much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle exiſting any where in the world (as perhaps that figure exiſts not any where exactly marked out) yet the *idea* annexed to that name would not ceaſe to be what it is; nor ceaſe to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name *circle*, and ſo to ſhow which of them, by having that eſſence, was of that *ſpecies*. And though there neither were nor had been in nature ſuch a beaſt as an *unicorn*, or ſuch a fiſh as a *mermaid*; yet ſuppoſing thoſe names to ſtand for complex abſtract *ideas* that contained no inconſiſtency in them, the *eſſence* of a *mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a *man*; and the *idea* of an *unicorn* as certain, ſteady, and permanent as that of a horſe. From what has been ſaid, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of *eſſences* proves them to be only abſtract *ideas*; and is founded on the relation eſtabliſhed between them, and certain ſounds as ſigns of them; and will always be true as long as the ſame name can have the ſame ſignification.

§ 20. *Recapitulation.*

To conclude, this is that which in ſhort I would ſay, *viz.* That all the great buſineſs of *genera* and *ſpecies*, and their *eſſences*, amounts to no more but this, that men making abſtract *ideas*, and ſettling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themſelves to conſider things, and diſcourſe of them, as it were in bundles, for the eaſier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but ſlowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE *IDEAS*.

§ 1. *Names of ſimple* Ideas, *Modes, and Subſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.*

THOUGH all words, as I have ſhown, ſignify nothing immediately but the *ideas* in the mind of the ſpeaker; yet upon a nearer ſurvey we ſhall find that the *names of ſimple* ideas, *mixed modes* (under which I compriſe relations too) *and natural ſubſtances, have each of them ſomething peculiar* and different from the other. For example:

§ 2. 1. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *and Subſtances intimate real Exiſtence.*

FIRST, The *names of ſimple* ideas *and ſubſtances*, with the abſtract *ideas* in the mind, which they immediately ſignify, *intimate* alſo *ſome real exiſtence*, from which was derived their original pattern. But the *names of mixed modes terminate in the* idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we ſhall ſee more at large in the following chapter.

§ 3. 2. *Names of ſimple* Ideas, *and Modes ſignify always both real and nominal Eſſence.*

SECONDLY, The *names of ſimple* ideas, *and modes ſignify always the real as well as nominal eſſence of their ſpecies.* But *the names of natural ſubſtances ſignify rarely*, if ever, any thing but *barely the nominal eſſences* of thoſe ſpecies, as we ſhall ſhow in the chapter that treats of the names of ſubſtances in particular.

§ 4. 3. *Names of ſimple* Ideas *undefinable.*

THIRDLY, The *names of ſimple* ideas *are not capable of any definitions*; the names of all complex *ideas* are. It has not, that I know, been yet obſerved by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not ſeldom the occaſion of great wrangling and obſcurity in men's diſcourſes, whilſt ſome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined: and others think they ought to reſt ſatisfied in an explication made by a more general word,

and its reſtriction (or to ſpeak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when even after ſuch definition made according to rule, thoſe who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at leaſt I think, that the ſhowing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein conſiſts a good definition, is not wholly beſides our preſent purpoſe; and perhaps will afford ſo much light to the nature of theſe ſigns, and our *ideas*, as to deſerve a more particular conſideration.

§ 5. *If all were definable it would be a proceſs* in infinitum. I WILL not here trouble myſelf, to prove that all terms are not definable from that progreſs, *in infinitum*, which it will viſibly lead us into, if we ſhould allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were ſtill to be defined by another, where at laſt ſhould we ſtop? But I ſhall, from the nature of our *ideas*, and the ſignification of our words, ſhow, *why ſome names can, and others cannot be defined*, and which they are.

§ 6. *What a Definition is.*

I THINK it is agreed, that *a definition* is nothing elſe, but *the ſhowing the meaning of one word by ſeveral other not ſynonimous terms*. The meaning of words being only the *ideas* they are made to ſtand for by him that uſes them: the meaning of any term is then ſhowed, or the word is defined, when by other words, the *idea* it is made the ſign of, and annexed to in the mind of the ſpeaker, is as it were repreſented, or ſet before the view of another; and thus its ſignification aſcertained: this is the only uſe and end of definitions; and therefore the only meaſure of what is, or is not a good definition.

§ 7. *Simple* Ideas *why undefinable.*

THIS being premiſed, I ſay, that *the names of ſimple* ideas, and thoſe only, *are incapable of being defined*. The reaſon whereof is this, that the ſeveral terms of a definition, ſignifying ſeveral *ideas*, they can all together by no means repreſent an *idea*, which has no compoſition at all; and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the ſhowing the meaning of one word by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can in the names of ſimple *ideas* have no place.

§ 8. *Instances—Motion.*

THE not observing this difference in our *ideas*, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple *ideas*. For as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite *jargon* could the wit of man invent, than this definition, *the act of being in power, as far forth as in power?* which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If *Tully* asking a *Dutchman* what *beweeginge* was, should have received this explication in his own language, that it was *actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word *beweeginge* signified, or have guessed what *idea* a *Dutchman* ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another when he used that sound.

§ 9.

NOR have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the *jargon* of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple *ideas*, whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The *atomists*, who define motion to be a *passage from one place to another*, what do they more than put one synonimous word for another? For what is *passage*, other than *motion?* And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define it than by *motion?* For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, *passage is a motion from one place to another*, as to say, *motion is a passage*, &c. This is to translate and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what *idea* the unknown stands for; but is very far from a *definition*, unless we will say every *English* word in the dictionary is the definition of the *Latin* word it answers, and that motion is a definition of *motus*. *Nor will the successive application of the parts of the*

ſuperficies *of one body to thoſe of another*, which the *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

§ 10. *Light.*

THE act of perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous, is another peripatetic definition of a ſimple *idea*; which though not more abſurd than the former of *motion*, yet betrays its uſeleſsneſs and inſignificancy more plainly, becauſe experience will eaſily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word *light* (which it pretends to define) at all underſtood by a blind man; but the definition of *motion* appears not at firſt ſight ſo uſeleſs, becauſe it eſcapes this way of trial. For this ſimple *idea*, entering by the touch as well as ſight, it is impoſſible to ſhow an example of any one, who has no other way to get the *idea* of *motion*, but barely by the definition of that name. Thoſe who tell us, that *light* is a great number of little globules, ſtriking briſkly on the bottom of the eye, ſpeak more intelligibly than the ſchools; but yet theſe words ever ſo well underſtood would make the *idea* the word *light* ſtands for, no more known to a man that underſtands it not before, than if one ſhould tell him, that *light* was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which fairies all day long ſtruck with rackets againſt ſome men's foreheads, whilſt they paſſed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the *idea* of the cauſe of *light*, if we had it ever ſo exact, would no more give us the *idea* of *light* itſelf, as it is ſuch a particular perception in us, than the *idea* of the figure and motion of a ſharp piece of ſteel, would give us the *idea* of that pain which it is able to cauſe in us. For the cauſe of any ſenſation, and the ſenſation itſelf, in all the ſimple *ideas* of one ſenſe, are two *ideas*; and two *ideas* ſo different and diſtant one from another, that no two can be more ſo. And therefore ſhould *Des Cartes's* globules ſtrike ever ſo long on the *retina* of a man, who was blind by a *gutta ſerena*, he would thereby never have any *idea* of *light*, or any thing approaching it, though he underſtood what little globules were, and what ſtriking on another body was, ever ſo well,

And therefore the *Cartesians* very well distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us, and the *idea* which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

§ 11. *Simple* Ideas *why undefinable, farther explained.* SIMPLE *ideas*, as has been shown, *are only* to be *got* by those *impressions*, objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the *words* in the world, *made use of to explain, or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the* idea *it stands for*. For words being sounds, can produce in us no other simple *ideas*, than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection, which is known to be between them and those simple *ideas*, which common use has made them signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true *idea* of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the *ideas* already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that *idea* by a *definition*, but exciting in us other simple *ideas*, by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple *ideas*, it is the same thing; for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of *light* or *redness*, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those *ideas* in us, than the sound *light* or *red* by itself. For to hope to produce an *idea* of light, or colour, by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell and see by the ears; a sort of philosophy worthy only of *Sancho Panca*, who had the faculty to see *Dulcinea* by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple *idea* which any word stands for,

can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that *idea* in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now understood what *scarlet* signified. Upon which his friend demanding, what *scarlet* was? the blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple *idea* will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§ 12. *The contrary showed in complex* Ideas *by Instances of a Statue and Rainbow.*

The case is quite otherwise *in complex ideas*; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several *ideas* that make that composition, to imprint complex *ideas* in the mind, which were never there before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of *ideas*, passing under one name, *definition*, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others, has place, and *may make us understand the names* of things, which never came within the reach of our senses: and frame *ideas* suitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple *ideas*, which he to whom the explication is made, has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word *statue* may be explained to a blind man by other words, when *picture* cannot; his senses having given him the *idea* of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their eyes, could yet perceive the

excellency of it; the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a ſtatue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was firſt led to the ſtatue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the ſkill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, That now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, noſe, &c. as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leaſt diſtinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that muſt needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanſhip, which could repreſent to them all thoſe parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§ 13.

He that ſhould uſe the word *rainbow* to one who knew all thoſe colours, but yet had never ſeen that *phenomenon*, would, by enumerating the figure, largeneſs, poſition, and order of the colours, ſo well define that word that it might be perfectly underſtood. But yet that *definition*, how exact and perfect ſoever, would never make a blind man underſtand it; becauſe ſeveral of the ſimple *ideas* that make that complex one, being ſuch as he never received by ſenſation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

§ 14. *The names of complex* Ideas *when to be made intelligible by words.*

Simple *ideas*, as has been ſhowed, can only be got by experience, from thoſe objects, which are proper to produce in us thoſe perceptions. *When* by this means we have our minds ſtored with them, and know the names for them, then *we are in a condition to define*, and by *definition* to underſtand the names of complex *ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any term ſtands for a ſimple *idea*, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impoſſible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term ſtands for an *idea* a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the ſign of it, there another name, of the ſame *idea*

which he has been accuſtomed to, may make him underſtand its meaning. But in no caſe whatſoever is any name of any ſimple *idea*, capable of a *definition*.

§ 15. 4. *Names of Simple* Ideas *leaſt doubtful.* *FOURTHLY*, But though the names of *ſimple ideas* have not the help of *definition* to determine their ſignification, yet that hinders not but that they *are generally leſs doubtful and uncertain, than thoſe of mixed modes and ſubſtances*: becauſe they ſtanding only for one ſimple perception, men for the moſt part, eaſily and perfectly agree in their ſignification; and there is little room for miſtake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteneſs is the name of that colour he has obſerved in ſnow or milk, will not be apt to miſapply that word as long as he retains that *idea*; which when he has quite loſt, he is not apt to miſtake the meaning of it, but perceives he underſtands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of ſimple *ideas* to be put together, which makes the doubtfulneſs in the names of mixed modes; nor a ſuppoſed, but an unknown real eſſence, with properties depending thereon, the preciſe number whereof are alſo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of ſubſtances. But, on the contrary, in ſimple *ideas* the whole ſignification of the name is known at once, and conſiſts not of parts, whereof more or leſs being put in, the *idea* may be varied, and ſo the ſignification of its name be obſcure or uncertain.

§ 16. 5. *Simple* Ideas *have few Aſcents* in linea predicamentali. *FIFTHLY*, This farther may be obſerved concerning *ſimple* ideas, and their names, that they *have but few aſcents* in linea predicamentali (as they call it) *from the loweſt ſpecies to the* ſummum genus. The reaſon whereof is, that the loweſt ſpecies being but one ſimple *idea*, nothing can be left out of it; that ſo the difference being taken away, it may agree with ſome other thing in one *idea* common to them both; which having one name, is the *genus* of the other two: *v. g.* There is nothing that can be left out of the *idea* of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and ſo have one gener-

al name; as *rationality* being left out of the complex *idea* of *man*, makes is agree with brute, in the more general *idea* and name of *animal*: and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both *white* and *red*, and several other such simple *ideas*, under one general name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when *white*, *red* and *yellow* are all comprehended under the *genus* or name *colour*, it signifies no more but such *ideas* as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both *colours* and *sounds*, and the like simple *ideas*, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense: and so the general term *quality*, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes smells and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their *ideas* by more senses than one.

§ 17. 6. *Names of simple* Ideas *stand for* Ideas *not at all arbitrary.*

Sixthly, The names of simple *ideas*, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference; that those *of mixed modes* stand for *ideas* perfectly *arbitrary*; those *of substances* are not perfectly so, but *refer to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of simple* ideas *are* perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are *not arbitrary at all*. Which what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple *ideas*.

CHAP. V.

OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.

§ 1. *They stand for abstract* Ideas, *as other general Names.* THE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The es-

ſences of theſe ſpecies alſo, as has been ſhowed, are nothing but the abſtract *ideas* in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and eſſences of mixed modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other *ideas*: but if we take a little nearer ſurvey of them, we ſhall find that they have ſomething peculiar, which perhaps may deſerve our attention.

§ 2. 1. *The* Ideas *they ſtand for are made by the Underſtanding.*

THE firſt particularity I ſhall obſerve in them, is, that the abſtract *ideas*, or, if you pleaſe, the eſſences of the ſeveral ſpecies of *mixed modes are made by the underſtanding*, wherein they differ from thoſe of ſimple *ideas*; in which ſort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives ſuch as are preſented to it, by the real exiſtence of things operating upon it.

§ 3. 2. *Made arbitrarily and without Patterns.*

IN the next place, theſe *eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes are* not only *made* by the mind, but made very *arbitrarily*, made without patterns, or reference to any real exiſtence. Wherein they differ from thoſe of ſubſtances, which carry with them the ſuppoſition of ſome real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex *ideas* of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the exiſtence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as ſo many diſtinct ſpecific *ideas*, whilſt others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly ſuggeſted by outward things, paſs neglected, without particular names or ſpecifications. Nor does the mind, in theſe of mixed modes, as in the complex *idea* of ſubſtances, examine them by the real exiſtence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing ſuch peculiar compoſitions in nature. To know whether his *idea of adultery* or *inceſt* be right, will a man ſeek it any where amongſt things exiſting? Or is it true, becauſe any one has been witneſs to ſuch an action? No: but it ſuffices here, that men have put together ſuch a collection into one complex *idea*, that makes the *archetype* and ſpecific *idea*, whether ever any ſuch action were committed *in rerum natura* or no.

§ 4. *How this is done.*

To understand this aright, we must consider *wherein this making of these complex* ideas *consists*; and that is not in the making any new *idea*, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: first, It chooses a certain number: secondly, It gives them connection, and makes them into one *idea*: thirdly, It ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind, and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

§ 5. *Evidently arbitrary, in that the* Idea *is often before the Existence.*

Nobody can doubt, but that these *ideas* of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of *ideas*, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex *ideas* may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the *ideas of sacrilege* or *adultery* might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed: and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much *the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding*, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but lawmakers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And I think nobody can deny, but that the *resurrection* was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

§ 6. *Instances— Murder, Incest, Stabbing.*

To see *how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made* by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent *ideas* into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature. For what greater connection in nature has the *idea* of a man, than the *idea* of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word *murder*, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the *idea* of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex *idea*, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species *parricide*, whilst the other make no distinct species at all? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, or daughter; yet in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex *ideas*, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one *idea*, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of *ideas*, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called *stabbing*, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident than that for the most part, in the framing these *ideas*, the mind searches not

its patterns in nature, nor refers the *ideas* it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§ 7. *But still subservient to the end of Language.* But though these complex *ideas*, or *essences of mixed modes*, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they *are not made at random*, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex *ideas* be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract *ideas* are made: and though they be combinations made of *ideas* that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one *idea*; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions: wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent *ideas* collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex *ideas*, and given names to; whilst others that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract *ideas*, of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that men make and name so many complex *ideas* of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the *idea* of killing, the *idea* of father, or mother, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be in-

flicted on the murder of a ſon or neighbour; and therefore they find it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct name, which is the end of making that diſtinct combination. But though the *ideas* of mother and daughter are ſo differently treated, in reference to the *idea* of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a diſtinct abſtract *idea* with a name, and ſo a diſtinct ſpecies, and the other not; yet in reſpect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under *inceſt*: and that ſtill for the ſame convenience of expreſſing under one name, and reckoning of one ſpecies, ſuch unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious deſcriptions.

§ 8. *Whereof the intranſlatable Words of diverſe Languages are a proof.*

A MODERATE ſkill in *different languages* will eaſily ſatisfy one of the truth of this; it being ſo obvious to obſerve great ſtore of *words in one* language, *which have not any that anſwer them in another.* Which plainly ſhows, that thoſe of one country, by their cuſtoms and manner of life, have found occaſion to make ſeveral complex *ideas*, and give names to them, which others never collected into ſpecific *ideas*. This could not have happened, if theſe ſpecies were the ſteady workmanſhip of nature, and not collections made and abſtracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty ſounds, will hardly find words that anſwer them in the *Spaniſh* or *Italian*, no ſcanty languages; much leſs, I think, could any one tranſlate them into the *Caribbée* or *Weſtoe* tongues: and the *verſura* of the *Romans*, or *Corban* of the *Jews*, have no words in other languages to anſwer them; the reaſon whereof is plain, from what has been ſaid. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we ſhall find, that though they have words which in tranſlations and dictionaries are ſuppoſed to anſwer one another, yet there is ſcarce one of ten amongſt the names of complex *ideas*, eſpecially of mixed modes, that ſtands for the ſame preciſe *idea*, which the word does that in

dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no *ideas* more common, and less compounded, than the measures of time, extension, and weight, and the *Latin* names, *hora*, *pes*, *libra*, are without difficulty rendered by the *English* names *hour*, *foot*, and *pound*: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the *ideas* a *Roman* annexed to these *Latin* names, were very far different from those which an *Englishman* expresses by those *English* ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other language designed by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the names of more abstract and compounded *ideas*, such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations.

§ 9. *This shows Species to be made for Communication.* The reason why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about *genera* and *species*, and their *essences*, as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier signifying such collections of *ideas*, as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract *idea*, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of the word *species*, may make it sound harsh to some, that I say the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied, that it is the mind makes those abstract complex *ideas*, to which specific names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes the boundaries of the sort or *species*; since with me, *species* and *sort* have no other difference, than that of a *Latin* and *English idiom*.

§ 10. *In mixed modes it is the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.*

THE *near relation* that there is *between ſpecies, eſſences*, and their *general name*, at leaſt *in mixed modes*, will farther appear, when we conſider that it is the name that ſeems to preſerve thoſe *eſſences*, and give them their laſting duration. For the connection between the looſe parts of thoſe complex *ideas* being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would ceaſe again, were there not ſomething that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from ſcattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them faſt together. What a vaſt variety of different *ideas* does the word *triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one *ſpecies!* Had this name been never made or quite loſt, we might, no doubt, have had deſcriptions of what paſſed in that ſolemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds thoſe different parts together, in the unity of one complex *idea*, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the ſeveral parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other ſhow, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex *idea*, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity neceſſary to any eſſence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common uſe annexed to it; I leave to be conſidered by thoſe, who look upon *eſſences* and *ſpecies* as real eſtabliſhed things in nature.

§ 11.

SUITABLE to this, we find, that *men ſpeaking of mixed modes, ſeldom* imagine, or *take any other for ſpecies of them, but ſuch as are ſet out by name:* becauſe they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no ſuch *ſpecies* are taken notice of, or ſuppoſed to be, unleſs a *name* be joined to it, as the ſign of man's having combined into one *idea*, ſeveral looſe ones; and by that *name* giving a laſting union to the parts, which would otherwiſe ceaſe to have any, as ſoon as the mind laid by that abſtract

idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex *idea*, have a settled and permanent union; then is the essence as it were established, and the *species* looked on as complete. For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general *names* for the convenience of discourse, and communication? Thus we see, that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet, are looked on as no distinct species of action: but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes for a distinct *species*, where it has a distinct *name*; as in *England*, in whose language it is called *stabbing*: but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar *name*, it passes not for a distinct *species*. But in the *species* of corporeal substances, though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence; yet since those *ideas* which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct *species*, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting or giving a *name* to that complex *idea*.

§ 12. *For the Originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind which also shows them to be the workmanship of the Understanding.*

Conformably also to what has been said, concerning the *essences* of the *species* of *mixed modes*, that they are the creatures of the understanding, rather than the works of nature: conformable, I say to this, we find that *their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther*. When we speak of *justice* or *gratitude*, we frame to ourselves no imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract *ideas* of those virtues, and look not farther: as they do, when we speak of a *horse* or *iron*, whose specific *ideas* we consider not, as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those *ideas*. But in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the orig-

inal patterns as being in the mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that these *essences* of the *species* of mixed modes, are by a more particular name called *notions*; as by a peculiar right, appertaining to the understanding.

§ 13. *Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shows the reason why they are so compounded.* HENCE likewise we may learn, *Why the complex* ideas *of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural substances.* Because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short those *ideas*, it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract *idea* things that in their nature have no coherence; and so, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded *ideas*. Thus the name of *procession*, what a great mixture of independent *ideas* of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas the complex *ideas* of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two, *viz.* shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.

§ 14. *Names of mixed modes stand always for their real Essences.*

ANOTHER thing we may observe from what has been said, is, that *the names of mixed modes always signify* (when they have any determined signification) *the real essences of their species*. For these abstract *ideas*, being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name, but barely that complex *idea* the mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that, on which all the properties of the *species* depend, and from which alone they all flow. and so in these the *real* and *nominal essence* is the same; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we shall see hereafter.

§ 15. *Why their Names are usually got before their* Ideas.

THIS also may show us the reason, *Why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got, before the* Ideas *they stand for are perfectly known.* Because there being no *species* of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names, and those *species*, or rather their essences, being abstract complex *ideas* made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame these complex *ideas*: unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex *ideas*, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the *idea*, before one gave it the name: and so it is still, where making a new complex *idea*, one also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for *ideas*, which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate: and in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their *ideas?* What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract *ideas* of *glory* and *ambition*, before he has heard the names of them? In simple *ideas* and substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such *ideas* as have a real existence and union in nature, the *ideas* or names are got one before the other, as it happens.

§ 16. *Reason of my being so large on this Subject.*

WHAT has been said here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable also to relations; which, since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on; especially, since what I have here said concerning words in this third book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a subject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass: but I was willing to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way (I am sure it is one I thought not of when I began to write) That by searching it to the bottom, and

turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general miscarriage; which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice of. When it is considered what a pudder is made about *essences*, and how much all sorts of knowledge, discourse and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused use and application of words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I think, therefore, needs to be inculcated; because the faults, men are usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hinderances of true knowledge, but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. Men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none at all, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what *ideas* are, or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to truth, peace and learning, if by any enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language; and give them reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to say concerning this matter.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. *The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.*

THE *common names of substances*, as well as other general terms, *stand for sorts*; which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex *ideas*,

wherein ſeveral particular ſubſtances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and ſignified by one name. I ſay, do or might agree: for though there be but one ſun exiſting in the world, yet the *idea* of it being abſtracted, ſo that more ſubſtances (if there were ſeveral) might each agree in it; it is as much a ſort, as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars. They want not their reaſons who think there are, and that each fixed ſtar would anſwer the *idea* the *name* ſun ſtands for, to one who was placed in a due diſtance; which, by the way, may ſhow us how much the ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, *genera* and *ſpecies* of things (for thoſe *Latin* terms ſignify to me no more than the *Engliſh* word *ſort*) depend on ſuch collections of *ideas* as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; ſince it is not impoſſible, but that in propriety of ſpeech, that might be a ſun to one, which is a ſtar to another.

§ 2. *The Eſſence of each ſort is the abſtract* Idea. THE meaſure and boundary of each ſort, or *ſpecies*, whereby it is conſtituted that particular ſort, and diſtinguiſhed from others, is that we call its *eſſence*, which *is* nothing but that *abſtract* idea *to which the name is annexed*: ſo that every thing contained in that *idea* is eſſential to that ſort. This, though it be all the *eſſence* of natural ſubſtances that we know, or by which we diſtinguiſh them into ſorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the *nominal eſſences*, to diſtinguiſh it from the real conſtitution of ſubſtances, upon which depends this *nominal eſſence*, and all the properties of that ſort: which therefore, as has been ſaid, may be called the *real eſſence*: *v. g.* the *nominal eſſence* of *gold* is that complex *idea* the word *gold* ſtands for, let it be, for inſtance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fuſible, and fixed. But the *real eſſence* is the conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of that body, on which thoſe qualities, and all the other properties of gold depend. How far theſe two are different, though they are both called *eſſence*, is obvious at firſt ſight to diſcover.

§ 3. *The nominal and real Essence different.*

For though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex *idea* to which I, and others, annex the name *man*, and so be the *nominal essence* of the *species* so called; yet nobody will say that complex *idea* is the *real essence* and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort. The foudation of all those qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex *idea*, is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of *man*, from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow: and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has: we should have a quite other *idea* of his *essence* than what now is contained in our definition of that *species*, be it what it will: and our *idea* of any individual *man* would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels, and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at *Strasburg*, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.

§ 4. *Nothing essential to Individuals.*

That *essence*, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to *sorts*; and that it is considered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into *sorts*, appears from hence: that take but away the abstract *ideas*, by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of any thing *essential* to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and nature has made me so: but there is nothing, I have is essential to me. An accident, or disease, may very much alter my colour, or shape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding, no nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more, and bet-

ter, or fewer, and worse faculties than I have: and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. Nor of these are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual whatsoever, till the mind refers it to some sort of *species* of things; and then presently according to the abstract *idea* of that sort something is found *essential*. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *essential*, the consideration of some *species*, or the complex *idea*, signified by some general name, comes into his mind: and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is said to be *essential*. So that if he be asked, whether it be *essential* to me or any other particular corporeal being to have reason? I say no: no more than it is *essential* to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort *man*, and to have the name *man* given it, then reason is *essential* to it, supposing reason to be a part of the complex *idea* the name *man* stands for: as it is *essential* to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name *treatise*, and rank it under that *species*. So that *essential and not essential, relate only to our abstract* Ideas, *and the names annexed to them*; which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities, which are contained in the abstract *idea*, which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that *species*, nor be called by that name, since that abstract *idea* is the very *essence* of that *species*.

§ 5.

THUS if the *idea* of *body*, with some people, be bare extension or space, then solidity is not *essential* to body: if others make the *idea*, to which they give the name *body*, to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to *body*. That, therefore, and *that alone is* considered as *essential, which makes a part of the complex* idea *the name of a sort stands for*, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in *iron*, but wanted obedience to

the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would any one question, whether it wanted any thing *essential?* It would be absurd to ask, whether a thing really existing wanted any thing *essential* to it. Or could it be demanded, whether this made an *essential* or *specific* difference or no; since we have no other measure of *essential* or *specific*, but our abstract *ideas?* And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general *ideas* and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, what is sufficient to make an *essential* difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract *idea*, which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a *species?* All such patterns and standards, being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally *essential;* and every thing, in each individual, will be *essential* to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, whether obeying the magnet be *essential* to *iron?* yet, I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask whether it be *essential* to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name *iron*, or as being of a certain *species?* And if, as has been said, our abstract *ideas*, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of *species*, nothing can be *essential* but what is contained in those *ideas*.

§ 6.

It is true I have often mentioned a *real essence*, distinct in substances from those abstract *ideas* of them, which I call their *nominal essence*. By this *real essence* I mean the real constitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the *nominal essence;* that particular constitution which every thing has within itself, without any relation to any thing without it. But *essence*, even in this sense, *relates to a sort*, and supposes a *species:* for being that real constitution, on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to *species*, and not to individuals:

v. g. Suppoſing the nominal eſſence of *gold* to be a body of ſuch a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fuſibility, the real eſſence is that conſtitution of the parts of matter, on which theſe qualities, and their union, depend; and is alſo the foundation of its ſolubility in *aq. regia*, and other properties accompanying that complex *idea*. Here are *eſſences* and *properties*, but all upon ſuppoſition of a ſort, or general abſtract *idea*, which is conſidered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of theſe qualities are ſo annexed, as to be *eſſential* to it, or inſeparable from it. That which is *eſſential* belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that ſort: but take away the conſideration of its being ranked under the name of ſome abſtract *idea*, and then there is nothing neceſſary to it, nothing inſeparable from it. Indeed, as to the *real eſſences* of ſubſtances, we only ſuppoſe their being, without preciſely knowing what they are: but that which annexes them ſtill to the *ſpecies*, is the nominal eſſence, of which they are the ſuppoſed foundation and cauſe.

§ 7. *The nominal Eſſence bounds the Species.*

THE next thing to be conſidered, is, by which of thoſe eſſences it is that *ſubſtances are determined into* ſorts, or *ſpecies*; and that, it is evident, is *by the nominal eſſence*. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the ſort, ſignifies. It is impoſſible, therefore, that any thing ſhould determine the ſorts of things, which we rank under general names, but that *idea* which that name is deſigned as a mark for; which is that, as has been ſhown, which we call the *nominal eſſence*. Why do we ſay, this is a *horſe*, and that a *mule*; this is an *animal*, that an *herb*? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that *ſort*, but becauſe it has that nominal eſſence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abſtract *idea* that name is annexed to? And I deſire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or ſpeaks any of thoſe or other names of ſubſtances, to know what ſort of *eſſences* they ſtand for.

§ 8.

AND that the *ſpecies of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct names, according to the com-*

plex ideas *in us*, and not according to precise, distinct, real *essences* in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one *species*, have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ *specifically*. This as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the same *species*, having the same nominal *essence*, under the same name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into *species*, according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same *species*, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the *essence* to us, which determines every particular to this or that *class*; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but that abstract *idea* to which that name is annexed? and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

§ 9. *Not the real Essence which we know not.*

Nor indeed *can we* rank, and *sort things*, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them *by their real essences*, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible *ideas* which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as I said a countryman's *idea* is from the inward contrivance

of that famous clock at *Straſburg*, whereof he only ſees the outward figure and motions. There is not ſo contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the moſt enlarged underſtanding. Though the familiar uſe of things about us, take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the ſtones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we preſently find we know not their make, and can give no reaſon of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal conſtitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the groſſeſt and moſt obvious we can imagine amongſt them, What is that texture of parts, that real *eſſence*, that makes lead and antimony fuſible; wood and ſtones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and ſtones not? And yet how infinitely theſe come ſhort of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable *real eſſences* of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanſhip of the all-wiſe and powerful God, in the great fabric of the univerſe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehenſion of the moſt inquiſitive and intelligent man, than the beſt contrivance of the moſt ingenious man doth the conceptions of the moſt ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into ſorts, and diſpoſe them into certain claſſes, under names, by their *real eſſences*, that are ſo far from our diſcovery or comprehenſion. A blind man may as ſoon ſort things by their colours, and he that has loſt his ſmell, as well diſtinguiſh a lily and a roſe by their odours, as by thoſe internal conſtitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can diſtinguiſh ſheep and goats by their real eſſences, that are unknown to him, may be pleaſed to try his ſkill in thoſe *ſpecies*, called *caſſowary* and *querechinchio*; and by their internal real eſſences determine the boundaries of thoſe *ſpecies*, without knowing the complex *idea* of ſenſible qualities, that each of thoſe ſtand for, in the countries where thoſe animals are to be found.

§ 10. *Not ſubſtantial Forms which we know leſs.*

Those therefore who have been taught, that the ſeveral

species of substances had their distinct internal *substantial forms*; and that it was those *forms* which made the distinction of substances into their true *species* and *genera*, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after *substantial forms*, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confused conception in general.

§ 11. *That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species farther evident from Spirits.*

THAT our *ranking* and distinguishing natural *substances into species, consists in the nominal essences* the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves, is farther evident from our *ideas* of *spirits*. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple *ideas* which it attributes to *spirits*, it hath, or can have no other notion of *spirit*, but by attributing all those operations, it finds in itself, to a sort of beings, without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple *ideas* which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple *ideas* to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourselves, the *idea* of existence, knowledge, power, and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex *idea* of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy Being. And though we are told, that there are different *species of angels*: yet we know not how to frame distinct specific *ideas* of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of more *species* than one of *spirits* is impossible, but because having no more simple *ideas* (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such beings, but only these few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several *species of*

spirits one from another, but by attributing those operations and powers, we find in ourselves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specific *ideas* of *spirits*, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration, and all those other *ideas* with infinity; to the other *spirits*, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our *ideas*, put any difference by any number of simple *ideas*, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular *ideas* of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, *&c.* being *ideas* derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of *spirits*, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an *idea* of the first Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay purest seraph, is from the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him.

§ 12. *Whereof there are probably numberless Species.* It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many *species of spirits*, as much separated and diversified one from another, by distinct properties, whereof we have no *ideas*, as the *species* of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities, which we know and observe in them. That there should be more *species* of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, That in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region; and there are some birds, that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish days.

There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts, that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and at sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids or sea-men. There are some brutes, that seem to have as much knowledge and reason, as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find every where, that the several *species* are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the *species* of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more *species* of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of GOD, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches neareſt to nothing. And yet of all those distinct *species*, for the reasons above said, we have no clear distinct *ideas*.

§ 13. *The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.*

But to return to the *species* of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one, whether *ice* and *water* were two distinct *species* of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two distinct *species*, is in the right. But if an *Englishman*, bred in *Jamaica*, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of *ice*, coming into *England* in the winter, find the water he put in his bason at night, in

a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, ſhould call it hardened water; I aſk, whether this would be a new *ſpecies* to him different from water? And, I think, it would be anſwered here, it would not be to him a new *ſpecies*, no more than congealed gelly, when it is cold, is a diſtinct *ſpecies* from the ſame gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a diſtinct *ſpecies* from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be ſo, it is plain, that our *diſtinct ſpecies are nothing but diſtinct complex* ideas, *with diſtinct names annexed to them.* It is true, every ſubſtance that exiſts has its peculiar conſtitution, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible qualities and powers we obſerve in it; but the ranking of things into *ſpecies*, which is nothing but ſorting them under ſeveral titles, is done by us according to the *ideas* that we have of them: which though ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them by names, ſo that we may be able to diſcourſe of them, when we have them not preſent before us; yet if we ſuppoſe it to be done by their real internal conſtitutions, and that things exiſting are diſtinguiſhed by nature into ſpecies, by real eſſences, according as we diſtinguiſh them into *ſpecies* by names, we ſhall be liable to great miſtakes.

§ 14. *Difficulties againſt a certain number of real Eſſences.*

To diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial beings into *ſpecies*, according to the uſual ſuppoſition, that there are certain preciſe *eſſences* or *forms* of things, whereby all the individuals exiſting, are by nature diſtinguiſhed into *ſpecies*, theſe things are neceſſary:

§ 15.

FIRST, To be aſſured that nature, in the production of things, always deſigns them to partake of certain regulated eſtabliſhed *eſſences*, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude ſenſe it is uſually propoſed, would need ſome better explication before it can fully be aſſented to.

§ 16.

SECONDLY, It would be neceſſary to know whether na-

ture always attains that *essence* it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births, that in diverse sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.

§ 17.

Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call *monsters* be really a distinct *species*, according to the scholastic notion of the word *species*; since it is certain, that every thing that exists has its particular constitution; and yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities, which are supposed to result from, and accompany the *essence* of that *species*, from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

§ 18. *Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties.*

Fourthly, The *real essences* of those things, which we distinguish into *species*, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ought to have *ideas* of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, *the supposed real essences of things stand us not instead for the distinguishing substances into species.*

§ 19.

Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that having framed perfect complex *ideas* of the *properties* of things, flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into *species*. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that *specie*. We can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of *gold*, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined that *species*. By the word *gold* here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter; *v. g.* the last guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in

its ordinary ſignification for that complex *idea*, which I or any one elſe calls *gold*; *i. e* for the nominal eſſence of gold, it would be *jargon*: ſo hard is it to ſhow the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing elſe but words to do it by.

§ 20.

By all which it is clear, that our *diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies* by names, *is not* at all *founded on their real eſſences*; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into ſpecies, according to the internal eſſential differences.

§ 21. *But ſuch a Collection as our Name ſtands for.*

But ſince, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real eſſences of things; all we can do is to collect ſuch a number of ſimple *ideas*, as by examination we find to be united together in things exiſting, and thereof to make one complex *idea*. Which though it be not the real eſſence of any ſubſtance that exiſts, is yet *the ſpecific eſſence*, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at leaſt try the truth of theſe nominal eſſences. For example, there be that ſay, that the eſſence of *body* is extenſion: if it be ſo, we can never miſtake in putting the eſſence of any thing for the thing itſelf. Let us then in diſcourſe put *extenſion* for *body*; and when we would ſay that body moves, let us ſay that extenſion moves, and ſee how it will look. He that ſhould ſay that one extenſion by impulſe moves another extenſion, would by the bare expreſſion, ſufficiently ſhow the abſurdity of ſuch a notion. The *eſſence* of any thing, in reſpect of us, is the whole complex *idea*, comprehended and marked by that name; and in ſubſtances, beſides the ſeveral diſtinct ſimple *ideas* that make them up, the confuſed one of ſubſtance, or of an unknown ſupport and cauſe of their union, is always a part: and therefore the eſſence of body is not bare extenſion, but an extended ſolid thing: and ſo to ſay an extended ſolid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to ſay, *body* moves or impels. Likewiſe to ſay, that a rational animal is capable of converſation, is all one as

to say a *man*. But no one will say, that rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name man.

§ 22. *Our abstract* Ideas *are to us the Measures of species—Instance in that of Man.*

THERE are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said (*sit fides penes authorem*, but there appears no contradiction that there should be such) that with language, and reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked, whether these be all *men* or no, all of human *species*; it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word *man*, or the complex *idea* signified by that name, agrees, are *men*, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence, and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific *idea*; only we have reason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the internal real constitution makes a specific difference, it is in vain to inquire; whilst *our measures of species* be, as they *are*, *only our abstract ideas*, which we know; and not that internal constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and speech? and shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and *species* between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the distinction of *species* or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

§ 23. *Species not distinguished by Generation.*

Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed real *species* distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the *species* of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? but in those two it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women have conceived by drills; and what real *species*, by that measure, such a production will be in nature, will be a new question: and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by the pedigree of what *species* every animal's issue is; and be at a loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But farther, if the *species* of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation, must I go to the *Indies* to see the sire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger or that tea?

§ 24. *Not by substantial forms.*

Upon the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of sensible qualities, that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men, in the sorting them. Much less were any *substantial forms* ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor

trouble themſelves about ſubſtantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their ſenſible qualities, are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely diſtinguiſh them from their uſes, and better know what they may expect from each, than thoſe learned quick-ſighted men, who look ſo deep into them, and talk ſo confidently of ſomething more hidden and eſſential.

§ 25. *The ſpecific Eſſences are made by the Mind.* But ſuppoſing that the *real eſſences* of ſubſtances were diſcoverable by thoſe that would ſeverely apply themſelves to that inquiry, yet we could not reaſonably think that the *ranking of things under general names was regulated by* thoſe internal real conſtitutions, or any thing elſe but *their obvious appearances:* ſince languages in all countries, have been eſtabliſhed long before ſciences. So that they have not been philoſophers, or logicians, or ſuch who have troubled themſelves about *forms* and *eſſences*, that have made the general names that are in uſe amongſt the ſeveral nations of men: but thoſe more or leſs comprehenſive terms have for the moſt part, in all languages, received their birth and ſignification from ignorant and illiterate people, who ſorted and denominated things by thoſe ſenſible qualities they found in them; thereby to ſignify them, when abſent, to others, whether they had an occaſion to mention a ſort or a particular thing.

§ 26. *Therefore very various and uncertain.* SINCE then it is evident, that we ſort and name ſubſtances by their *nominal*, and not by their real *eſſences;* the next thing to be conſidered is, how and by whom theſe *eſſences* come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they *are made by the mind*, and not by nature: for were they nature's workmanſhip, they could not be ſo various and different in ſeveral men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we ſhall not find the nominal eſſence of any one *ſpecies* of ſubſtances in all men the ſame; no not of that which of all others we are the moſt intimately acquainted with. It could not poſſibly be, that the abſtract *idea* to which the name

man is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making; and that to one it should be *animal rationale*, and to another *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the name *man*, to a complex *idea* made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, as thereby one essence of the *species man*; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the *species* he calls *man*: by which means, the same individual will be a true *man* to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the *species man*; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent, is very visible: since it has been more than once debated, whether several human *fœtus's* should be preserved or received to baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason, as infants cast in another mould: some whereof though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human *species*: the learned divine and lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of *animal rationale*, and substitute some other essence of the human *species*. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. *When the Abbot of St. Martin*, says he, *was born, he had so little of the figure of a man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptized and declared a man provisionally* [till time should show what he would prove.] *Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotrue, i. e.* Ill-shaped. *He was of* Caen. Menagi-

ana, 278-430. This child, we ſee, was very near being excluded out of the *ſpecies* of *man* barely by his ſhape. He eſcaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had caſt him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to paſs for a man. And yet there can be no reaſon given, why if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational ſoul could not have been lodged in him; why a viſage ſomewhat longer, or a noſe flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have conſiſted, as well as the reſt of his ill figure, with ſuch a ſoul, ſuch parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

§ 27.

WHEREIN, then, would I gladly know, conſiſts the preciſe and *unmoveable boundaries* of that *ſpecies*? It is plain, if we examine, there is *no* ſuch thing *made by nature*, and eſtabliſhed by her amongſt men. The real eſſence of that, or any other ſort of ſubſtances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are ſo undetermined in our nominal eſſences, which we make ourſelves, that if ſeveral men were to be aſked concerning ſome oddly-ſhaped *fœtus*, as ſoon as born, whether it were a *man* or no, it is paſt doubt, one ſhould meet with different anſwers, which could not happen, if the nominal eſſences, whereby we limit and diſtinguiſh the *ſpecies* of ſubſtances, were not made by man, with ſome liberty; but were exactly copied from preciſe boundaries ſet by nature, whereby it diſtinguiſhed all ſubſtances into certain ſpecies. Who would undertake to reſolve, what ſpecies that monſter was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, *lib.* 1. *c.* 3. with a man's head and hog's body? Or thoſe other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beaſts, as dogs, horſes, *&c.* If any of theſe creatures had lived, and could have ſpoke, it would have increaſed the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human ſhape; and all below ſwine; had it been murder to deſtroy it? Or muſt the biſhop have been conſulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France, ſome years ſince, in ſomewhat a like caſe. So

uncertain are the boundaries of ſpecies of animals to us, who have no other meaſures than the complex *ideas* of our own collecting: and ſo far are we from certainly knowing what a *man* is; though, perhaps, it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may ſay, that the certain boundaries of that ſpecies are ſo far from being determined, and the preciſe number of ſimple *ideas*, which make the nominal eſſence, ſo far from being ſettled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may ſtill ariſe about it. And I imagine, none of the definitions of the word *man*, which we yet have, nor deſcriptions of that ſort of animal, are ſo perfect and exact, as to ſatisfy a conſiderate inquiſitive perſon, much leſs to obtain a general conſent, and to be that which men would every where ſtick by, in the deciſion of caſes, and determining of life and death, baptiſm or no baptiſm, in productions that might happen.

§ 28. *But not ſo arbitrary as Mixed Modes.* BUT though theſe *nominal eſſences of ſubſtances* are made by the mind, they are *not* yet *made ſo arbitrarily as thoſe of mixed modes*. To the making of any nominal eſſence, it is neceſſary, *Firſt*, That the *ideas* whereof it conſiſts, have ſuch an union as to make but one *idea*, how compounded ſoever. *Secondly*, That the particular *ideas* ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more nor leſs; for if two abſtract complex *ideas*, differ either in number or ſorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame eſſence. In the firſt of theſe, the mind in making its complex *ideas* of ſubſtances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a ſheep, with the ſhape of a horſe; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedneſs of gold, to be the complex *ideas* of any real ſubſtances: unleſs he has a mind to fill his head with *chimeras*, and his diſcourſe with unintelligible words. Men obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſting together, therein copied nature; and of *ideas* ſo united, made their complex ones of ſubſtances.

For though men may make what complex *ideas* they pleaſe, and give what names to them they will; yet if they will be underſtood, when they ſpeak of things really exiſting, they muſt in ſome degree conform their *ideas* to the things they would ſpeak of: or elſe men's language will be like that of *Babel*; and every man's words being intelligible only to himſelf, would no longer ſerve to converſation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the *ideas* they ſtand for be not ſome way anſwering the common appearances and agreement of ſubſtances, as they really exiſt.

§ 29. *Though very imperfect.*

SECONDLY, Though the mind of man, *in making* its *complex ideas of ſubſtances*, never puts any together that do not really or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt; and ſo it truly borrows that union from nature; yet *the number* it combines, *depends upon the various care, induſtry or fancy of him that makes it.* Men generally content themſelves with ſome few ſenſible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as thoſe that they take. Of ſenſible ſubſtances, there are two ſorts; one of organized bodies which are propagated by ſeed; and in theſe, the ſhape is that, which to us is the leading quality and moſt characteriſtical part that determines the ſpecies. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended ſolid ſubſtance of ſuch a certain figure uſually ſerves the turn. For however ſome men ſeem to prize their definition of *animal rationale*, yet ſhould there a creature be found, that had language and reaſon, but partook not of the uſual ſhape of a man, I believe it would hardly paſs for a man, how much ſoever it were *animal rationale*. And if *Balaam's* aſs had, all his life, diſcourſed as rationally as he did once with his maſter, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name *man*, or allowed him to be of the ſame ſpecies with himſelf. As in vegetables and animals it is the ſhape, ſo in moſt other bodies, not propagated by ſeed, it is the colour we muſt fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qual-

ities, comprehended in our complex *idea*, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, *viz.* shape and colour, for so presumptive *ideas* of several *species*, that in a good picture we readily say this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil.

§ 30 *Which yet serve for common converse.*

But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet *men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple* ideas, *or* qualities, *belonging to any sort of things, signified by its name.* Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many those simple *ideas* are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life: and so, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities coexisting, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled signification, a precise number of simple *ideas*; much less all those, which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir about *genus* and *species*, and such a deal of talk of specific differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with reason imagine that those *forms*, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only *chimeras*, which gives us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that shall consider, how far the names of substances are from having significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reason to conclude, that though the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most

of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex *ideas* are, in several men, very different: and therefore that these boundaries of *species* are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate *species*, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the *species* of things: or if it be so, our boundaries of *species* are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would best show us their most material differences and agreements, but we ourselves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into *species*, that we may the easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any substance, but of the simple *ideas* that are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple *ideas*, we make that collection our specific *idea*, and give it a general name; that in recording our own thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word design all the individuals that agree in that complex *idea*, without enumerating the simple *ideas* that make it up; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for.

§ 31. *Essences of Species under the same name very different.*

But however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation, it is plain that this complex *idea*, wherein they observe several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex *idea* contains a greater, and in others a smaller num-

ber of qualities; and ſo is apparently ſuch as the mind makes it. The yellow ſhining colour makes *gold* to children; others add weight, malleableneſs, and fuſibility; and others yet other qualities which they find joined with that yellow colour, as conſtantly as its weight and fuſibility; for in all theſe and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex *idea* of that ſubſtance wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore *different men* leaving out or putting in ſeveral ſimple *ideas*, which others do not, according to their various examination, ſkill, or obſervation of that ſubject, *have different eſſences of gold*; which muſt therefore be of their own, and not of nature's making.

§ 32. *The more general our* Ideas *are, the more incomplete and partial they are.*

If the number of ſimple *ideas*, that make the nominal eſſence of the loweſt ſpecies, or firſt ſorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man variouſly collecting them, it is much more evident that they do ſo, in the more comprehenſive *claſſis*, which by the maſters of logic are called *genera*. Theſe are complex *ideas* deſignedly imperfect: and it is viſible at firſt ſight, that ſeveral of thoſe qualities, that are to be found in the things themſelves, are purpoſely left out of *generical ideas*. For as the mind, to make general *ideas* comprehending ſeveral particulars, leaves out thoſe of time, and place, and ſuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; ſo to make other yet more general *ideas*, that may comprehend different ſorts, it leaves out thoſe qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new collection only ſuch *ideas* as are common to ſeveral ſorts. The ſame convenience that made men expreſs ſeveral parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, ſets them alſo upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and ſilver, and ſome other bodies of different ſorts. This is done by leaving out thoſe qualities which are peculiar to each ſort; and retaining a complex *idea* made up of thoſe that are common to them all. To which the name *metal* being annexed, there is a *genus* conſti-

tuted; the essence whereof being that abstract *idea*, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name *metal*, whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature, when they make their general *ideas* of substances; since there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making their general *ideas*, seeing more the convenience of language and quick dispatch, by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract *ideas*, chiefly pursued that end which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole business of *genera* and *species* the *genus*, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the *species*, and the *species* but a partial *idea* of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a *man*, and a *horse*, and an animal, and a plant, *&c.* are distinguished by real essences, made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon *Bucephalus*. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these *genera* and *species*, or sorts, we should find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general term is always the name of a less complex *idea*; and that each *genus* is but a partial conception of the *species* comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general *ideas* be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names, which are made

uſe of to ſignify them; and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting, as made by nature.

§ 33. *This all accommodated to the end of Speech.* THIS is *adjuſted to the true end of ſpeech*, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would diſcourſe of things as they agreed in the complex *idea* of extenſion and ſolidity, needed but uſe the word *body* to denote all ſuch. He that to theſe would join others ſignified by the words life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, needed but uſe the word *animal*, to ſignify all which partook of thoſe *ideas*: and he that had made a complex *idea* of a body, with life, ſenſe, and motion, with the faculty of reaſoning, and a certain ſhape joined to it, needed but uſe the ſhort monoſyllable *man*, to expreſs all particulars that correſpond to that complex *idea*. This is the proper buſineſs of *genus* and *ſpecies*: and this men do, without any conſideration of *real eſſences*, or *ſubſtantial forms*, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of thoſe things; nor within the ſignification of our words, when we diſcourſe with others.

§ 34. *Inſtance in Contraries.* WERE I to talk with any one of a ſort of birds I lately ſaw in St. James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of ſomething between feathers and hair of a dark brown colour without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like ſprigs of Spaniſh broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I muſt make this deſcription of it, and ſo may make others underſtand me: but when I am told that the name of it is *Caſſowary*, I may then uſe that word to ſtand in diſcourſe for all my complex *idea* mentioned in that deſcription; though by that word, which is now become a ſpecific name, I know no more of the real eſſence or conſtitution of that ſort of animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that *ſpecies* of birds, before I learned the name, as many *Engliſhmen* do of ſwans, or herons, which are ſpecific names, very well known, of ſorts of birds common in *England*.

§ 35. *Men determine the Sorts.*

FROM what has been said, it is evident, that *men make sorts of things.* For it being different essences alone that make different *species*, it is plain that they who make those abstract *ideas*, which are the nominal essences, do thereby make the *species*, or sort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or no, *i. e.* whether it were of that *species*. This could be determined only by that abstract *idea* to which every one annexed the name *gold*: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that *species*, who included not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound *gold*; and on the other side it would not be true gold, or of that *species* to him who included malleableness in his specific *idea*. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse *species* even under one and the same name, but men that make two different abstract *ideas* consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine that a body may exist, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain, that gold itself, will be sometimes so eager (as artists call it) that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said, of the putting in or leaving malleableness out of the complex *idea*, the name *gold* is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities: for whatsoever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed, that makes the *species*; and as any particular parcel of matter answers that *idea*, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that *species*. And thus any thing is true *gold*, perfect *metal*. All which determination of the *species*, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex *idea*.

§ 36. *Nature makes the Similitude.*

THIS then, in short, is the case: *nature makes many particular things which do agree* one with another, in many sensible qualities and probably too in their inter-

nal frame and constitution: but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into *species*; it is *men*, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, *range them into sorts, in order to their naming*, for the convenience of comprehensive signs: under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract *idea*, come to be ranked as under ensigns; so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in this, I think, consists the whole business of *genus* and *species*.

§ 37.

I DO not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that *the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men*; since the essences of the *species*, distinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.

§ 38. *Each abstract* Idea *is an Essence.*

ONE thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine; which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that *each abstract* idea, *with a name to it, makes a distinct species*. But who can help it if truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can show us the *species* of things limited and distinguished by something else; and let us see, that general terms signify not our abstract *ideas*, but something different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a hound are not as distinct *species* as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no other *idea* of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different collection of simple *ideas*, to which we have given those different names.

§ 39. Genera *and* Species *are in order to naming.* How much *the making of* species *and* genera *is in order to general names*, and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a *species*, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking *watch* are but one *species* to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the name *watch* for one, and *clock* for the other, and distinct complex *ideas* to which those names belong, to him they are different *species*. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear *idea* of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one *species* to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new *species?* There are some *watches* that are made with four wheels, others with five: is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles: are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions of *watches?* It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest: but whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex *idea* to which the name *watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the *idea* which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different *species* under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such precise complex *ideas*, give names that shall prevail; they will then be new *species* to them, who have those *ideas* with names to them; and can, by those differences, distinguish watches into these several sorts, and then *watch* will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct *species* to men ignorant of clock-

work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other *idea* but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same *idea*, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a *watch*. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a *rational man* and a *changeling*, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a *drill* and a *changeling*. But whether one or both these differences be essential or specifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex *idea* that the name *man* stands for: for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man or no.

§ 40. *Species of artificial things less confused than natural.* FROM what has been before said, we may see the reason *why, in the species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, than in natural.* Because an *artificial* thing being a production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well knows the *idea* of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other *idea*, nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the *idea* or essence of the several sorts of *artificial* things consisting, for the most part in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts; and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain *idea* thereof, and to settle the signification of the names, whereby the species of *artificial* things are distinguished with less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

§ 41. *Artificial things of distinct Species.* I MUST be excused here if I think *artificial things are of distinct species*, as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by different abstract *ideas*, with general names annexed to them, as distinct

one from another as thoſe of natural ſubſtances. For why ſhould we not think a watch and piſtol, as diſtinct ſpecies one from another, as a horſe and a dog, they being expreſſed in our minds by diſtinct *ideas*, and to others by diſtinct appellations?

§ 42. *Subſtances alone have proper Names.*

THIS is farther to be obſerved concerning *ſubſtances*, that they alone of all our ſeveral ſorts of *ideas* have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is ſignified. Becauſe in ſimple *ideas*, modes, and relations, it ſeldom happens that men have occaſion to mention often this or that particular when it is abſent. Beſides, the greateſt part of mixed modes, being actions which periſh in their birth, are not capable of a laſting duration as ſubſtances, which are the actors: and wherein the ſimple *ideas* that make up the complex *ideas* deſigned by the name, have a laſting union.

§ 43. *Difficulty to treat of Words.*

I MUST beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt ſo long upon this ſubject, and perhaps with ſome obſcurity. But I deſire it may be conſidered how *difficult* it is *to lend another by words into the thoughts of things ſtripped of thoſe ſpecific differences* we give them: which things, if I name not, I ſay nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into ſome ſort or other, and ſuggeſt to the mind the uſual abſtract *idea* of that *ſpecies*, and ſo croſs my purpoſe. For to talk of a *man*, and to lay by, at the ſame time, the ordinary ſignification of the name man, which is our complex *idea* uſually annexed to it; and bid the reader conſider *man* as he is in himſelf, and as he is really diſtinguiſhed from others in his internal conſtitution, or real eſſence, that is, by ſomething he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one muſt do who would ſpeak of the ſuppoſed real eſſences and *ſpecies* of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it underſtood, that there is no ſuch thing ſignified by the general names, which ſubſtances are called by, but becauſe it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different conſideration the mind

has of ſpecific names and *ideas* a little more clear; and to ſhow how the complex *ideas* of modes are referred ſometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the ſame, to the ſignification annexed by others to their received names; and ſometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave alſo to ſhow how the mind always refers its *ideas* of ſubſtances, either to the ſubſtances themſelves, or to the ſignification of their names as to the *archetypes*; and alſo to make plain the nature of *ſpecies*, or ſorting of things, as apprehended, and made uſe of by us; and of the eſſences belonging to thoſe *ſpecies*, which is perhaps of more moment, to diſcover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at firſt imagine.

§ 44. *Inſtance of Mixed Modes in* Kinneah *and* Niouph.

LET us ſuppoſe *Adam* in the ſtate of a grown man, with a good underſtanding, but in a ſtrange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He obſerves *Lamech* more melancholy than uſual, and imagines it to be from a ſuſpicion he has of his wife *Adah* (whom he moſt ardently loved) that ſhe had too much kindneſs for another man. *Adam* diſcourſes theſe his thoughts to *Eve*, and deſires her to take care that *Adah* commit not folly: and in theſe diſcourſes with *Eve* he makes uſe of theſe two new words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. In time *Adam's* miſtake appears, for he finds *Lamech's* trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*; the one ſtanding for ſuſpicion, in a huſband, of his wife's diſloyalty to him, and the other for the act of commiting diſloyalty, loſt not their diſtinct ſignifications. It is plain then that here were two diſtinct complex *ideas* of mixed modes, with names to them, two diſtinct ſpecies of actions eſſentially different; I aſk wherein conſiſted the eſſences of theſe two diſtinct ſpecies of action? And it is plain it conſiſted in a preciſe combination of ſimple *ideas*, different in one from the other. I aſk, whether the complex *idea* in *Adam's* mind,

which he called *Kinneah*, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a combination of simple *ideas*, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name *Kinneah* to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple *ideas* contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate *idea*. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.

§ 45.

These words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat altered. *Adam's* children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had to make what complex *ideas* of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our *ideas* within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same *idea* in two who would communicate their thoughts, and discourse together. Those therefore of *Adam's* children, that found these two words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain *ideas*, abstract *ideas*, they being general names, which abstract *ideas* were the essences of the species distinguished by those names. If, therefore, they would use these words, as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the *ideas*, in their minds signified by these names, to the *ideas*, that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and *archetypes*; and then indeed their *ideas* of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple *ideas*) not to be exactly conformable to the *ideas*, in other men's minds, using the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask

the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer קנאה and סוטה) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what *Kinneah* and *Niouph* stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary signs in every one.

§ 46. *Instance of Substances in* Zahab.

Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances in their first application. One of *Adam's* children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye; home he carries it to *Adam*, who, upon consideration of it finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it: and abstracting this complex *idea*, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name *Zahab*, to denote and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this case, *Adam* acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those *ideas* of mixed modes, to which he gave the name *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. For there he puts *ideas* together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of any thing; and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract *ideas*, without considering whether any such thing did exist or no: the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his *idea* of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself, by the *idea* he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple *idea* into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his *idea* be conformable to this *archetype*, and intends the name should stand for an *idea* so conformable.

§ 47.

THIS piece of matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by *Adam*, being quite different from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name *Zahab* is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence. But here it is plain, the essence, *Adam* made the name *Zahab* stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say superficial qualities, puts *Adam* on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former *idea*, and made part of the essence of the species that name *Zahab* stands for? Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex *idea* signified by the name *Zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex *idea*, which the name *Zahab* stands for, and so be the essence of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the *idea* made after this fashion by this *archetype*, will be always inadequate.

§ 48. *Their* Ideas *imperfect, and therefore various.* BUT this is not all, it would also follow, that the *names of substances* would not only have (as in truth they have) but would also be supposed to *have different significations, as used by different men*, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex *idea*, signified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things

in different men; since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

§ 49. *Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.*

To avoid this, therefore, they have *supposed a real essence belonging to every species*, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not having any *idea* of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the *ideas* they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is; and this is that which men do, when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

§ 50. *Which Supposition is of no use.*

For let us consider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, part of the nominal essence the word *gold* stands for; and so this affirmation, *all gold is fixed*, contains nothing but the signification of the term *gold*. Or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word *gold*, is a property of that substance itself; in which case, it is plain, that the word *gold* stands in the place of a substance, having the real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that though this proposition, *gold is fixed*, be in that sense an affirmation of something real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use nor certainty. For let it be ever so true, that all *gold*, *i. e.* all that has the real essence of *gold*, is fixed, what serves this for? whilst we know not in this sense what is or is not *gold*? For if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence, and so whether it be true *gold* or no.

§ 51. *Conclusion.*

To conclude: what liberty *Adam* had at first to make

any complex *ideas* of mixed modes, by no other patterns but by his own thoughts, the ſame have all men ever ſince had. And the ſame neceſſity of conforming his *ideas* of ſubſtances to things without him, as to *archetypes* made by nature, that *Adam* was under, if he would not wilfully impoſe upon himſelf; the ſame are all men ever ſince under too. The ſame liberty alſo that *Adam* had of affixing any new name to any *idea*, the ſame has any one ſtill (eſpecially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any ſuch) but only with this difference, that in places where men in ſociety have already eſtabliſhed a language amongſt them, the ſignification of words are very warily and ſparingly to be altered: becauſe men being furniſhed already with names for their *ideas*, and common uſe having appropriated known names to certain *ideas*, an affected miſapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions, will, perhaps, venture ſometimes on the coining new terms to expreſs them: but men think it a boldneſs, and it is uncertain whether common uſe will ever make them paſs for current. But in communication with others, it is neceſſary, that we conform the *ideas* we make the vulgar words of any language ſtand for, to their known proper ſignifications (which I have explained at large already) or elſe to make known that new ſignification we apply them to.

CHAP. VII.

OF PARTICLES.

§ 1. *Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.* BESIDES words, which are names of *ideas* in the mind, there are a great many others that are made uſe of, to ſignify the *connection* that the mind gives to *ideas, or propoſitions, one with another.* The mind in communicating its thought to others, does not only need ſigns of the *ideas* it has then before it, but others alſo, to ſhow or intimate ſome particular action of its own, at that time, relating to thoſe *ideas.* This it does ſeveral ways; as *is* and *is not*, are the general marks of the

mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

§ 2. *In them consists the Art of Well speaking.*

The words, whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called *particles*; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To think well, it is not enough that a man has *ideas* clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to *show* what *connection*, *restriction*, *distinction*, *opposition*, *emphasis*, &c. he gives to each respective *part of his discourse*. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that those words, which are not truly by themselves the names of any *ideas*, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

§ 3. *They show what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.*

This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of *cases* and *genders*, *modes* and *tenses*, *gerunds* and *supines*. In these, and the like, there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though *prepositions* and *conjunctions*, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions: yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a

little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

§ 4. *They show what Relation the Mind gives to its own thoughts.*

NEITHER is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as it is usually in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which came nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all *marks of some action, or intimation of the mind;* and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are dilligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles, that most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting but of one single letter, of which there are reckoned up as I remember, seventy, I am sure about fifty several significations.

§ 5. *Instances in But.*

BUT is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers *sed* in *Latin*, or *mais* in *French*, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations, the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

First, *BUT to say no more:* here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.

Secondly, *I saw BUT two plants:* here it shows, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly, *You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true religion.*

Fourthly, *BUT that he would confirm you in your own.*

The first of these *BUTS* intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows, that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, *All animals have sense; BUT a dog is an animal:* here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the *minor* of a syllogism.

§ 6.

To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found, which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of *discretive*, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles; some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.

§ 1. *Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.*

THE ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our *ideas*, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its *ideas*, and so they become *essences*, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract *idea* being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions, no two whole *ideas* can ever be af-

firmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits *not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another.* For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions: *humanity is animality*, or *rationality*, or *whiteness*: and this is as evident, as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract *idea* to be another, but one abstract *idea* to be joined to another; which abstract *ideas*, in substances, may be of any sort: in all the rest, are little else but of relations; and in substances the most frequent are of powers: *v. g. a man is white*, signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man, has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the *idea* of whiteness in one, whose eyes can discover ordinary objects; or *a man is rational*, signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man, hath also in it the essence of rationality, *i. e.* a power of reasoning.

§ 2. *They show the difference of our* Ideas.

This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our *ideas*: for if we observe them we shall find that our *simple ideas have all abstract, as well as concrete names*: the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective: as whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our *ideas* of modes and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal; only with this difference: that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly, are substantives; as *paternitas*, *pater*; whereof it were easy to render a reason. But as to our *ideas* of *substances*, we have very few or *no abstract names* at all. For though the schools have introduced *animalitas*, *humanitas*, *corporietas*, and some others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones: and those few that the schools forged, and put into the mouths of their scholars, could

never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the licenſe of public approbation. Which ſeems to me at leaſt to intimate the confeſſion of all mankind, that they have no *ideas* of the real eſſences of ſubſtances, ſince they have not names for ſuch *ideas*: which no doubt they would have had, had not their conſciouſneſs to themſelves of their ignorance of them, kept them from ſo idle an attempt. And therefore though they had *ideas* enough to diſtinguiſh gold from ſtone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorouſly ventured on ſuch terms, as *aurietas* and *ſaxietas*, *metallietas* and *lignietas*, or the like names, which ſhould pretend to ſignify the real eſſences of thoſe ſubſtances, whereof they knew they had no *ideas*. And indeed it was only the doctrine of *ſubſtantial forms*, and the confidence of miſtaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which firſt coined, and then introduced *animalitas*, and *humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own ſchools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding men. Indeed, *humanitas* was a word familiar amongſt the *Romans*, but in a far different ſenſe, and ſtood not for the abſtract eſſence of any ſubſtance; but was the abſtract name of a mode, and its concrete *humanus*, not *homo*.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are uſed for recording and communicating our Thoughts.*

FROM what has been ſaid in the foregoing chapters, it is eaſy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almoſt unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their ſignifications. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is neceſſary firſt to conſider their uſe and end: for as they are more or leſs fitted to attain that, ſo they are more or leſs perfect. We have in the former part of this *diſcourſe*, often upon occaſion mentioned *a double uſe of words*.

First, One for the recording of our own thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

§ 2. *Any Words will serve for recording.*

As to the first of these, *for the recording our own thoughts* for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any *ideas*, a man may use what words he pleases, to signify his own *ideas* to himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same *idea*; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language.

§ 3. *Communication by words, Civil or Philosophical.*

SECONDLY, As to *Communication of Words*, that too *has a double Use*.

I. *Civil.*

II. *Philosophical.*

First, By their *civil use*, I mean such a communication of thoughts and *ideas* by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the *philosophical use* of words, I mean such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§ 4. *The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.*

THE chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same *idea* which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now since sounds have no

natural connection with our *ideas*, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, the *doubtfulness* and uncertainty *of their signification*, which is the *imperfection* we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the *ideas* they stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one sound more than in another, to signify any *idea*: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words, is the difference of *ideas* they stand for.

§ 5. *Causes of their Imperfection.*

WORDS having naturally no signification, the *idea* which each stands for must be learned and retained by those, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The *ideas* they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of *ideas* put together.

Secondly, Where the *ideas* they stand for have no certain connection in nature; and so no settled standard, any where in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, Where the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not so easy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the signification of the word, and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same.

These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple *ideas*, which another has not organs or faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man; need not here be mentioned.

In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of *ideas*: for if we examine them, we shall find that the *names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two*

first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter.

§ 6. *The Names of mixed Modes doubtful.*

First, The names of *mixed modes* are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.

First, Because the Ideas *they stand for, are so complex.*

I. Because of that *great composition* these complex *ideas* are often made up of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they excite in the hearer exactly the same *idea* they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their *ideas*, which is the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex *idea* that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to form and retain that *idea* so exactly, as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise *idea* without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, that men's names of very compound *ideas*, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise signification; since one man's complex *idea* seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow.

§ 7. *Secondly, Because they have no Standards.*

II. *Because the names of mixed modes*, for the most part, *want standards* in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of *ideas* put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *sham*, or *wheedle*, or *banter* in use, put together, as he thought fit, those *ideas* he made it stand for: and as it is with any new names of modes,

that are now brought into any language; so it was with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names therefore that stand for collections of *ideas* which the mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are no where to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. What the word *murder*, or *sacrilege*, &c. signifies, can never be known from things themselves: there be many of the parts of those complex *ideas*, which are not visible in the action itself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of *murder* or *sacrilege*, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connection with those other *ideas* that make up the complex one, named *murder*. They have their union and combination only from the understanding: which unites them under one name: but uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections, should be often various in the minds of different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by, in such arbitrary *ideas*.

§ 8. *Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.*

It is true, *common use*, that is the rule of propriety, may be supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and it cannot be denied, but that in some measure it does. Common use *regulates the meaning of words* pretty well for common conversation; but nobody having an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what *ideas* any one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses; there being scarce any name of any very complex *idea* (to say nothing of others) which in common use has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far different *ideas*. Besides, the

rule and measure of propriety itself being no where established, it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word, be propriety of speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex *ideas* are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in men that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same *idea* in speaker and hearer. Though the names *glory* and *gratitude* be the same in every man's mouth through a whole country, yet the complex collective *idea*, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men using the same language.

§ 9. *The way of learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.*

THE *way* also *wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does* not a little *contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification.* For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that to make them understand what the names of simple *ideas*, or substances, stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the *idea*; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it, as *white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog.* But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first; and then to know what complex *ideas* they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused, signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex *ideas* different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either *controversial debate*, or

familiar diſcourſe, concerning *honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c.* wherein it is not eaſy to obſerve the different notions men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the ſignification of thoſe words, nor have in their minds the ſame complex *ideas* which they make them ſtand for: and ſo all the conteſts that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a ſound. And hence we ſee, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications: and of limiting, diſtinguiſhing, varying the ſignification of theſe moral words, there is no end. Theſe *ideas* of men's making, are, by men ſtill having the ſame power multiplied *in infinitum*. Many a man, who was pretty well ſatisfied of the meaning of a text of ſcripture, or clauſe in the code at firſt reading, has by conſulting commentators quite loſt the ſenſe of it, and by theſe elucidations given riſe or increaſe to his doubts, and drawn obſcurity upon the place. I ſay not this, that I think commentaries needleſs; but to ſhow how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of thoſe who had both the intention and the faculty of ſpeaking as clearly as language was capable to expreſs their thoughts.

§ 10. *Hence unavoidable Obſcurity in ancient Authors.* WHAT obſcurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who have lived in remote ages and different countries, it will be needleſs to take notice; ſince the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to ſhow what attention, ſtudy, ſagacity, and reaſoning are required, to find out the true meaning of *ancient authors*. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very ſolicitous about the meaning of, but thoſe that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we miſtake or tranſgreſs, we may be leſs anxious about the ſenſe of other authors; who writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater neceſ-

ſity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may ſafely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not uſe their words with a due clearneſs and perſpicuity, we may lay them aſide, and, without any injury done them, reſolve thus with ourſelves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

§ 11.

If the ſignification of the names of mixed modes are uncertain, becauſe there be no real ſtandards exiſting in nature, to which thoſe *ideas* are referred, and by which they may be adjuſted, the *names of ſubſtances are of a doubtful ſignification*: for a contrary reaſon, viz. Becauſe the *ideas* they ſtand for are ſuppoſed conformable to the reality of things, and are *referred to ſtandards* made by nature. In our *ideas* of ſubſtances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteriſtical notes to rank and denominate things by. In theſe we muſt follow nature, ſuit our complex *ideas* to real exiſtences, and regulate the ſignification of their names by the things themſelves, if we will have our names to be the ſigns of them, and ſtand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the ſignification of their names very uncertain: for names muſt be of a very unſteady and various meaning, if the *ideas* they ſtand for be referred to ſtandards without us, *that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.*

§ 12. *Names of Subſtances referred,* 1. *To real eſſences that cannot be known.*

The *names of ſubſtances have*, as has been ſhowed, a double *reference* in their ordinary uſe.

Firſt, Sometimes they are made to ſtand for, and ſo their ſignification is ſuppoſed to agree to, *the real conſtitution of things*, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real conſtitution; or (as it is apt to be called) eſſence, being utterly unknown to us, any ſound that is put to ſtand for it, muſt be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impoſ-

ſible to know what things are, or ought to be called an *horſe*, or *anatomy*, when thoſe words are put for real eſſences, that we have no *ideas* of at all. And therefore in this ſuppoſition, the names of ſubſtances being referred to ſtandards that cannot be known, their ſignifications can never be adjuſted and eſtabliſhed by thoſe ſtandards.

§ 13. 2. *To co-exiſting Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*

Secondly, The *ſimple ideas* that are found to *co-exiſt in ſubſtances* being that which their names immediately ſignify, theſe, as united in the ſeveral ſorts of things, *are* the proper *ſtandards* to which their names are referred, and by which their ſignifications may be beſt rectified. But neither will theſe *archetypes* ſo well ſerve this purpoſe, as to leave theſe names without very various and uncertain ſignifications. Becauſe theſe ſimple *ideas* that co-exiſt, and are united in the ſame ſubject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex ſpecific *idea*, which the ſpecific name is to ſtand for, men, though they propoſe to themſelves the very ſame ſubject to conſider, yet frame very different *ideas* about it; and ſo the name they uſe for it unavoidably comes to have, in ſeveral men, very different ſignifications. The ſimple qualities which make up the complex *ideas* being moſt of them powers, in relation to changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from, other bodies, are almoſt infinite. He that ſhall but obſerve what a great variety of alterations any one of the baſer metals is apt to receive from the different application only of fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chemiſt, by the application of other bodies, will not think it ſtrange that I count the properties of any ſort of bodies not eaſy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of inquiry, which our faculties are capable of. They being therefore at leaſt ſo many, that no man can know the preciſe and definite number, they are differently diſcovered by different men, according to their various ſkill, attention, and ways of handling; who there-

fore cannot chooſe but have different *ideas* of the ſame ſubſtance, and therefore make the ſignification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex *ideas* of ſubſtances being made up of ſuch ſimple ones as are ſuppoſed to co-exiſt in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex *idea* thoſe qualities he has found to be united together. For though in the ſubſtance of *gold*, one ſatisfies himſelf with colour and weight, yet another thinks ſolubility in *aqua regia* as neceſſary to be joined with that colour in his *idea* of gold, as any one does its fuſibility; ſolubility in *aqua regia* being a quality as conſtantly joined with its colour and weight, as fuſibility, or any other: others put in its ductility or fixedneſs, &c. as they have been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all theſe has eſtabliſhed the right ſignification of the word *gold?* or who ſhall be the judge to determine? Each has his ſtandard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reaſon thinks he has the ſame right to put into his complex *idea* ſignified by the word *gold*, thoſe qualities which upon trial he has found united: as another, who has not ſo well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of theſe qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex *idea*, who can ſay, one of them has more reaſon to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex *ideas* of ſubſtances, in men uſing the name for them, will be very various; and ſo the ſignifications of thoſe names very uncertain.

§ 14. *To co-exiſting Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*

BESIDES, there is ſcarce any particular thing exiſting, which, in ſome of its ſimple *ideas*, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a leſs number of particular beings: who ſhall determine in this caſe which are thoſe that are to make up the preciſe collection that is to be ſignified by the ſpecific name; or can with any juſt authority preſcribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out; or which more ſecret, or more

particular, are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance? All *which* together seldom or never fail to *produce* that various and *doubtful signification in the names of substances*, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 15. *With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.*

It is true, as *to civil and common conversation*, the general *names of substances*, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour, joined with some other sensible qualities) *do well enough* to design the words men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word *gold*, or *apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. *But in philosophical inquiries and debates*, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down; there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found, not only *not* to be *well established*, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make malleableness, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex *idea* of *gold*, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from *gold* taken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complex *idea*, that the name *gold*, in his use of it, stands for.

§ 16. *Instance—Liquor.*

This is a natural, and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very

learned and ingenious phyſicians, where by chance there aroſe a queſtion, whether any liquor paſſed through the filaments of the nerves. The debate having been managed a good while by variety of arguments on both ſides, I (who had been uſed to ſuſpect, that the greateſt part of diſputes were more about the ſignification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) deſired, that before they went any farther on in this diſpute, they would firſt examine, and eſtabliſh among them what the word *liquor* ſignified. They at firſt were a little ſurpriſed at the propoſal; and had they been perſons leſs ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: ſince there was no one there that thought not himſelf to underſtand very perfectly what the word liquor ſtood for; which I think too none of the moſt perplexed names of ſubſtances. However, they were pleaſed to comply with my motion, and upon examination, found, that the ſignification of that word was not ſo ſettled and certain as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a ſign of a different complex *idea*. This made them perceive that the main of their diſpute was about the ſignification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions, concerning ſome fluid and ſubtile matter, paſſing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not ſo eaſy to agree whether it was to be called *liquor* or no, a thing which, when conſidered, they thought it not worth the contending about.

§ 17. *Inſtance—Gold.*

How much this is the caſe, in the greateſt part of diſputes that men are engaged ſo hotly in, I ſhall perhaps have an occaſion in another place to take notice. Let us only here conſider a little more exactly the forementioned inſtance of the word *gold*, and we ſhall ſee how hard it is preciſely to determine its ſignification. I think all agree to make it ſtand for a body of a certain yellow ſhining colour; which being the *idea* to which children have annexed that name, the ſhining yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others, finding fuſibility joined with that yellow colour in cer-

tain parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex *idea*, to which they give the name *gold* to denote a ſort of ſubſtances; and ſo exclude from being *gold* all ſuch yellow ſhining bodies, as by fire will be reduced to aſhes; and admit to be of that ſpecies, or to be comprehended under that name *gold*, only ſuch ſubſtances as having that ſhining yellow colour will by fire be reduced to fuſion, and not to aſhes. Another, by the ſame reaſon, adds the weight, which, being a quality as ſtraitly joined with that colour as its fuſibility, he thinks has the ſame reaſon to be joined in its *idea*, and to be ſignified by its name: and therefore the other made up of body, of ſuch a colour and fuſibility, to be imperfect; and ſo on of all the reſt: wherein no one can ſhow a reaſon why ſome of the inſeparable qualities, that are always united in nature, ſhould be put into the nominal eſſence, and others left out: or why the word *gold*, ſignifying that ſort of body the ring on his finger is made of, ſhould determine that ſort rather by its colour, weight, and fuſibility, than by its colour, weight, and ſolubility in *aqua regia*: ſince the diſſolving it by that liquor is as inſeparable from it as the fuſion by fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which that ſubſtance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that fuſibility comes to be a part of the eſſence ſignified by the word *gold*, and ſolubility but a property of it? or why is its colour part of the eſſence, and its malleableneſs but a property? That which I mean is this, that theſe being all but properties depending on its real conſtitution, and nothing but powers, either active or paſſive, in reference to other bodies: no one has authority to determine the ſignification of the word *gold* (as referred to ſuch a body exiſting in nature) more to one collection of *ideas* to be found in that body than to another: whereby the ſignification of that name muſt unavoidably be very uncertain; ſince, as has been ſaid, ſeveral people obſerve ſeveral properties in the ſame ſubſtance; and, I think, I may ſay nobody all. And therefore have but very imper-

fect descriptions of things, and words have very uncertain significations.

§ 18. *The Names of simple* Ideas *the least Doubtful.* FROM what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before remarked, *viz.* That the *names of simple* ideas *are*, of all others, the *least liable to mistakes*, and that for these reasons: *First*, Because the *ideas* they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of *substances and mixed modes*, in which the precise number of simple *ideas*, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the mind. And *Secondly*, Because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify: which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many disputes. Men, that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any langauage which they are aquainted with, the use and signification of the names of simple *ideas*; *white* and *sweet*, *yellow* and *bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of simple *ideas*, *modesty* or *frugality* stand for in another's use, is not so certainly known. And however, we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by *gold* and *iron*, yet the precise complex *idea*, others make them the signs of, is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them.

§ 19. *And next to them Simple Modes.* BY the same rule, the *names of simple modes are*, *next to those of simple ideas*, *least liable to doubt and uncertainty*, es-

pecially thoſe of figure and number, of which men have ſo clear and diſtinct *ideas*. Who ever, that had a mind to underſtand them, miſtook the ordinary meaning of *ſeven* or a *triangle?* And in general the leaſt compounded *ideas* in every kind have the leaſt dubious names.

§ 20. *The moſt doubtful are the Names of very compounded Mixed Modes and Subſtances.*

MIXED modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious ſimple *ideas*, have uſually names of no very uncertain ſignification. But the names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of ſimple *ideas*, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been ſhown. The names of ſubſtances, being annexed to *ideas* that are neither the real eſſences nor exact repreſentations of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty, eſpecially when we come to a philoſophical uſe of them.

§ 21. *Why this imperfection charged upon Words.*

THE great diſorder that happens in our names of ſubſtances, proceeding for the moſt part from our want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate into their real conſtitutions, it may probably be wondered, *why I charge this as an imperfection* rather *upon our words* than underſtandings. This exception has ſo much appearance of juſtice, that I think myſelf obliged to give a reaſon why I have followed this method. I muſt confeſs then, that when I firſt began this diſcourſe of the underſtanding, and a good while after, I had not the leaſt thought that any conſideration of words were at all neceſſary to it. But when having paſſed over the original and compoſition of our *ideas*, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had ſo near a connection with words, that unleſs their force and manner of ſignification were firſt well obſerved, there could be very little ſaid clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being converſant about truth, had conſtantly to do with propoſitions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the moſt part ſo much by the intervention of words, that they ſeemed ſcarce ſeparable from our gener-

al knowledge. At leaſt they interpoſe themſelves ſo much between our underſtandings and truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the *medium* through which viſible objects paſs, their obſcurity and diſorder does not ſeldom caſt a miſt before our eyes, and impoſe upon our underſtandings. If we conſider, in the fallacies men put upon themſelves as well as others, and the miſtakes in men's diſputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or miſtaken ſignifications, we ſhall have reaſon to think this no ſmall obſtacle in the way to knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, becauſe it has been ſo far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the buſineſs of men's ſtudy; and obtained the reputation of learning and ſubtilty, as we ſhall ſee in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of languge, as the inſtrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controverſies that make ſuch a noiſe in the world, would of themſelves ceaſe; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§ 22. *This ſhould teach us Moderation, in impoſing our own ſenſe of old Authors.*

SURE I am, that the ſignification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and *ideas* of him that uſes them, muſt unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the ſame language and country. This is ſo evident in the *Greek* authors, that he that ſhall peruſe their writings will find in almoſt every one of them a diſtinct language, though the ſame words. But when to this natural difficulty in every country, there ſhall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the ſpeakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, cuſtoms, ornaments, and figures of ſpeech, *&c.* every one of which influenced the ſignification of their words then, though to us now they are loſt and unknown; *it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or miſunderſtanding of* thoſe *ancient writings*: which though of great

concernment to be underſtood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of ſpeech, which (if we except the names of ſimple *ideas*, and ſome very obvious things) is not capable, without a conſtant defining the terms of conveying the ſenſe and intention of the ſpeaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the hearer. And in diſcourſes of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the higheſt concernment, ſo there will be the greateſt difficulty.

§ 23.

THE volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New Teſtament, are but too manifeſt proofs of this. Though every thing ſaid in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot chooſe but be very fallible in the underſtanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of GOD, when clothed in words, ſhould be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that ſort of conveyance; when even his Son, whilſt clothed in fleſh, was ſubject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, ſin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodneſs, that he hath ſpread before all the world ſuch legible characters of his works and Providence, and given all mankind ſo ſufficient a light of reaſon, that they to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they ſet themſelves to ſearch) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the obedience due to him. Since, then, the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and ſeldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obſcurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in obſerving the former, and leſs magiſterial, poſitive, and imperious, in impoſing our own ſenſe and interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Abuse of Words.*

BESIDES the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several *wilful faults and neglects* which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification, than naturally they need to be.

§ 2. 1. *Words without any, or without clear* Ideas. *First*, In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct *ideas*: or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts:

1. One may observe, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first original and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct *ideas*. These, for the most part, the several *sects* of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to *coin* new words, and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called *insignificant terms*. For having either had no determinate collection of *ideas* annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise *ideas* they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances: every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him: or if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-mas-

ters of theſe kind of terms, I mean the ſchoolmen and metaphyſicians (under which, I think, the diſputing natural and moral philoſophers of theſe latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3.

II. Others there be, who extend this abuſe yet farther, who take ſo little care to lay by words, which in their primary notation have ſcarce any clear and diſtinct *ideas* which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly *uſe words*, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important *ideas*, *without any diſtinct meaning* at all. *Wiſdom*, *glory*, *grace*, &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of thoſe who uſe them, ſhould be aſked what they mean by them, they would be at a ſtand, and not know what to anſwer: a plain proof, that though they have learned thoſe ſounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined *ideas* laid up in their minds, which are to be expreſſed to others by them.

§ 4. *Occaſioned by learning Names before the* Ideas *they belong to.*

Men having been *accuſtomed* from their cradles *to learn words*, which are eaſily got and retained, *before they knew*, or had framed *the complex ideas* to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things *they* were thought to *ſtand* for, they *uſually continue to do ſo* all their lives; and without taking the pains neceſſary to ſettle in their minds determined *ideas*, they uſe their words for ſuch unſteady and confuſed notions as they have, contenting themſelves with the ſame words other people uſe: as if their very ſound neceſſarily carried with it conſtantly the ſame meaning. This, though men make a ſhift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it neceſſary to be underſtood, and therefore they make ſigns till they are ſo; yet this inſignificancy in their words, when they come to reaſon concerning either their tenets or intereſt, manifeſtly fills their diſcourſe with abundance of empty unintelligible

noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of *ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours, and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning: whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

§ 5. 2. *Unsteady Application of them.*

Secondly, Another great abuse of words, is, *inconstancy* in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse written of any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple *ideas*, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my *ideas*, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units (*v. g.* this character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his discourse, or reasoning, make the same words stand for different collections of simple *ideas*. If men

ſhould do ſo in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would ſpeak thus, in the affairs and buſineſs of the world, and call eight ſometimes ſeven, and ſometimes nine, as beſt ſerved his advantage, would preſently have clapped upon him one of the two names men commonly are diſguſted with. And yet in arguings and learned conteſts, the ſame ſort of proceeding paſſes commonly for wit and learning: but to me it appears a greater diſhoneſty, than the miſplacing of counters in the caſting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

§ 6. 3. *Affected Obſcurity by wrong Application.* THIRDLY, Another abuſe of language is, an *affected obſcurity*, by either applying old words to new and unuſual ſignifications, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or elſe putting them ſo together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the peripatetic philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other ſects have not been wholly clear of it. There are ſcarce any of them that are not cumbered with ſome difficulties (ſuch is the imperfection of human knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with obſcurity of terms, and to confound the ſignification of words, which, like a miſt before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being diſcovered. That *body* and *extenſion*, in common uſe, ſtand for two diſtinct *ideas*, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their ſignification preciſely the ſame, it would be proper, and as intelligible to ſay, the *body of an extenſion*, as *the extenſion of a body*; and yet there are thoſe who find it neceſſary to confound their ſignification. To this abuſe, and the miſchiefs of confounding the ſignification of words, logic and the liberal ſciences, as they have been handled in the ſchools, have given reputation; and the admired art of diſputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of and fitted to perplex the ſignification of words, more than to diſcover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that ſort of learned writings,

will find the words there much more obſcure, uncertain and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary converſation.

§ 7. *Logic and Diſpute have much contributed to this.* THIS is unavoidably to be ſo, where men's parts and learning are eſtimated by their ſkill in *diſputing*. And if reputation and reward ſhall attend theſe conqueſts, which depend moſtly on the fineneſs and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man ſo employed, ſhould perplex, involve and ſubtilize the ſignification of ſounds, ſo as never to want ſomething to ſay, in oppoſing or defending any queſtion; the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his ſide, but the laſt word in the diſpute.

§ 8. *Calling it Subtilty.* THIS, though a very uſeleſs ſkill, and that which I think the direct oppoſite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet paſſed hitherto under the laudable and eſteemed names of *ſubtilty* and *acuteneſs*; and has had the applauſe of the ſchools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, ſince the philoſophers of old (the diſputing and wrangling philoſophers I mean, ſuch as Lucian wittily and with reaſon taxes) and the ſchoolmen ſince, aiming at glory and eſteem for their great and univerſal knowledge, eaſier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themſelves the admiration of others by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, becauſe they could not be underſtood: whilſt it appears in all hiſtory, that theſe profound doctors were no wiſer, nor more uſeful than their neighbours; and brought but ſmall advantage to human life, or the ſocieties wherein they lived: unleſs the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obſcuring the ſignification of old ones, and ſo bringing all things into queſtion and diſpute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.

§ 9. *This Learning very little benefits Society.*

For notwithſtanding theſe learned diſputants, theſe all-knowing doctors, it was to the unſcholaſtic ſtateſman, that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of diſgrace) that they received the improvements of uſeful arts. Nevertheleſs, this artificial ignorance, and *learned gibberiſh*, prevailed mightily in theſe laſt ages, by the intereſt and artifice of thoſe, who found no eaſier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amuſing the men of buſineſs and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate diſputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endleſs labyrinth: beſides, there is no ſuch way to gain admittance, or give defence to ſtrange and abſurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obſcure, doubtful and undefined words: which yet make theſe retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortreſſes of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the ſtrength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obſcurity of the thickets they are beſet with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for abſurdity, but obſcurity.

§ 10. *But deſtroys the Inſtruments of Knowledge and Communication.*

Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping, even inquiſitive men, from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilſt it pretended to inform the underſtanding. For we ſee that other well-meaning and wiſe-men, whoſe education and parts had not acquired that *acuteneſs*, could intelligibly expreſs themſelves to one another; and in its plain uſe make a benefit of language. But though unlearned men well enough underſtood the words *white* and *black*, &c. and had conſtant notions of the *ideas* ſignified by thoſe words; yet there were philoſophers found, who had learning and *ſubtilty* enough to prove, that *ſnow was black*; i. e. to prove, that *white* was *black*.

Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction and society; whilst with great art and *subtilty* they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful, than the real defects of it had made it; a gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

§ 11. *As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.* These learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known characters, and, by a subtile device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should, in his writing, show that he could put *A* for *B*, and *D* for *E*, &c. to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as senseless to put *black*, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible *idea*, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary *idea*, *i. e.* to call *snow black*, as to put this mark *A*, which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for *B*; which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain motion of the organs of speech.

§ 12. *This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.* Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty speculations, it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and society, obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity, brought confusion, disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered useless, these two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of GOD and man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions and acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are easily understood; speaking to

their people, in their laws, are not ſo? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well underſtands a text or a law that he reads, till he conſults an expoſitor, or goes to council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words ſignify either nothing at all, or what he pleaſes.

§ 13. *And ought not to paſs for Learning.*

WHETHER any by intereſts of theſe profeſſions have occaſioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be conſidered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whoſe concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to ſpend their lives in talking about them, or toſſing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I ſay, that the uſe of words were made plain and direct, and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of ſociety, ſhould not be employed to darken truth, and unſettle people's rights; to raiſe miſts, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at leaſt, if this will happen, it ſhould not be thought learning or knowledge to do ſo?

§ 14. 4. *Taking them for Things.*

FOURTHLY, Another great *abuſe of words is, the taking them for things.* This though it in ſome degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects thoſe of ſubſtances. To this abuſe thoſe men are moſt ſubject, who confine their thoughts to any one ſyſtem, and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypotheſis; whereby they come to be perſuaded that the terms of that ſect are ſo ſuited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real exiſtence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the peripatetic philoſophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that ſchool, that is not perſuaded, that *ſubſtantial forms, vegetative ſouls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional ſpecies*, &c. are ſomething real? Theſe words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and

have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The *Platonists* have their *soul of the world*, and the *Epicureans their endeavour towards motion* in their atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms, that others understand not; but yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes by familiar use among those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant. And should *aerial* and *etherial vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as *peripatetic forms* and *intentional species* have heretofore done.

§ 15. *Instance in Matter.*

How much *names taken for things* are apt to *mislead the understanding*, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one: how many intricate disputes have there been about *matter*, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from *body*; as it is evident the word *matter* stands for an *idea* distinct from the *idea* of body? For if the *ideas* these two terms stood for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we see, that though it be proper to say, there is *one matter of all bodies*, one cannot say, there is *one body of all matters*: we familiarly say, one *body* is bigger than another, but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one *matter* is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that though *matter* and *body* be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet *matter* and *body* stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part

of the other. For *body* ſtands for a ſolid extended figured ſubſtance, whereof *matter* is but a partial and more confuſed conception, it ſeeming to me to be uſed for the ſubſtance and ſolidity of body, without taking in its extenſion and figure; and therefore it is that ſpeaking of *matter*, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe in truth it expreſsly contains nothing but the *idea* of a ſolid ſubſtance, which is every where the ſame, every where uniform. This being our *idea* of *matter*, we no more conceive or ſpeak of different *matters* in the world, than we do of different ſolidities; though we both conceive and ſpeak of different bodies, becauſe extenſion and figure are capable of variation. But ſince ſolidity cannot exiſt without extenſion and figure, the taking *matter* to be the name of ſomething really exiſting under that preciſion, has no doubt produced thoſe obſcure and unintelligible diſcourſes and diſputes, which have filled the heads and books of philoſophers concerning *materia prima*; which imperfection or abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, I may at leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have a great many fewer diſputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the ſigns of our *ideas* only, and not for things themſelves. For when we argue about *matter*, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the *idea* we expreſs by that ſound, whether that preciſe *idea* agree to any thing really exiſting in nature or no. And if men would tell what *ideas* they make their words ſtand for, there could not be half that obſcurity or wrangling, in the ſearch or ſupport of truth, that there is.

§ 16. *This makes Errors laſting.*

But whatever inconvenience follows from this miſtake of words, this I am ſure, that by conſtant and familiar uſe, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to perſuade any one, that the words which his father or ſchoolmaſter, the parſon of the pariſh, or ſuch a reverend doctor uſed, ſignified nothing that really exiſted in nature: which, perhaps, is *none of the leaſt cauſes, that men are ſo hardly drawn to quit their miſtakes*, even in opinions purely phi-

losophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

§ 17. 5. *Setting them for what they cannot signify.* *FIFTHLY*, Another *abuse of words, is the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify.* We may observe, that in the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says *gold is malleable*, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that *what I call gold is malleable* (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, *viz.* that *gold*, i. e. *what has the real essence of gold is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from, the real essence of gold.* But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleableness, is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus when we say, that *animal rationale* is, and *animal implume bipes latis unguibus* is not, a good definition of a man; it is plain we suppose the name *man* in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify, that a *rational animal* better described that real essence, than *a two legged animal with broad nails and without feathers.* For else, why might not *Plato* as properly make the word ἄνθρωπος or *man* stand for his complex *idea*, made up of the *idea* of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as *Aristotle*, make the complex *idea*, to which he gave the name ἄνθρωπος or *man*, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless the name ἄνθρωπος or *man* were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the *idea* a man professes he would express by it?

§ 18. v. g. *Putting them for the real Eſſences of Subſtances.*

It is true, the names of ſubſtances would be much more uſeful, and propoſitions made in them much more certain were the real eſſences of ſubſtances the *ideas* in our minds which thoſe words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real eſſences that our words convey ſo little knowledge or certainty in our diſcourſes about them: and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a ſecret ſuppoſition, to ſtand for a thing having that real eſſence, as if thereby it made ſome nearer approaches to it. For though the word *man* or *gold* ſignify nothing truly but a complex *idea* of properties united together in one ſort of ſubſtances; yet there is ſcarce any body in the uſe of theſe words, but often ſuppoſes each of thoſe names to ſtand for a thing having the real eſſence on which theſe properties depend. Which is ſo far from diminiſhing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuſe it adds to it when we would make them ſtand for ſomething which not being in our complex *idea*, the name we uſe can no ways be the ſign of.

§ 19. *Hence we think every change of our* Idea *in Subſtances, not to change the Species.*

This ſhows us the reaſon why in *mixed modes* any of the *ideas* that make the compoſition of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, *i. e.* to be of another ſpecies, as is plain in *chance-medley*, *manſlaughter*, *murder*, *parricide*, &c. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the complex *idea* ſignified by that name is the real as well as nominal eſſence; and there is no ſecret reference of that name to any other eſſence but that. But in *ſubſtances* it is not ſo. For though in that called *gold* one puts into his complex *idea* what another leaves out, and *vice verſa*; yet men do not uſually think that therefore the ſpecies is changed: becauſe they ſecretly in their minds refer that name, and ſuppoſe it annexed to a real immutable eſſence of a thing exiſting, on which thoſe properties depend. He that adds to his complex *idea* of *gold* that of fixedneſs or ſol-

ubility in *aq. regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the ſpecies; but only to have a more perfect *idea*, by adding another ſimple *idea*, which is always in fact joined with thoſe other, of which his former complex *idea* conſiſted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the *idea*, is ſo far from helping at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real eſſence of that ſpecies of bodies, the word *gold* (which by ſtanding for a more or leſs perfect collection of ſimple *ideas*, ſerves to deſign that ſort of body well enough in civil diſcourſe) comes to have no ſignification at all, being put for ſomewhat whereof we have no *idea* at all, and ſo can ſignify nothing at all, when the body itſelf is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well conſidered, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about *gold* in name, and about a parcel of the body itſelf, *v. g.* a piece of *leaf-gold* laid before us; though in diſcourſe we are fain to ſubſtitute the name for the thing.

§ 20. *The cauſe of the Abuſe, a Suppoſition of Nature's working always regularly.*

THAT which I think very much diſpoſes men to ſubſtitute their names for the real eſſences of *ſpecies*, is the ſuppoſition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and ſets the boundaries to each of thoſe *ſpecies*, by giving exactly the ſame real internal conſtitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who obſerves their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the ſame name, are, in their internal conſtitution, as different one from another as ſeveral of thoſe which are ranked under different ſpecific names. *This ſuppoſition*, however, *that the ſame preciſe internal conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecific name, makes men forward to take* thoſe *names for the repreſentatives* of thoſe real *eſſences*, though indeed they ſignify nothing but the complex *ideas* they have in their minds when they uſe them. So that, if I may ſo ſay, ſignifying one thing, and being ſuppoſed for, or put in

the place of another, they cannot but in such a kind of use cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of *substantial forms*, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished.

§ 21. *This abuse contains two false suppositions.* But however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for *ideas* we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous *fœtus*, be a *man* or no; it is evident, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex *idea* expressed by the name *man*: but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things, which he supposes his name *man* to stand for. In which way of using the names of substances, there are these false suppositions contained.

First, That there are certain precise essences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into *species*. That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: but I think it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of *species*, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.

Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had *ideas* of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species *man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known? which yet is utterly false: and therefore such application of names, as would make them stand for *ideas* which we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

§ 22. 6. *A Supposition that Words have a certain and evident Signification.*

Sixthly, There remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed *abuse of words*; and that is, that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain *ideas*, they are apt *to imagine so near and necessary a connection between the names and the signification* they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise *ideas*: whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others, the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceed noise and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own *ideas*. And yet men think it strange, if, in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms: though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation, make it evident, that there are few names of complex *ideas* which any two men use for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this. *Life* is a term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive or no; it is easy to perceive that a clear distinct settled *idea* does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of *life* is. Some gross and

confuſed conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and ſuch a looſe uſe of their words ſerves them well enough in their ordinary diſcourſes or affairs. But this is not ſufficient for philoſophical inquiries. Knowledge and reaſoning require preciſe determinate *ideas*. And though men will not be ſo importunately dull, as not to underſtand what others ſay, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor ſo troubleſomely critical, as to correct others in the uſe of the words they receive from them: yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the caſe, I know not what fault it can be to deſire the explication of words, whoſe ſenſe ſeems dubious; or why a man ſhould be aſhamed to own his ignorance, in what ſenſe another man uſes his words, ſince he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abuſe of taking words upon truſt, has no where ſpread ſo far, nor with ſo ill effects, as amongſt men of letters. The multiplication and obſtinacy of diſputes, which has ſo laid waſte the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill uſe of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diverſity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controverſies the world is diſtracted with; yet the moſt I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they ſpeak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the ſame; though perhaps what they would have, be different.

§ 23. *The Ends of Language*: 1. *To convey our* Ideas. To conclude this conſideration of the imperfection and abuſe of language; the *ends of language in our diſcourſe with others*, being chiefly theſe three: *Firſt*, *To make known* one man's thoughts or *ideas* to another: *Secondly*, To do it *with* as much eaſe and *quickneſs* as is poſſible: and *Thirdly*, Thereby to *convey* the *knowledge* of things: language is either abuſed or deficient, when it fails of any of theſe three.

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's *ideas* to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determined *ideas* in their minds, whereof they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to *ideas*, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another *idea*.

§ 24. 2. *To do it with quickness.*

Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex *ideas* without having distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that *idea* he would show another.

§ 25. 3. *Therewith to convey the Knowledge of things.*

Thirdly, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their *ideas* agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect, that has its original in our *ideas*, which are not so conformable to the nature of things, as attention, study, and application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence.

§ 26. *How Men's Words fail in all these.*

First, He that hath words of any language, without distinct *ideas* in his mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

§ 27.

Secondly, He that has complex *ideas*, without particular names for them, would be in no better a caſe than a bookſeller, who had in his warehouſe volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by ſhowing the looſe ſheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his diſcourſe, for want of words to communicate his complex *ideas*, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the ſimple ones that compoſe them; and ſo is fain often to uſe twenty words, to expreſs what another man ſignifies in one.

§ 28.

Thirdly, He that puts not conſtantly the ſame ſign for the ſame *idea*, but uſes the ſame words ſometimes in one, and ſometimes in another ſignification, ought to paſs in the ſchools and converſation for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who ſells ſeveral things under the ſame name.

§ 29.

Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to *ideas* different from thoſe to which the common uſe of that country applies them, however his own underſtanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by ſuch words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the ſounds are ſuch as are familiarly known, and eaſily enter the ears of thoſe who are accuſtomed to them; yet ſtanding for other *ideas* than thoſe they uſually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uſes them.

§ 30.

Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himſelf ſubſtances ſuch as never have been, and filled his head with *ideas* which have not any correſpondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives ſettled and defined names, may fill his diſcourſe, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantaſtical imaginations of his own

brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

§ 31.

He that hath names without *ideas*, wants meaning in his words, and ſpeaks only empty ſounds. He that hath complex *ideas*, without names for them, wants liberty and diſpatch in his expreſſions, and is neceſſiated to uſe periphraſes. He that uſes his words looſely and unſteadily, will either be not minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his names to *ideas* different from their common uſe, wants propriety in his language, and ſpeaks gibberiſh. And he that hath *ideas* of ſubſtances diſagreeing with the real exiſtence of things, ſo far wants the materials of true knowledge in his underſtanding, and hath inſtead thereof *chimeras*.

§ 32. *How in Subſtances.*

In our notions concerning ſubſtances, we are liable to all the former inconveniences; *v. g.* He that uſes the word *tarantula*, without having any imagination or *idea* of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good word; but ſo long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new-diſcovered country ſhall ſee ſeveral ſorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true *ideas* of them, as of a horſe or a ſtag; but can ſpeak of them only by a deſcription, till he ſhall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himſelf. 3. He that uſes the word *body* ſometimes for pure extenſion, and ſometimes for extenſion and ſolidity together, will talk very fallaciouſly. 4. He that gives the name *horſe* to that *idea* which common uſage calls *mule*, talks improperly, and will not be underſtood. 5. He that thinks the name *centaur* ſtands for ſome real being, impoſes on himſelf, and miſtakes words for things.

§ 33. *How in Modes and Relations.*

In modes and relations generally we are liable only to the four firſt of theſe inconveniencies; *viz.* 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as *gratitude*, or *charity*, and yet not have any preciſe *ideas* annexed in my thoughts to thoſe names. 2. I may have *ideas*, and not know

the names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the *idea* of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called *drunkenneſs*. 3. I may have the *ideas* of virtues or vices, and names alſo, but apply them amiſs; *v. g.* when I apply the name *frugality* to that *idea* which others call and ſignify by this ſound, *covetouſneſs*. 4. I may uſe any of thoſe names with inconſtancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have *ideas* diſagreeing to the exiſtence of things: for modes being complex *ideas*, made by the mind at pleaſure; and relation being but my way of conſidering or comparing two things together, and ſo alſo an *idea* of my own making; theſe *ideas* can ſcarce be found to diſagree with any thing exiſting, ſince they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inſeparably flowing from the internal conſtitution or eſſence of any ſubſtance; but as it were patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exiſt. But the miſtake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and ſo uſing words in a different ſenſe from other people, I am not underſtood, but am thought to have wrong *ideas* of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my *ideas* of mixed modes or relations, any inconſiſtent *ideas* together, I fill my head alſo with *chimeras*; ſince ſuch *ideas*, if well examined, cannot ſo much as exiſt in the mind, much leſs any real being be ever denominated from them.

§ 34. 7. *Figurative Speech alſo an Abuſe of Language.* SINCE wit and fancy find eaſier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, *figurative ſpeeches* and alluſion in language will hardly be admitted, as an imperfection or *abuſe* of it. I confeſs, in diſcourſes where we ſeek rather pleaſure and delight than information and improvement, ſuch ornaments as are borrowed from them can ſcarce paſs for faults. But yet if we would ſpeak of things as they are, we muſt allow that all the art of rhetoric, beſides order and clearneſs, all the

artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong *ideas*, move the paſſions, and thereby miſlead the judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect cheats; and, therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addreſſes, they are certainly in all diſcourſes that pretend to inform or inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or perſon that makes uſe of them. What and how various they are, will be ſuperfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will inſtruct thoſe who want to be informed; only I cannot but obſerve, how little the preſervation and improvement of truth and knowledge, is the care and concern of mankind; ſince the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, ſince rhetoric, that powerful inſtrument of error and deceit, has its eſtabliſhed profeſſors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldneſs, if not brutality in me, to have ſaid thus much againſt it. *Eloquence*, like the fair ſex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to ſuffer itſelf ever to be ſpoken againſt. And it is in vain to find fault with thoſe arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleaſure to be deceived.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES.

§ 1. *They are worth ſeeking.*

THE natural and improved imperfections of languages, we have ſeen above at large; and ſpeech being the great bond that holds ſociety together, and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and one generation to another, it would well deſerve our moſt ſerious thoughts, to conſider what *remedies* are to be found *for theſe inconveniencies* above mentioned.

§ 2. *Are not easy.*

I AM not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect *reforming* the *languages* of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform *ideas*, would be to think that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct *ideas* of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men's talking much or little, should hold proportion only to their knowledge.

§ 3. *But yet necessary to Philosophy.*

BUT though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking, and gossipings not to be robbed of their ancient privilege; though the schools and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered to abate the length, or lessen the number of their disputes: yet methinks those who pretend *seriously* to *search after* or maintain *truth*, should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

§ 4. *Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.*

FOR he that shall well consider the *errors* and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are *spread in the world by an ill use of words*, will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hinderance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations, and reasonings about little more than sounds, whilst the *ideas* they annexed to them

are very confuſed or very unſteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I ſay, that ſuch thoughts and reaſonings end in nothing but obſcurity and miſtake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?

§ 5. *Obſtinacy.*

THIS inconvenience, in an ill uſe of words, men ſuffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifeſt are the diſorders which follow from it, in converſation, diſcourſe, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their diſcoveries, reaſonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill uſe of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themſelves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the pipes, whereby it is diſtributed to the public uſe and advantage of mankind. He that uſes words without any clear and ſteady meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into errors? And he that deſignedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the ſciences and parts of knowledge have been ſo overcharged with obſcure and equivocal terms, and inſignificant and doubtful expreſſions, capable to make the moſt attentive or quick-ſighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox; ſince ſubtilty, in thoſe who make profeſſion to teach or defend truth, hath paſſed ſo much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which conſiſting for the moſt part in nothing but the fallacious and illuſory uſe of *obſcure* or *deceitful terms*, is only fit to *make men* more *conceited* in their ignorance, and *obſtinate* in their errors.

§ 6. *And Wrangling.*

LET us look into the books of controverſy of any kind; there we ſhall ſee, that the effect of obſcure, unſteady or equivocal terms, is nothing but noiſe and wrangling about ſounds, without convincing or bettering a man's underſtanding. For if the *idea* be not agreed on betwixt the ſpeaker and hearer, for which the words ſtand, the argument not about things, but names. As often as ſuch a word, whoſe ſignification is not aſcertained be-

twixt them, comes in uſe, their underſtandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the ſound; the things that they think on at that time, as expreſſed by that word, being quite different.

§ 7. *Inſtance—Bat and Bird.*

WHETHER a *bat* be a *bird* or no, is not a queſtion; whether a *bat* be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely abſurd to doubt of: but the queſtion is, 1. Either between thoſe that acknowledged themſelves to have but imperfect *ideas*, of one or both of thoſe ſorts of things, for which theſe names are ſuppoſed to ſtand; and then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a *bird* or a *bat*, to make their yet imperfect *ideas* of it more complete, by examining, whether all the ſimple *ideas*, to which, combined together, they both give the name *bird*, be all to be found in a *bat*: but this is a queſtion only of inquirers (not diſputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a queſtion between diſputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a *bat* is a *bird*. And then the queſtion is barely about the ſignification of one or both theſe words; in that they not having both the ſame complex *ideas*, to which they give theſe two names, one holds, and the other denies that theſe two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the ſignification of theſe two names, it were impoſſible they ſhould diſpute about them: for they would preſently and clearly ſee (were that adjuſted between them) whether all the ſimple *ideas*, of the more general name *bird*, were found in the complex *idea* of a *bat*, or no: and ſo there could be no doubt, whether a *bat* were a *bird* or no. And here I deſire it may be conſidered and carefully examined, whether the greateſt part of the diſputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the ſignification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their ſignification (as they muſt be where they ſignify any thing) to determined collections of the ſimple *ideas* they do or ſhould ſtand for, thoſe diſputes would not end of themſelves, and immediately van-

nish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds; *i. e.* those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every one may do in the words he uses himself); I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain glory, ambition or a party.

§ 8. 1. *Remedy, to use no Word without an* Idea. *To remedy the defects of speech* before-mentioned to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniencies that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

First, A man should take care *to use no word without a signification*, no name without an *idea* for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words, as *instinct*, *sympathy*, and *antipathy*, &c. in the discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no *ideas* in their minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words and any *ideas*, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no *ideas* in their minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

§ 9. 2. *To have distinct* Ideas *annexed to them in Modes.*

Secondly, It is not enough a man *uses* his *words as signs of* some *ideas*; those *ideas* he annexes them to, if they be *simple*, must be clear and distinct; if *complex* must be de-

terminate, *i. e.* the precise collection of simple *ideas* settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words, which having no settled objects in nature, from whence their *ideas* are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. *Justice* is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose signification: which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that a complex *idea* consists of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple *ideas* that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be *justice*, for example, or any other: I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect and make this analysis at large, every time the word *justice* comes in his way: but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the *idea* of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex *idea* of *justice*, to be such a treatment of the person or goods of another, as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct *idea* what *law* is, which makes a part of his complex *idea* of justice, it is plain his *idea* of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex *ideas* of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with others.

§ 10. *And conformable in Substances.*

In the names of *substances*, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely *determined ideas*. In these *the names must also be conformable to things*, as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in con-

troverſies about truth. And though it would be well too, if it extended itſelf to common converſation, and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is ſcarce to be expected. Vulgar notions ſuit vulgar diſcourſes; and both, though confuſed enough, yet ſerve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to diſpatch their ordinary affairs; and ſo, I think, might philoſophers and diſputants too, if they had a mind to underſtand, and to be clearly underſtood.

§ 11. 3. *Propriety.*

THIRDLY, It is not enough that men have *ideas*, determined *ideas*, for which they make theſe ſigns ſtand; but they *muſt* alſo take care to *apply their words*, as near as may be, *to ſuch* ideas *as common uſe has annexed them to.* For words, eſpecially of languages already framed, being no man's private poſſeſſion, but the common meaſure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleaſure, to change the ſtamp they are current in, nor alter the *ideas* they are affixed to; or at leaſt, when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in ſpeaking are, or at leaſt ſhould be, to be underſtood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common uſe. Propriety of ſpeech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greateſt eaſe and advantage; and therefore deſerves ſome part of our care and ſtudy, eſpecially in the names of moral words. The proper ſignification and uſe of terms is beſt to be learned from thoſe, who in their writings and diſcourſes appear to have had the cleareſt notions, and applied to them their terms with the exacteſt choice and fitneſs. This way of uſing a man's words according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be underſtood, yet moſt commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is ſo unſkilful in the language he ſpeaks, as not to underſtand it, when made uſe of as it ought to be.

§ 12. 4. *To make known their meaning.*

Fourthly, But because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have *ideas* different from the ordinary and received ones, for which they must either make new words (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty) or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to *declare their meaning*, where either common use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex *ideas*) or where the term being very material in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.

§ 13. *And that three ways.*

As the *ideas* men's words stand for, are of different sorts; so the way of making known the *ideas*, they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the proper *way to make known the proper signification of words*; yet there are some words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition; and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple *ideas*, modes and substances.

§ 14. 1. *In simple* Ideas, *by synonymous terms, or showing.*

First, When a man makes use of the *name* of *any simple idea*, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. *First*, Sometimes the *naming the subject, wherein that simple* idea *is* to be found, will make its name be understood by those who are

acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So, to make a countryman understand what *fueillemorte* colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in *autumn*. *Secondly*, But the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple *idea*, is *by presenting to his senses that subject which may produce it in his mind*, and make him actually have the *idea* that word stands for.

§ 15. 2. *In mixed Modes, by definition.*

SECONDLY, *Mixed modes*, especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such combinations of *ideas*, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing; the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple *ideas*, by any showing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly *defined*. For they being combinations of several *ideas*, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly knowthe *ideas* that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each species is to be known, they being not of nature's but man's making, it is a great negligence and preversenes to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.

§ 16. *Morality capable of Demonstration.*

UPON this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that *morality is capable of demonstration*, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor

let any one object, that the names of substance are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much inquired into, as supposed; *v. g.* when we say, that *man is subject to law*, we mean nothing by *man*, but a corporeal rational creature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are, in this case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a child or changeling be a *man* in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the *moral man*, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable *idea, a corporeal rational being*. For were there a monkey, or any other creature to be found, that had the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general *ideas*, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a *man*, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses: where, if the mathematician speaks of a *cube* or *globe* of *gold*, or any other body, he has his clear settled *idea* which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.

§ 17. *Definitions can make moral Discourses clear.* This I have here mentioned by the by, to show of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a *definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known*; and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known *certainly*, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than those

in natural philoſophy: ſince they are about *ideas* in the mind, which are none of them falſe or diſproportionate; they having no external beings for the *archetypes* which they are referred to, and muſt correſpond with. It is far eaſier for men to frame in their minds an *idea* which ſhall be the ſtandard to which they will give the name *juſtice*, with which pattern ſo made all actions that agree ſhall paſs under that denomination, than, having ſeen *Ariſtides*, to frame an *idea* that ſhall in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what *idea* they pleaſe of him. For the one, they need but know the combination of *ideas* that are put together in their own minds; for the other they muſt inquire into the whole nature, and abſtruſe hidden conſtitution, and various qualities of a thing exiſting without them.

§ 18. *And is the only way.*

ANOTHER reaſon that makes the *defining of mixed modes* ſo neceſſary, *eſpecially of moral words*, is what I mentioned a little before, *viz.* That it is *the only way whereby the ſignification of the moſt of* them can be known with certainty. For the *ideas* they ſtand for, being for the moſt part ſuch whoſe component parts no where exiſt together, but ſcattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one *idea*: and it is only by words, enumerating the ſeveral ſimple *ideas* which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names ſtand for; the aſſiſtance of the ſenſes in this caſe not helping us, by the propoſal of ſenſible objects, to ſhow the *ideas* which our names of this kind ſtand for, as it does often in the names of ſenſible ſimple *ideas*, and alſo to ſome degree in thoſe of ſubſtances.

§ 19. 3. *In Subſtances, by ſhowing and defining.*

THIRDLY, *For the explaining* the ſignification of *the names of ſubſtances*, as they ſtand for the *ideas* we have of their diſtinct ſpecies, both the fore-mentioned ways *viz.* of *ſhowing and defining, are requiſite* in many caſes to be made uſe of. For there being ordinarily in each ſort ſome leading qualities, to which we ſuppoſe the other *ideas*, which make up our complex *idea* of that ſpe-

cies, annexed; we forwardly give the specific name to that thing, wherein that characteristical mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing *idea* of that species. These leading or characteristical (as I may so call them) *ideas*, in the sorts of animals and vegetables, are (as has been before remarked, Ch. VI. § 29. and Ch. IX. § 15.) mostly figure, and in inanimate bodies colour, and in some both together. Now,

§ 20. Ideas *of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by showing.*

THESE *leading sensible qualities* are those which make *the chief ingredients of our specific* ideas, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of *substances* coming under our knowledge. For though the sound *man*, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex *idea* made up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to signify any other combination; yet used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *idea*, signified by the word *man*, as any other we find in it: and therefore why *Plato's animal implume bipes latis unguibus* should not be a good definition of the name *man*, standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show: for it is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder, who kill monstrous births (as we call them) because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a rational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece, or can join itself to and inform no sort of body but one that is just of such an outward structure?

§ 21. Ideas *of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by showing.*

Now *these leading qualities are best made known by showing*, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an *horse*, or *cassowary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better: and the *idea* of the particular colour of *gold* is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight; where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice *idea* of that peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple *ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any substance; for which precise *ideas* there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing sound there is in *gold* distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

§ 22. *The* Ideas *of their Powers best by Definition.*

But because many of the simple *ideas* that make up our specific *ideas* of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the signification of our *names of substances, some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple* ideas, *than by showing the substance itself.* For he that, to the yellow shining colour of *gold* got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the *ideas* of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness, and solubility in *aq. regia*, will have a perfecter *idea* of *gold* than he can have by seeing a piece of *gold*, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitution of this shining, heavy, ductile thing (from whence all these its properties flow) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution, or essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word *gold* might as easily be ascertained as that of *triangle*.

§ 23. *A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.* HENCE we may take notice how much the foundation of all *our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses.* For how spirits, separate from bodies (whose knowledge and *ideas* of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no notion, no *idea* at all. The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own *ideas* limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear *ideas* of the radical constitution of substances, as we have of a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

§ 24. 4. Ideas *also of Substances must be conformable to things.* BUT though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our *ideas*, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our *ideas*, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And therefore in substances we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex *idea*, commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our *ideas* of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple *ideas* as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex *idea* in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: therefore *to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into;* and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniencies in discourses and arguings about

natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common but confused or very imperfect *idea* to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that *idea* in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex *idea* belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with others (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the complex *idea* is, that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical verity: in that children being taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined *ideas* to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the proper language of their country, *i. e.* according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

§ 25. *Not easy to be made so.*

It were therefore to be wished, that men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple *ideas*, wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things which

come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances, as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the significations of common words are certainly established, and the precise *ideas* they stand for perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false; no names of complex *ideas* having so settled determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise *ideas*. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise *idea* any sound stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the *ideas* which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar to him. But common use, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at last to the *ideas* of particular men, proves often but a very variable standard. But though such a dictionary, as I have above mentioned, will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped for in this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification

of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer *ideas* in men's minds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer *idea* of *apium*, or *ibex*, from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of *strigil* and *fistrum*, if instead of *curry-comb* and *cymbal*, which are the *English* names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin, small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the ancients. *Toga*, *tunica*, *pallium*, are words easily translated by *gown*, *coat*, and *cloak*; but we have thereby no more true *ideas* of the fashion of those habits amongst the *Romans*, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other words set for them or made use of to define them. But this only by the by.

§ 26. *By Constancy in their Signification.*

Fifthly, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should *use the same word constantly in the same sense*: if this were done (which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those great volumes, swoln with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other), as well as poet's works, might be contained in a nut shell.

§ 27. *When the Variation is to be explained.*

But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he there uses that term.

BOOK IV.—CHAP. I.

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

§ 1. *Our knowledge conversant about our* Ideas.

Since the *mind*, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own *ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.

§ 2. *Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two* Ideas.

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but *the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that *white is not black*, what do we else but perceive that these two *ideas* do not agree? when we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that *the three angles of a triangle*

are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does neceſſarily agree to, and is inſeparable from, the three angles of a triangle? (1)

(1) The placing of certainty, as Mr. Locke does, in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our ideas, the biſhop of Worceſter ſuſpects may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith which he has endeavoured to defend; to which Mr. Locke anſwers,† ſince your lordſhip hath not, as I remember, ſhown, or gone about to ſhow, how this propoſition, viz. that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas, is oppoſite or inconſiſtent with that article of faith which your lordſhip has endeavoured to defend; it is plain, it is but your lordſhip's fear, that it may be of dangerous conſequence to it, which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconſiſtent with that article.

Nobody, I think, can blame your lordſhip, or any one elſe, for being concerned for any article of the chriſtian faith; but if that concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) makes any one apprehend danger, where no danger is, are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any propoſition, becauſe any one, though of the firſt rank and magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous conſequence to any truth of religion, without ſhowing that it is ſo? If ſuch fears be the meaſures whereby to judge of truth and falſehood, the affirming that there are antipodes would be ſtill a hereſy; and the doctrine of the motion of the earth muſt be rejected, as overthrowing the truth of the ſcripture; for of that dangerous conſequence it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious divines, out of their great concern for religion. And yet, notwithſtanding thoſe great apprehenſions of what dangerous conſequence it might be, it is now univerſally received by learned men, as an undoubted truth; and writ for by ſome, whoſe belief of the ſcripture is not at all queſtioned; and particularly, very lately, by a divine of the church of England, with great ſtrength of reaſon, in his wonderful ingenious New Theory of the Earth.

The reaſon your lordſhip gives of your fears, that it may be of ſuch dangerous conſequence to that article of faith

† In his 2d letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

§ 3. *This agreement fourfold.*

But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

which your lordship endeavours to defend, though it occur in more places than one, is only this, viz. That it is made use of by ill men to do mischief, i. e. to oppose that article of faith which your lordship hath endeavoured to defend. But, my lord, if it be a reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill purpose, I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our defence, are sometimes made use of to do mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous consequence for all that. Nobody lays by his sword and pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous consequence as to be neglected, or thrown away, because robbers, and the worst of men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest men's lives or goods. And the reason is, because they were designed, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the present case? If your lordship thinks, that placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith: on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a defence against error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's judgment against your lordship's. But I have said this only to show, whilst the argument lies for or against the truth of any proposition, barely in an imagination that it may be of consequence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote truth; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of the truth or falsehood of that proposition. For imagination will be set up against imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your lordship; the strongest imaginations being usually in the weakest heads. The only way, in this case, to put it past doubt, is to show the inconsistency of the two propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true, the false one.

Your lordship says, indeed, this is a new method of certainty. I will not say so myself, for fear of deserving a sec-

1. *Identity*, or *diversity*.
2. *Relation*.
3. *Co-existence*, or *necessary connection*.
4. *Real existence*.

and reproof from your lordship, for being too forward to assume to myself the honour of being an original. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excuse me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your lordship, whether there be any other, or older method of certainty? and what it is? For, if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the method of certainty, and so mine is no new one; or else the world is obliged to me for this new one, after having been so long in the want of so necessary a thing as a method of certainty. If there be an older, I am sure your lordship cannot but know it; your condemning mine as new, as well as your thorough insight into antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that you do. And therefore to set the world right in a thing of that great concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous consequence there is in my having unreasonably started it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your lordship's care of that article you have endeavoured to defend, nor the goodwill you bear to truth in general. For I will be answerable for myself, that I shall; and I think I may be for all others, that they all will give off the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, if your lordship will be pleased to show, that it lies in any thing else.

But truly, not to ascribe to myself an invention of what has been as old as knowledge is in the world, I must own, I am not guilty of what your lordship is pleased to call starting new methods of certainty. Knowledge, ever since there has been any in the world, has consisted in one particular action in the mind; and so, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of it. And to start new methods of knowledge, or certainty, (for they are to me the same thing) i. e. to find out and propose new methods of attaining knowledge, either with more ease and quickness, or in things yet unknown, is what I think no body could blame: but this is not that which your lordship here means, by new methods of certainty. Your lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of certainty in something, wherein either it does not consist, or else wherein it was not placed before now; if this be to be call-

§ 4. 1. *Of Identity or Diverſity.*

FIRST, As to the firſt ſort of agreement or diſagreement, *viz. identity* or *diverſity*. It is the firſt act of the mind, when it has any ſentiments or *ideas* at all, to

ed a new method of certainty. As to the latter of theſe, I ſhall know whether I am guilty or no, when your lordſhip will do me the favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before: which your lordſhip knows I profeſſed myſelf ignorant of, when I writ my book, and ſo I am ſtill. But if ſtarting new methods of certainty, be the placing of certainty in ſomething wherein it does not conſiſt; whether I have done that or no, I muſt appeal to the experience of mankind.

There are ſeveral actions of men's minds, that they are conſcious to themſelves of performing, as willing, believing, knowing, &c. which they have ſo particular ſenſe of, that they can diſtinguiſh them one from another; or elſe they could not ſay, when they willed, when they believed, and when they knew any thing. But though theſe actions were different enough from one another, not to be confounded by thoſe who ſpoke of them, yet nobody, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly ſet down wherein the act of knowing preciſely conſiſted.

To this reflection upon the actions of my own mind the ſubject of my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding naturally led me; wherein if I have done any thing new, it has been to deſcribe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do when they perform that action which they call knowing; and if, upon examination, they obſerve I have given a true account of that action of their minds in all the parts of it, I ſuppoſe it will be in vain to diſpute againſt what they find and feel in themſelves. And if I have not told them right and exactly what they find and feel in themſelves, when their minds perform the act of knowing, what I have ſaid will be all in vain; men will not be perſuaded againſt their ſenſes. Knowledge is an internal perception of their minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not what I have ſaid it is, my groundleſs conceit will not be hearkened to, but be exploded by every body, and die of itſelf: and nobody need to be at any pains to drive it out of the world. So impoſſible is it to find out, or ſtart new methods of certainty, or to have them received, if any one places it in any thing, but in that wherein

perceive its *ideas*; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be

it really consists: much less can any one be in danger to be misled into error, by any such new, and to every one visibly senseless project. Can it be supposed, that any one could start a new method of seeing, and persuade men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be feared, that any one can cast such a mist over their eyes, that they should not know when they see, and so be led out of their way by it?

Knowledge, I find in myself, and I conceive in others, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas: but whether it does so in others or no, must be determined by their own experience, reflecting upon the action of their mind in knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor, I think, they themselves. But whether they will call those immediate objects of their minds in thinking ideas or no, is perfectly in their own choice. If they dislike that name, they may call them notions or conceptions, or how they please; it matters not, if they use them so as to avoid obscurity and confusion. If they are constantly used in the same and a known sense, every one has the liberty to please himself in his terms; there lies neither truth, nor error, nor science, in that; though those that take them for things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary signs of our ideas, make a great deal ado often about them; as if some great matter lay in the use of this or that sound. All that I know, or can imagine of difference about them, is, that those words are always best, whose significations are best known in the sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed confusion.

My lord, your lordship hath been pleased to find fault with my use of the new term, ideas, without telling me a better name for the immediate objects of the mind in thinking. Your lordship also has been pleased to find fault with my definition of knowledge, without doing me the favour to give me a better. For it is only about my definition of knowledge that all this stir concerning certainty is made. For, with me, to know and to be certain, is the same thing;

no knowledge, no reaſoning, no imagination, no diſtinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each *idea* to agree with itſelf, and to be what it is; and all diſtinct *ideas* to diſagree,

what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes ſhort of certainty, I think cannot be called knowledge; as your lordſhip could not but obſerve in the 18th ſection of chap. 4. of my 4th book, which you have quoted.

My definition of knowledge ſtands thus: "knowledge ſeems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or diſagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." This definition your lordſhip diſlikes, and apprehends it may be of dangerous conſequence as to that article of chriſtian faith which your lordſhip hath endeavoured to defend. For this there is a very eaſy remedy: it is but for your lordſhip to ſet aſide this definition of knowledge by giving us a better, and this danger is over. But your lordſhip chooſes rather to have a controverſy with my book for having it in it, and to put me upon the defence of it; for which I muſt acknowledge myſelf obliged to your lordſhip for affording me ſo much of your time, and for allowing me the honour of converſing ſo much with one ſo far above me in all reſpects.

Your lordſhip ſays, it may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of chriſtian faith which you have endeavoured to defend. Though the laws of diſputing allow bare denial as a ſufficient anſwer to ſayings, without any offer of a proof: yet, my lord, to ſhow how willing I am to give your lordſhip all ſatisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous conſequence in my book, as to that article, I ſhall not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, and put your lordſhip upon the difficulty of ſhowing wherein that danger lies; but ſhall on the other ſide, endeavour to ſhow your lordſhip that that definition of mine, whether true or falſe, right or wrong, can be of no dangerous conſequence to that article of faith. The reaſon which I ſhall offer for it, is this: becauſe it can be of no conſequence to it at all.

That which your lordſhip is afraid it may be dangerous to, is an article of faith: that which your lordſhip labours and is concerned for, is the certainty of faith. Now, my

i. e. the one not to be the other; and this it does without pains, labour or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have reduced this into those

lord, I humbly conceive the certainty of faith, if your lordship thinks fit to call it so, has nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge. As to talk of the certainty of faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge of believing, a way of speaking not easy to me to understand.

Place knowledge in what you will; start what new methods of certainty you please, that are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before; place certainty on such ground as will leave little or no knowledge in the world: (for these are the arguments your lordship uses against my definition of knowledge) this shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the assurance of faith; that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with knowledge.

Faith stands by itself, and upon grounds of its own; nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of knowledge. Their grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to certainty, faith is destroyed; it is knowledge then, and faith no longer.

With what assurance soever of believing I assent to any article of faith, so that I steadfastly venture my all upon it, it is still but believing. Bring it to certainty, and it ceases to be faith. I believe that Jesus Christ was crucified, dead, and buried, rose again the third day from the dead, and ascended into heaven: let now such methods of knowledge or certainty be started, as leave men's minds more doubtful than before; let the grounds of knowledge be resolved into what any one pleases, it touches not my faith; the foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it; and one may as well say, that any thing that weakens the sight, or casts a mist before the eyes, endangers the hearing; as that any thing which alters the nature of knowledge (if that could be done) should be of dangerous consequence to an article of faith.

Whether then I am or am not mistaken, in the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas; whether this account of knowledge be true or false, enlarges or straitens the bounds of it more than it should; faith still stands upon its own basis, which is not at all alter-

general rules, *What is, is; and it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;* for ready application in all caſes, wherein there may be occaſion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the firſt exerciſe of this faculty is about particular *ideas*. A man infallibly knows, as ſoon as ever he has them in his mind, that the *ideas* he calls *white* and *round*, are the very *ideas* they are, and that they are not other *ideas* which he calls *red* or *ſquare*. Nor can any maxim or propoſition in the world make him know it clearer or ſurer than he did before, and without any ſuch general rule. This then is the firſt agreement or diſagreement, which the mind perceives in its *ideas*; which it always perceives at firſt ſight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the *ideas* themſelves, whoſe identity and diverſity will always be perceived, as ſoon and as clearly as the *ideas* themſelves are, nor can it poſſibly be otherwiſe.

§ 5. 2. *Relative.*

Secondly, The next ſort of agreement, or diſagreement, the mind perceives in any of its *ideas*, may, I think, be called *relative*, and is nothing but *the perception of the relation between any two ideas*, of what kind ſoever, whether ſubſtances, modes, or any other. For ſince all diſtinct *ideas* muſt eternally be known not to be the ſame, and ſo be univerſally and conſtantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any poſitive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any

ed by it; and every article of that has juſt the ſame unmoved foundation, and the very ſame credibility, that it had before. So that, my lord, whatever I have ſaid about certainty, and how much ſoever I may be out in it, if I am miſtaken, your lordſhip has no reaſon to apprehend any danger to any article of faith from thence; every one of them ſtands upon the ſame bottom it did before, out of the reach of what belongs to knowledge and certainty. And thus much of my way of certainty by ideas; which, I hope, will ſatisfy your lordſhip how far it is from being dangerous to any article of the chriſtian faith whatſoever.

relation between our *ideas*, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.

§ 6. 3. *Of Co-existence.*

THIRDLY, The third sort of agreement, or disagreement, to be found in our *ideas*, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is *co-existence*, or *non-co-existence* in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning *gold* that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an *idea* that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in *aqua regia*, which make our complex *idea*, signified by the word *gold*.

§ 7. 4. *Of real Existence.*

FOURTHLY, The fourth and last sort is that of *actual, real existence* agreeing to any *idea*. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of: for all the inquiries that we can make concerning any of our *ideas*, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not, always co-exist with some other *idea* in the same subject; that it has this or that relation to some other *idea*; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus *blue is not yellow*, is of identity: *two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal*, is of relation: *iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions* is of co-existence: *God is*, is of real existence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our *ideas*, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this essay. I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowl-

edge, but that it is neceſſary firſt to conſider the different acceptations of the word *knowledge*.

§ 8. *Knowledge actual or habitual.*

THERE are ſeveral ways wherein the mind is poſſeſſed of truth, each of which is called *knowledge*.

1. There is *actual knowledge*, which is the preſent view the mind has of the agreement or diſagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another.

2. A man is ſaid to know any propoſition, which having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* whereof it conſiſts; and ſo lodged it in his memory, that whenever that propoſition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or heſitation, embraces the right ſide, aſſents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call *habitual knowledge*: and thus a man may be ſaid to know all thoſe truths which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the mind is aſſured paſt doubt, as often as it has occaſion to reflect on them. For our finite underſtandings being able to think clearly and diſtinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew moſt would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

§ 9. *Habitual Knowledge twofold.*

OF habitual knowledge, there are alſo, vulgarly ſpeaking, two degrees:

Firſt, The one is of *ſuch truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation is between thoſe* ideas. And this is in all thoſe truths, whereof we have an *intuitive knowledge*; where the *ideas* themſelves, by an immediate view, diſcover their agreement or diſagreement one with another.

Secondly, The other is of *ſuch truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory*

of the conviction without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the truth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know, and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another; yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter, is, that the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual view of all the intermediate *ideas*, whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate *ideas*, that show the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example, in this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth, knows it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The agreement of the two *ideas* joined in that proposition is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other *ideas* than those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, *i. e.* he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things, is now the *idea* that shows him, that if the three angles

of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the caſe, is always true; what *ideas* once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular demonſtrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If then the perception that the ſame *ideas* will eternally have the ſame habitudes and relations, be not a ſufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propoſitions in mathematics; for no mathematical demonſtration would be any other than particular: and when a man had demonſtrated any propoſition concerning one triangle or circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it farther, he muſt renew his demonſtration in another inſtance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and ſo on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propoſitions. Nobody, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any propoſition, that he now at any time reads in his book, to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate *ideas*, whereby he at firſt diſcovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, able to retain ſuch a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties: when the very diſcovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connection of *ideas*, is found to ſurpaſs moſt readers comprehenſion. But yet it is evident, the author himſelf knows the propoſition to be true, remembering he once ſaw the connection of thoſe *ideas*, as certainly as he knows ſuch a man wounded another, remembering that he ſaw him run him through. But becauſe the memory is not always ſo clear as actual perception, and does in all men more or leſs decay in length of time, this amongſt other differences is one, which ſhews that *demonſtrative knowl-*

edge is much more imperfect than *intuitive*, as we shall see in the following chapter.

CHAP. II.

OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1. *Intuitive.*

ALL our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own *ideas*, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its *ideas*. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two *ideas* immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call *intuitive knowledge*. For in this, the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives, that *white* is not *black*, that a *circle* is not a *triangle*, that *three* are more than *two*, and equal to *one* and *two*. Such kind of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the *ideas* together, by bare *intuition*, without the intervention of any other *idea*; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sun shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this *intuition* that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive him-

ſelf capable of a greater certainty, than to know that any *idea* in his mind is ſuch as he perceives it to be; and that two *ideas*, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not preciſely the ſame. He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and ſhows only that he has a mind to be a ſceptic, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this intuition, that in the next degree of *knowledge*, which I call *demonſtrative*, this intuition is neceſſary in all the connections of the intermediate *ideas*, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty.

§ 2. *Demonſtrative.*

THE next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or diſagreement of any *ideas*, but not immediately. Though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or diſagreement of any of its *ideas*, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind ſees that agreement or diſagreement which there is between them, even where it is diſcoverable: and in that caſe remains in ignorance, and at moſt gets no farther than a probable conjecture. The reaſon why the mind cannot always perceive preſently the agreement or diſagreement of two *ideas*, is, becauſe thoſe *ideas*, concerning whoſe agreement or diſagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be ſo put together as to ſhow it. In this caſe then, when the mind cannot ſo bring its *ideas* together, as by their immediate compariſon, and as it were juxta-poſition or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or diſagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other *ideas* (one or more, as it happens) to diſcover the agreement or diſagreement which it ſearches; and this is that which we call *reaſoning*. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it: becauſe the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one or two angles;

and ſo of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this caſe the mind is fain to find out ſome other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality; and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, comes to know their equality to two right ones.

§ 3. *Depends on Proofs.*

THOSE intervening *ideas* which ſerve to ſhow the agreement of any two others, are called *proofs*; and where the agreement or diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *demonſtration*, it being *ſhown* to the underſtanding, and the mind made to ſee that that it is ſo. A quickneſs in the mind to find out theſe intermediate *ideas* (that ſhall diſcover the agreement or diſagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *ſagacity*.

§ 4. *But not ſo eaſy.*

THIS knowledge by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is *not* altogether *ſo clear* and bright, nor the aſſent ſo ready, as in *intuitive* knowledge. For though in *demonſtration*, the mind does at laſt perceive the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* it conſiders, yet it is not without pains and attention: there muſt be more than one tranſient view to find it. A ſteady application and purſuit is required to this diſcovery: and there muſt be a progreſſion by ſteps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two *ideas* that need proofs and the uſe of reaſon to ſhow it.

§ 5. *Not without precedent Doubt.*

ANOTHER difference between intuitive and demonſtrative knowledge, is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed, when by the intervention of the intermediate *ideas* the agreement or diſagreement is perceived; yet before the demonſtration there was a doubt, which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind, that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of diſtinct *ideas*, no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can

diſtinctly ſee white and black) whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be ſight in the eyes, it will at firſt glimpſe, without heſitation, perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: and ſo if the mind have the faculty of diſtinct perceptions, it will perceive the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe *ideas* that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have loſt the faculty of ſeeing, or the mind of perceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickneſs of ſight in one, or clearneſs of perception in the other.

§ 6. *Not ſo clear.*

It is true, the perception produced by *demonſtration* is alſo very clear, yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident luſtre and full aſſurance, that always accompany that which I call *intuitive*; like a face reflected by ſeveral mirrors one to another, where, as long as it retains the ſimilitude and agreement with the object, it produces a knowledge: but it is ſtill in every ſucceſſive reflection with a leſſening of that perfect clearneſs and diſtinctneſs, which is in the firſt, till at laſt, after many removes, it has a great mixture of dimneſs, and is not at firſt ſight ſo knowable, eſpecially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge, made out by a long train of proofs.

§ 7. *Each ſtep muſt have intuitive Evidence.*

Now, *in every ſtep reaſon makes in demonſtrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge* of that agreement or diſagreement, it ſeeks with the next intermediate *idea*, which it uſes as a proof: for if it were not ſo, that yet would need a proof; ſince without the perception of ſuch agreement or diſagreement, there is no knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itſelf, it is intuitive knowledge; if it cannot be perceived by itſelf, there is need of ſome intervening *idea*, as a common meaſure to ſhow their agreement or diſagreement. By which it is plain that every ſtep in reaſoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the

agreement or disagreement of the *ideas*, concerning which we inquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a *demonstration*, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening *ideas*, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two *ideas* under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate *ideas*, in each step and progression of the *demonstration*, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out: which, because in long deductions, and the use of many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations.

§ 8. *Hence the mistake*, ex præcognitis et præconcessis. The necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientifical or demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that *mistaken axiom*, *that all reasoning was ex præcognitis et præconcessis*; which, how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to show more at large, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those propositions which are called maxims; and to show that it is by a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundation of all our knowledge and reasonings.

§ 9. *Demonstration not limited to Quantity.* It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement or disagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege of the *ideas* of *number*, *extension* and *figure* alone; it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at by any but mathematicians. For whatever *ideas* we have, wherein

the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate *ideas*, there the mind is capable of demonstration, which is not limited to *ideas* of extension, figure, number, and their modes.

§ 10. *Why it has been so thought.*

The reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only in those, I imagine has been not only the general usefulness of those sciences, but because, in comparing their equality or excess, the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and though, in extension, every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to examine and discover demonstratively the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or figures: and both these, *i. e.* numbers and figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, wherein the *ideas* under consideration are perfectly determined; which for the most part they are not, where they are marked only by names and words.

§ 11.

But in other simple *ideas*, whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences, as to perceive or find ways to measure their just equality, or the least differences. For those other simple *ideas*, being appearances of sensations, produced in us by the size, figure, number and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible, their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some, or all of those causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple *ideas*. For supposing the sensation or *idea* we name *whiteness* be produced in us by a certain

number of globules, which having a verticity about their own centres, ſtrike upon the *retina* of the eye, with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progreſſive ſwiftneſs, it will hence eaſily follow, that the more the ſuperficial parts of any body are ſo ordered, as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them that proper rotation, which is fit to produce this ſenſation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal ſpace ſends to the *retina* the greater number of ſuch corpuſcles, with that peculiar ſort of motion. I do not ſay, that the nature of light conſiſts in very ſmall round globules, nor of whiteneſs in ſuch a texture of parts, as gives a certain rotation to theſe globules when it reflects them; for I am not now treating phyſically of light or colours. But this, I think, I may ſay, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our ſenſes, but by the immediate contact of the ſenſible bodies themſelves, as in taſting and feeling, or the impulſe of ſome inſenſible particles coming from them, as in ſeeing, hearing and ſmelling; by the different impulſe of which parts, cauſed by their different ſize, figure and motion, the variety of ſenſations is produced in us.

§ 12.

WHETHER then they be globules, or no; or whether they have a verticity about their own centres, that produces the *idea* of *whiteneſs* in us, this is certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the ſenſation of whiteneſs in us; and poſſibly too, the quicker that peculiar motion is, the whiter does the body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the ſame piece of paper put in the ſun-beams, in the ſhade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us the *idea* of whiteneſs in far different degrees.

§ 13. *Why it has been ſo thought.*

NOT knowing therefore what number of particles,

nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of *whiteness*, we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of *whiteness*, because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being from our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is so great, as to produce in the mind clearly distinct *ideas*, whose differences can be perfectly retained, there these *ideas* of colours, as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of demonstration, as *ideas* of number and extension. What I have here said of *whiteness* and colours, I think, holds true in all secondary qualities, and their modes.

§ 14. *Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.* These two, *viz.* intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith, or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another *perception* of the mind, employed about *the particular existence of finite beings* without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the *idea* we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that *idea* in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that *idea*, is that, whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such *ideas* in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting; for I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that

favour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between an *idea* revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct *ideas*. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these *ideas* may be produced in us without any external objects, he may please to dream that I make him this answer: 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove this scruple, or no: where all is but a dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer, that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of *knowledge* this also, of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of *ideas* from them, and allow these *three degrees of knowledge*, viz. *intuitive*, *demonstrative*, and *sensitive*: in each of which, there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.

§ 15. *Knowledge not always clear, where the* Ideas *are so.*

But since our knowledge is founded on, and employed about, our *ideas* only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our *ideas*; and that where our *ideas* are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two

ideas, its clearneſs or obſcurity conſiſts in the clearneſs or obſcurity of that perception, and not in the clearneſs or obſcurity of the *ideas* themſelves; *v. g.* a man that has as clear *ideas* of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obſcure perception of their agreement, and ſo have but a very obſcure knowledge of it. But *ideas*, which by reaſon of their obſcurity or otherwiſe, are confuſed, cannot produce any clear or diſtinct knowledge; becauſe as far as any *ideas* are confuſed, ſo far the mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree or diſagree. Or, to expreſs the ſame thing in a way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood, he that hath not determined the *ideas* to the words he uſes, cannot make propoſitions of them, of whoſe truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1.

KNOWLEDGE, as has been ſaid, lying in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, that,

1. *No farther than we have* Ideas.

FIRST, We can have *knowledge* no farther than we have *ideas*.

§ 2. 2. *No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Diſagreement.*

SECONDLY, That we can have no *knowledge* farther than we can have perception of that agreement or diſagreement. Which perception being, 1. Either by *intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two *ideas*: or, 2. By *reaſon*, examining the agreement or diſagreement of two *ideas*, by the intervention of ſome others: or, 3. By *ſenſation*, perceiving the exiſtence of particular things: hence it alſo follows,

§ 3. 3. *Intuitive Knowledge extends itſelf not to all the Relations of all our* Ideas.

THIRDLY, That we cannot have an *intuitive knowledge*

that shall extend itself to all our *ideas*, and all that we would know about them, because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the *ideas* of an obtuse, and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge.

§ 4. 4. *Nor Demonstrative Knowledge.*

Fourthly, It follows also, from what is above observed, that our *rational knowledge* cannot reach to the whole extent of our *ideas*: because between two different *ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *mediums*, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

§ 5. 5. *Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.*

Fifthly, *Sensitive knowledge*, reaching no farther than the existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

§ 6. 6. *Our Knowledge, therefore, narrower than our Ideas.*

From all which it is evident, *that the extent of our knowledge* comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own *ideas*. Though our knowledge be limited to our *ideas*, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of all being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not

tied down to the dull and narrow information which is to be received from some few, and not very acute ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our *ideas*, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the *ideas* we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those *ideas* we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them. We have the *ideas* of a *square*, a *circle*, and *equality*; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the *ideas* of *matter* and *thinking*, (1) but possi-

(1) Against that assertion of Mr. Locke, that possibly we shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no, &c. the bishop of Worcester argues thus: if this be true, then, for all that we can know by our ideas of matter and thinking, matter may have a power of thinking: and, if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual substance in us from the idea of thinking: for how can we be assured by our ideas, that God hath not given such a power of thinking to matter so disposed as our bodies are? especially since it is said,* "That, in respect of our notions, it is "not much more remote from our comprehension to con-"ceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our idea of "matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd

* Essay of Human Understanding, B. 4. C. 3. § 6.

bly ſhall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no; it being impoſſible for us, by the contemplation of our own *ideas*, without "to it another ſubſtance, with a faculty of thinking." Whoever aſſerts this can never prove a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us from a faculty of thinking, becauſe he cannot know, from the idea of matter and thinking, that matter ſo diſpoſed cannot think: and he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the matter of our bodies ſo as to be capable of it.

To which Mr. Locke * anſwers thus: here your lordſhip argues, that upon my principles it cannot be proved that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us. To which, give me leave, with ſubmiſſion, to ſay, that I think it may be proved from my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof in my book ſtands thus: Firſt, we experiment in ourſelves thinking. The idea of this action or mode of thinking is inconſiſtent with the idea of ſelf-ſubſiſtence, and therefore has a neceſſary connexion with a ſupport or ſubject of inheſion: the idea of that ſupport is what we call ſubſtance; and ſo from thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking ſubſtance in us, which in my ſenſe is a ſpirit. Againſt this your lordſhip will argue, that, by what I have ſaid of the poſſibility that God may, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us, becauſe, upon that ſuppoſition, it is poſſible it may be a material ſubſtance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, that the general idea of ſubſtance being the ſame every where, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking, joined to it, makes it a ſpirit, without conſidering what other modifications it has, as, whether it has the modification of ſolidity, or no. As, on the other ſide, ſubſtance, that has the modification of ſolidity, is matter, whether it has the modification of thinking, or no. And therefore, if your lordſhip means by a ſpiritual, an immaterial ſubſtance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my principles can it be proved, (your lordſhip meaning, as I think you do, demonſtratively proved) that there is an immaterial ſubſtance in us that thinks. Though I preſume, from what I have ſaid about this ſuppoſition of a ſyſtem of matter, thinking † (which there demonſtrates that God is

* In his firſt letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

† B. 4. C. 10. § 16.

revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to mat-

immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. But your lordship thinks not probability enough, and by charging the want of demonstration upon my principle, that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable from principles of philosophy. That demonstration I should with joy receive from your lordship, or any one. For though all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without it, as I have shown,* yet it would be a great advance of our knowledge in nature and philosophy.

To what I have said in my book, to show that all the great ends of religion and morality are secured barely by the immortality of the soul, without a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, that immortality may and shall be annexed to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the apostle expressly declares in these words, † For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.

Perhaps my using the word spirit for a thinking substance, without excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty, and such as deserves censure, because I leave immateriality out of the idea I make it a sign of. I readily own, that words should be sparingly ventured on in a sense wholly new; and nothing but absolute necessity can excuse the boldness of using any term in a sense whereof we can produce no example. But, in the present case, I think I have great authorities to justify me. The soul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the first book of Cicero's Tusculan questions, and into the sixth book of Virgil's Æneid, will find, that these two great men, who of all the Romans best understood philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny the soul to be a subtile matter, which might come under the name of aura, or ignis, or æther, and this soul they both of them called spiritus: in the notion of which, it is plain, they included only thought and active motion, without the total exclusion of

* B. 4. C. 3. § 6. † 1 Cor. xv. 53.

ter ſo diſpoſed, a thinking immaterial ſubſtance: it being, in reſpect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehenſion to conceive, that God

matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not ſay; that is not the queſtion; but whether they ſpoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, ſubtile ſubſtance, out of which they excluded only groſs and palpable matter, ſpiritus, ſpirit. I think that nobody will deny, that if any among the Romans can be allowed to ſpeak properly, Tully and Virgil are the two who may moſt ſecurely be depended on for it: and one of them ſpeaking of the ſoul, ſays, Dum ſpiritus hos reget artus; and the other, Vita continetur corpore & ſpiritu. Where it is plain, by corpus, he means (as generally every where) only groſs matter that may be felt and handled, as appears by theſe words, Si cor, aut ſanguis, aut cerebrum eſt animus; certe, quoniam eſt corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; ſi anima eſt, fortè diſſipabitur; ſi ignis, extinguetur, Tuſc. Quæſt. l. 1. c. 11. Here Cicero oppoſes corpus to ignis and anima, i. e. aura, or breath. And the foundation of that his diſtinction of the ſoul, from that which he calls corpus or body, he gives a little lower in theſe words, Tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem, ib. c. 22. Nor was it the heathen world alone that had this notion of ſpirit; the moſt enlightened of all the ancient people of God, Solomon himſelf, ſpeaks after the ſame manner, * that which befalleth the ſons of men, befalleth beaſts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, ſo dieth the other, yea, they have all one ſpirit. So I tranſlate the Hebrew word רוח here, for ſo I find it tranſlated the very next verſe but one; † who knoweth the ſpirit of man that goeth upward, and the ſpirit of the beaſt that goeth down to the earth? In which places it is plain, that Solomon applies the word רוח, and our tranſlators of him the word ſpirit, to a ſubſtance, out of which materiality was not wholly excluded, unleſs the ſpirit of a beaſt that goeth downwards to the earth be immaterial. Nor did the way of ſpeaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: St. Luke tells us, ‡ that when our Saviour, after his reſurrection, ſtood in the midſt of them, they were affrighted, and ſuppoſed that they had ſeen πνεῦμα, the Greek word which always anſwers ſpirit in Engliſh; and ſo the tranſla-

* Eccl. iii. 19. † Eccl. iii. 21. ‡ Ch. xxiv. 37.

can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it another ſubſtance, with a faculty of thinking; ſince we know

tors of the Bible render it here, they ſuppoſed that they had ſeen a ſpirit. But our Saviour ſays to them, behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myſelf; handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath not fleſh and bones, as you ſee me have. Which words of our Saviour put the ſame diſtinction between body and ſpirit, that Cicero did in the place above-cited, viz. That the one was a groſs compages that could be felt and handled; and the other ſuch as Virgil deſcribes the ghoſt or ſoul of Anchiſes.

Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
Ter fruſtra comprenſa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique ſimillima ſumno.*

I would not be thought hereby to ſay, that ſpirit never does ſignify a purely immaterial ſubſtance. In that ſenſe the ſcripture, I take it, ſpeaks, when it ſays God is a ſpirit; and in that ſenſe I have uſed it; and in that ſenſe I have proved from my principles that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance; and am certain that there is a ſpiritual immaterial ſubſtance: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct anſwer to your lordſhip's queſtion in the beginning of this argument, viz. How we come to be certain that there are ſpiritual ſubſtances, ſuppoſing this principle to be true, that the ſimple ideas by ſenſation and reflection are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial Spirit, ſhould pleaſe to give to a ſyſtem of very ſubtile matter, ſenſe and motion, it might with propriety of ſpeech be called ſpirit, though materiality were not excluded out of its complex idea. Your lordſhip proceeds, It is ſaid indeed elſewhere,† that it is repugnant to the idea of ſenſeleſs matter, that it ſhould put into itſelf ſenſe, perception, and knowledge. But this doth not reach the preſent caſe; which is not what matter can do of itſelf, but what matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do. And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have none from the ideas, for thoſe are given up in this caſe, and conſequently we can have no certainty, upon theſe principles, whether we have any ſpiritual ſubſtance within us or not.

* Lib. VI. † B. 4. C. 10. § 5.

not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but

Your lordship in this paragraph proves, that, from what I say, we can have no certainty whether we have any spiritual substance in us or not. If by spiritual substance your lordship means an immaterial substance in us, as you speak, I grant what your lordship says is true, that it cannot upon these principles be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say at the same time, that upon these principles it can be proved, to the highest degree of probability. If by spiritual substance your lordship means a thinking substance, I must dissent from your lordship, and say, that we can have a certainty, upon my principles, that there is a spiritual substance in us. In short, my lord, upon my principles, i. e. from the idea of thinking, we can have a certainty that there is a thinking substance in us; from hence we have a certainty that there is an eternal thinking substance. This thinking substance, which has been from eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking substance, has put into us a thinking substance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas; though from them it may be proved, that it is to the highest degree probable that it is immaterial.

Again, the bishop of Worcester undertakes to prove from Mr. Locke's principles, that we may be certain, "That the "first eternal thinking Being, or omnipotent Spirit cannot, "if he would give to certain systems of created sensible "matter put together as he sees fit, some degrees of sense, "perception, and thought."

To which Mr. Locke has made the following answer in his third letter.

Your first argument I take to be this; that according to me, the knowledge we have being by our ideas, and our idea of matter in general being a solid substance, and our idea of body a solid extended figured substance; if I admit matter to be capable of thinking, I confound the idea of matter with the idea of a spirit: to which I answer, No, no more than I confound the idea of matter with the idea of an horse, when I say that matter in general is a solid extended sub-

merely by the good pleaſure and bounty of the Creator. For I ſee no contradiction in it, that the firſt eternal thinking Being ſhould, if he pleaſed, give to

ſtance; and that an horſe is a material animal, or an extended ſolid ſubſtance with ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion.

The idea of matter is an extended ſolid ſubſtance; wherever there is ſuch a ſubſtance, there is matter, and the eſſence of matter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that eſſence, it ſhall pleaſe God to ſuperadd to it. For example, God creates an extended ſolid ſubſtance, without the ſuperadding any thing elſe to it, and ſo we may conſider it at reſt: to ſome parts of it he ſuperadds motion, but it has ſtill the eſſence of matter: other parts of it he frames into plants, with all the excellencies of vegetation, life, and beauty, which is to be found in a roſe or peach tree, &c. above the eſſence of matter, in general, but it is ſtill but matter: to other parts he adds ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, and thoſe other properties that are to be found in an elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted but the power of God may go, and that the properties of a roſe, a peach, or an elephant, ſuperadded to matter, change not the properties of matter; but matter is in theſe things matter ſtill. But if one venture to go one ſtep farther and ſay, God may give to matter thought, reaſon, and volition, as well as ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, there are men ready preſently to limit the power of the omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; becauſe it deſtroys the eſſence, or changes the eſſential properties of matter. To make good which aſſertion, they have no more to ſay, but that thought and reaſon are not included in the eſſence of matter. I grant it; but whatever excellency, not contained in its eſſence, be ſuperadded to matter, it does not deſtroy the eſſence of matter, if it leaves it an extended ſolid ſubſtance; wherever that is, there is the eſſence of matter: and if every thing of greater perfection, ſuperadded to ſuch a ſubſtance, deſtroys the eſſence of matter, what will become of the eſſence of matter in a plant or an animal, whoſe properties far exceed thoſe of a mere extended ſolid ſubſtance?

But it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to ſay God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow

certain systems of created senseless matter put together, as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception and thought: though, as I think, I have prov-

compass, because man's understanding is so; and brings down God's infinite power to the size of our capacities. If God can give no power to any parts of matter, but what men can account for from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities and properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural consequence of that essence; it is plain, that the essence of matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the sensible parts of this our system. For it is visible, that all the planets have revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to that essence, which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in a crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be said in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from the essence of matter or body in general; though one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be superadded in this instance to the essence of matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the making of the world, and his ways are not the less excellent, because they are past finding out.

In the next place, the vegetable part of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it, will observe excellencies and operations in this part of matter, which he will not find contained in the essence of matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produced by it. And will he therefore say, that the essence of matter is destroyed in them, because they have properties and operations not contained in the essential properties of matter as matter, nor explicable by the essence of matter in general?

Let us advance one step farther, and we shall in the animal world meet with yet greater perfections and properties, no ways explicable by the essence of matter in general. If the omnipotent Creator had not superadded to the earth, which produced the irrational animals, qualities far surpass-

ed, *lib.* 4. *ch.* 10. § 14. it is no leſs than a contradiction to ſuppoſe matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of ſenſe and thought) ſhould be that eternal firſt

ing thoſe of the dull dead earth, out of which they were made, life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, nobler qualities than were before in it, it had ſtill remained rude ſenſeleſs matter; and if to the individuals of each ſpecies he had not ſuperadded a power of propagation, the ſpecies had periſhed with thoſe individuals: but by theſe eſſences or properties of each ſpecies, ſuperadded to the matter which they were made of, the eſſence or properties of matter in general were not deſtroyed or changed, any more than any thing that was in the individuals before was deſtroyed or changed by the power of generation, ſuperadded to them by the firſt benediction of the Almighty.

In all ſuch caſes, the ſuperinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualities deſtroys nothing of the eſſence or perfections that were there before; unleſs there can be ſhowed a manifeſt repugnancy between them: but all the proof offered for that, is only, that we cannot conceive how matter, without ſuch ſuperadded perfections, can produce ſuch effects; which is, in truth, no more than to ſay, matter in general, or every part of matter, as matter, has them not; but is no reaſon to prove, that God, if he pleaſes, cannot ſuperadd them to ſome parts of matter, unleſs it can be proved to be a contradiction, that God ſhould give to ſome parts of matter qualities and perfections, which matter in general has not; though we cannot conceive how matter is inveſted with them, or how it operates by virtue of thoſe new endowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilſt we limit all its operations to thoſe qualities it had before, and would explain them by the known properties of matter in general, without any ſuch induced perfections. For, if this be a right rule of reaſoning, to deny a thing to be, becauſe we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be; I ſhall deſire them who uſe it to ſtick to this rule, and ſee what work it will make both in divinity as well as philoſophy: and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of ſcepticiſm.

For to keep within the preſent ſubject of the power of thinking and ſelf-motion, beſtowed by omnipotent power in ſome parts of matter: the objection to this is, I cannot con-

thinking Being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that ſome perceptions, ſuch as, *v. g.* pleaſure and pain, ſhould not be in ſome bodies themſelves,

ceive how matter ſhould think. What is the conſequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this ſtand for a good reaſon, and then proceed in other caſes by the ſame. You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any diſtance, much leſs at the diſtance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it ſuch a power: you cannot conceive how matter ſhould feel, or move itſelf, or affect an immaterial being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it ſuch powers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of the plants about the ſun; to make brutes mere machines, without ſenſe or ſpontaneous motion; and to allow man neither ſenſe nor voluntary motion.

Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended ſolid ſubſtance ſhould think, therefore God cannot make it think: can you conceive how your own ſoul, or any ſubſtance, thinks? You find indeed that you do think, and ſo do I; but I want to be told how the action of thinking is performed: this, I confeſs, is beyond my conception; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this faculty; and ſince I cannot but be convinced of his power in this inſtance, which though I every moment experiment in myſelf, yet I cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be leſs than an inſolent abſurdity, to deny his power in other like caſes, only for this reaſon, becauſe I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this matter a little farther: God has created a ſubſtance; let it be, for example, a ſolid extended ſubſtance. Is God bound to give it, beſides being, a power of action? that, I think, nobody will ſay: he therefore may leave it in a ſtate of inactivity, and it will be nevertheleſs a ſubſtance; for action is not neceſſary to the being of any ſubſtance that God does create God has likewiſe created and made to exiſt, de novo, an immaterial ſubſtance, which will not loſe its being of a ſubſtance, though God ſhould beſtow on it nothing more but this bare being, without giving it any activity at all Here are now two diſtinct ſubſtances, the one material, the other immaterial, both in a ſtate of perfect inactivity. Now I aſk, what power God can give to

after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they ſhould be in an immaterial ſubſtance, upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far as

one of theſe ſubſtances (ſuppoſing them to retain the ſame diſtinct natures that they had as ſubſtances in their ſtate of inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that ſtate, it is plain, neither of them thinks; for thinking being an action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any action of any created ſubſtance, without annihilating of the ſubſtance whereof it is an action; and if it be ſo, he can alſo create or give exiſtence to ſuch a ſubſtance, without giving that ſubſtance any action at all. By the ſame reaſon it is plain, that neither of them can move itſelf: now, I would aſk, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of theſe ſubſtances, which are equally in a ſtate of perfect inactivity, the ſame power that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of ſpontaneous or ſelf-motion, which is a power that it is ſuppoſed God can give to an unſolid ſubſtance, but denied that he can give to ſolid ſubſtance.

If it be aſked, why they limit the omnipotency of God, in reference to the one rather than the other of theſe ſubſtances? all that can be ſaid to it is, that they cannot conceive, how the ſolid ſubſtance ſhould ever be able to move itſelf. And as little, ſay I, are they able to conceive, how a created unſolid ſubſtance ſhould move itſelf. But there may be ſomething in an immaterial ſubſtance, that you do not know. I grant it; and in a material one too: for example, gravitation of matter towards matter, and in the ſeveral proportions obſervable, inevitably ſhows, that there is ſomething in matter that we do not underſtand, unleſs we can conceive ſelf-motion in matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable attraction in matter, at immenſe, almoſt incomprehenſible diſtances: it muſt therefore be confeſſed, that there is ſomething in ſolid, as well as unſolid ſubſtances, that we do not underſtand. But this we know, that they may each of them have their diſtinct beings, without any activity ſuperadded to them, unleſs you will deny, that God can take from any being its power of acting, which it is probable will be thought too preſumptuous for any one to do; and I ſay, it is as hard to conceive ſelf-motion in a created immaterial, as in a material being, conſider it how you will: and therefore this is no reaſon to deny Omnipotency to be

we can conceive, being able only to ſtrike and affect body; and motion, according to the utmoſt reach of our *ideas*, being able to produce nothing but motion;

able to give a power of ſelf-motion to a material ſubſtance, if he pleaſes, as well as to an immaterial; ſince neither of them can have it from themſelves, nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them.

The ſame is viſible in the other operation of thinking; both theſe ſubſtances may be made, and exiſt without thought; neither of them has, or can have the power of thinking from itſelf; God may give it to either of them, according to the good pleaſure of his omnipotency; and in which ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our capacity to conceive, how either of theſe ſubſtances thinks. But for that reaſon, to deny that God, who had power enough to give them both a being out of nothing, can by the ſame omnipotency, give them what other powers and perfections he pleaſes, has no better foundation than to deny his power of creation, becauſe we cannot conceive how it is performed: and there, at laſt, this way of reaſoning muſt terminate.

That Omnipotency cannot make a ſubſtance to be ſolid and not ſolid at the ſame time, I think with due reverence we may ſay; but that a ſolid ſubſtance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have no natural or viſibly neceſſary connexion with ſolidity and extenſion, is too much for us (who are but of yeſterday, and know nothing) to be poſitive in. If God cannot join things together by connexions inconceivable to us, we muſt deny even the conſiſtency and being of matter itſelf; ſince every particle of it having ſome bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raiſed againſt the thinking of matter, from our ignorance, or narrow conceptions, ſtand not at all in the way of the power of God, if he pleaſes to ordain it ſo; nor prove any thing againſt his having actually endued ſome parcels of matter, ſo diſpoſed as he thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can be ſhown, that it contains a contradiction to ſuppoſe it.

Though to me ſenſation be comprehended under thinking in general, yet in the foregoing diſcourſe, I have ſpoke of ſenſe in brutes, as diſtinct from thinking; becauſe your lordſhip, as I remember, ſpeaks of ſenſe in brutes. But here I take liberty to obſerve, that if your lordſhip allows brutes

ſo that when we allow it to produce pleaſure or pain, or the *idea* of a colour or ſound, we are fain to quit our reaſon, go beyond our *ideas*, and attribute it to have ſenſation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to ſome parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking; or that all animals have immaterial, and conſequently, according to your lordſhip, immortal ſouls, as well as men; and to ſay that fleas and mites, &c. have immortal ſouls as well as men, will poſſibly be looked on as going a great way to ſerve an hypotheſis.

I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, that they who are ſo forward to beſtow hard cenſures or names on the opinions of thoſe who differ from them, may conſider whether ſometimes they are not more due to their own; and that they may be perſuaded a little to temper that heat, which, ſuppoſing the truth in their current opinions, gives them (as they think) a right to lay what imputations they pleaſe on thoſe who would fairly examine the grounds they ſtand upon. For talking with a ſuppoſition and inſinuations, that truth and knowledge, nay, and religion too, ſtand and fall with their ſyſtems, is at beſt but an imperious way of begging the queſtion, and aſſuming to themſelves, under the pretence of zeal for the cauſe of God, a title to infallibility. It is very becoming that men's zeal for truth ſhould go as far as their proofs, but not go for proofs themſelves. He that attacks received opinions with any thing but fair arguments, may, I own, be juſtly ſuſpected not to mean well, nor to be led by the love of truth; but the ſame may be ſaid of him too, who ſo defends them. An error is not the better for being common, nor truth the worſe for having lain neglected: and if it were put to the vote any where in the world, I doubt, as things are managed, whether truth would have the majority, at leaſt whilſt the authority of men, and not the examination of things, muſt be its meaſure. The imputation of ſcepticiſm, and thoſe broad inſinuations to render what I have writ ſuſpected, ſo frequent, as if that were the great buſineſs of all this pains you have been at about me, has made me ſay thus much, my lord, rather as my ſenſe of the way to eſtabliſh truth in its full force and beauty, than that I think the world will need to have any thing ſaid to it, to make it diſtinguiſh between your lordſhip's and my deſign in writing, which therefore I ſecurely

wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what

leave to the judgment of the reader, and return to the argument in hand.

What I have above said, I take to be a full answer to all that your lordship would infer from my idea of matter, of liberty, of identity, and from the power of abstracting. You ask, * How can my idea of liberty agree with the idea that bodies can operate only by motion and impulse? Ans. By the omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a contradiction. It is true, I say, "† That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else." And so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation. But I am since convinced by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power in this point by my narrow conception. The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, if he please, put into bodies powers, and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter, but also an unquestionable, and every where visible instance, that he has done so. And therefore in the next edition of my book, I will take care to have that passage rectified.

As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, ‡ What is there like self-consciousness in matter? Nothing at all in matter as matter. But that God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with it self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking, § How is it possible to apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? The weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsolid created substance thinks; but this weakness of our apprehensions reaches not the power of God, whose weakness is stronger than any thing in men.

Your argument from abstraction we have in this question, ‖ If it may be in the power of matter to think, how comes it to be so impossible for such organized bodies as the brutes

* 1st Answer. † Essay, B. 2. Ch. 8. § 11. ‡ 1st Answer.
§ Ibid. ‖ Ibid.

reaſon have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a ſubject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a ſubject we have, to enlarge their ideas by abſtraction? Anſ. This ſeems to ſuppoſe, that I place thinking within the natural power of matter. If that be your meaning, my lord, I never ſay, nor ſuppoſe, that all matter has naturally in it a faculty of thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain parcels of matter, ordered by the Divine power, as ſeems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his omnipotency the faculty of thinking; that, indeed, I ſay; and that being granted, the anſwer to your queſtion is eaſy; ſince, if Omnipotency can give thought to any ſolid ſubſtance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that faculty in a higher or lower degree, as it pleaſes him, who knows what diſpoſition of the ſubject is ſuited to ſuch a particular way or degree of thinking.

Another argument to prove, that God cannot endue any parcel of matter with the faculty of thinking, is taken from thoſe words of mine, *where I ſhow, by what connexion of ideas we may come to know, that God is an immaterial ſubſtance. They are theſe, "The idea of an eternal actual "knowing being, with the idea of immateriality, by the in- "tervention of the idea of matter, and of its actual diviſion, "diviſibility, and want of perception," &c. From whence your lordſhip thus argues, ‖Here the want of perception is owned to be ſo eſſential to matter, that God is therefore concluded to be immaterial. Anſ. Perception and knowledge in that one eternal being, where it has its ſource, it is viſible muſt be eſſentially inſeparable from it; therefore the actual want of perception in ſo great a part of the particular parcels of matter, is a demonſtration, that the firſt being, from whom perception and knowledge are inſeparable, is not matter: how far this makes the want of perception an eſſential property of matter, I will not diſpute; it ſuffices that it ſhows, that perception is not an eſſential property of matter; and therefore matter cannot be that eternal original being to which perception and knowledge are eſſential. Matter, I ſay, naturally is without perception: ergo, ſays your lordſhip, want of perception is an eſſential property of matter, and God does not change the eſſential properties of.

* 1ſt Letter. † 1ſt Anſwer.

cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality: I am not

things, their nature remaining. From whence you infer, that God cannot bestow on any parcel of matter (the nature of matter remaining) a faculty of thinking. If the rules of logic, since my days, be not changed, I may safely deny this consequence. For an argument that runs thus, God does not; ergo, he cannot, I was taught when I first came to the university, would not hold. For I never said God did; but, * "That I see no contradiction in it, that he should, if he "pleased, give to some systems of senseless matter a faculty "of thinking;" and I know nobody before Des Cartes, that ever pretended to show that there was any contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able to see in matter any such incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it a faculty of thinking, makes me opposite only to the Cartesians. For, as far as I have seen or heard, the fathers of the christian church never pretended to demonstrate that matter was incapable to receive a power of sensation, perception and thinking, from the hand of the omnipotent Creator. Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the form of your argumentation right, and that your lordship means, God cannot: and then, if your argument be good, it proves, that God could not give to Balaam's ass a power to speak to his master as he did; for the want of rational discourse being natural to that species, it is but for your lordship to call it an essential property, and then God cannot change the essential properties of things, their nature remaining: whereby it is proved, that God cannot, with all his omnipotency, give to an ass a power to speak as Balaam's did.

You say,† my lord, You do not set bounds to God's omnipotency: for he may, if he please, change a body into an immaterial substance, i. e. take away from a substance the solidity which it had before, and which made it matter, and then give it a faculty of thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a spirit, the same substance remaining. For if the substance remains not, body is not changed into an immaterial substance, but the solid substance, and all belonging to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial substance cre-

* B. 4. C. 3. § 6. † 1st Answer.

here ſpeaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the modeſty of philoſophy not to pronounce magiſterially, where we want

ated, which is not a change of one thing into another, but the deſtroying of one, and making another de novo. In this change therefore of a body or material ſubſtance into an immaterial, let us obſerve theſe diſtinct conſiderations.

Firſt, you ſay, God may, if he pleaſes, take away from a ſolid ſubſtance ſolidity, which is that which makes it a material ſubſtance or body; and may make it an immaterial ſubſtance, i. e. a ſubſtance without ſolidity. But this privation of one quality gives it not another; the bare taking away a lower or leſs noble quality does not give it an higher or nobler; that muſt be the gift of God. For the bare privation of one, and a meaner quality, cannot be the poſition of an higher and better; unleſs any one will ſay, that cogitation, or the power of thinking, reſults from the nature of ſubſtance itſelf; which if it do, then wherever there is ſubſtance, there muſt be cogitation, or a power of thinking. Here then, upon your lordſhip's own principles, is an immaterial ſubſtance without the faculty of thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this ſubſtance, thus deprived of ſolidity, a faculty of thinking; for you ſuppoſe it made capable of that, by being made immaterial; whereby you allow, that the ſame numerical ſubſtance may be ſometimes wholly incogitative, or without a power of thinking, and at other times perfectly cogitative, or endued with a power of thinking.

Further, you will not deny, but God can give it ſolidity and make it material again. For, I conclude, it will not be denied, that God can make it again what it was before.—Now I crave leave to aſk your lordſhip, why God, having given to this ſubſtance the faculty of thinking after ſolidity was taken from it, cannot reſtore to it ſolidity again without taking away the faculty of thinking? When you have reſolved this, my lord, you will have proved it impoſſible for God's omnipotence to give a ſolid ſubſtance a faculty of thinking; but till then, not having proved it impoſſible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny that he can do what is in itſelf poſſible; which, as I humbly conceive, is viſibly to ſet bounds to God's omnipotency, though you ſay here* you do not ſet bounds to God's omnipotency.

* 1ſt Anſwer.

that evidence that can produce knowledge; but alſo, that it is of uſe to us to diſcern how far our knowledge does reach: for the ſtate we are at preſent in,

If I ſhould imitate your lordſhip's way of writing, I ſhould not omit to bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his way, Deum verbis ponere, re tollere: and then add, that I am certain you do not think he promoted the great ends of religion and morality. For it is with ſuch candid and kind inſinuations as theſe, that you bring in both *Hobbes and †Spinoſa into your diſcourſe here about God's being able, if he pleaſe, to give to ſome parcels of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of thinking: neither of thoſe authors having, as appears by any paſſages you bring out of them, ſaid any thing to this queſtion, nor having, as it ſeems, any other buſineſs here, but by their names ſkilfully to give that character to my book, with which you would recommend it to the world.

I pretend not to inquire what meaſure of zeal, nor for what, guides your lordſhip's pen in ſuch a way of writing, as yours has all along been with me: only I cannot but conſider, what reputation it would give to the writings of the fathers of the church, if they ſhould think truth required, or religion allowed them to imitate ſuch patterns. But God be thanked, there be thoſe amongſt them who do not admire ſuch ways of managing the cauſe of truth or religion; they being ſenſible that if every one, who believes or can pretend he hath truth on his ſide, is thereby authoriſed, without proof, to inſinuate whatever may ſerve to prejudice men's minds againſt the other ſide, there will be great ravage made on charity and practice, without any gain to truth or knowledge: and that the liberties frequently taken by diſputants to do ſo, may have been the cauſe that the world in all ages has received ſo much harm, and ſo little advantage from controverſies in religion.

Theſe are the arguments which your lordſhip has brought to confute one ſaying in my book, by other paſſages in it; which therefore being all but argumenta ad hominem, if they did prove what they do not, are of no other uſe, than to gain a victory over me: a thing methinks, ſo much beneath your lordſhip, that it does not deſerve one of your pages. The queſtion is, whether God can, if he pleaſes, beſtow on any

* 1ſt Anſwer. † Ibid.

not being that of vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the present question, about the immateriality of the

parcel of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of perception and thinking. You say,* you look upon a mistake herein to be of dangerous consequence, as to the great ends of religion and morality. If this be so, my lord, I think one may well wonder, why your lordship has brought no arguments to establish the truth itself which you look on to be of such dangerous consequence to be mistaken in; but have spent so many pages only in a personal matter, in endeavouring to show, that I had inconsistencies in my book; which if any such thing had been showed, the question would be still as far from being decided, and the danger of mistaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been said. If therefore your lordship's care of the great ends of religion and morality have made you think it necessary to clear this question, the world has reason to conclude there is little to be said against that proposition which is to be found in my book, concerning the possibility, that some parcels of matter might be so ordered by Omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of thinking, if God so pleased; since your lordship's concern for the promoting the great ends of religion and morality, has not enabled you to produce one argument against a proposition that you think of so dangerous consequence to them.

And here I crave leave to observe, that though in your title page you promise to prove, that my notion of ideas is inconsistent with itself, (which if it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else) and with the articles of the christian faith; yet your attempts all along have been to prove me, in some passages of my book, inconsistent with myself, without having shown any proposition in my book inconsistent with any article of the christian faith.

I think your lordship has indeed made use of one argument of your own: but it is such an one, that I confess I do not see how it is apt much to promote religion, especially the christian religion, founded on revelation. I shall set down your lordship's words, that they may be considered: you say,† that you are of opinion, that the great ends of religion

* 1st Answer. † Ibid.

foul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonſtrative certainty, we need not think it ſtrange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough ſecured,

and morality are beſt ſecured by the proofs of the immortality of the ſoul from its nature and properties; and which you think prove it immaterial. Your lordſhip does not queſtion whether God can give immortality to a material ſubſtance; but you ſay it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of, &c. So likewiſe you ſay,* If a man cannot be certain, but that matter may think, (as I affirm) then what becomes of the ſoul's immateriality (and conſequently immortality) from its operations? But for all this, ſay I, his aſſurance of faith remains on its own baſis. Now you appeal to any man of ſenſe, whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles, which he went upon, in point of reaſon, doth not weaken the credibility of theſe fundamental articles, when they are conſidered purely as matters of faith? For before, there was a natural credibility in them on account of reaſon; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty, all that is loſt, and inſtead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And if the evidence of faith fall ſo much ſhort of that of reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon men's minds, when the ſubſerviency of reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be when the grounds of certainty by reaſon are vaniſhed. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his reaſon deceive him in ſuch fundamental points, ſhall have his faith ſtand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation? For in matters of revelation there muſt be ſome antecedent principles ſuppoſed, before we can believe any thing on the account of it.

More to the ſame purpoſe we have ſome pages farther, where, from ſome of my words your lordſhip ſays,† you cannot but obſerve, that we have no certainty upon my grounds, that ſelf-conſciouſneſs depends upon an individual immaterial ſubſtance, and conſequently that a material ſubſtance may, according to my principles, have ſelf-conſciouſneſs in it; at leaſt, that I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon your lordſhip bids me conſider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole article of the reſurrection. What does all this tend to, but to make the world believe

* 2d Anſwer. † Ibid.

without philoſophical proofs of the ſoul's immateriality: ſince it is evident, that he who made us at firſt begin to ſubſiſt here ſenſible intelligent beings, and

that I have leſſened the credibility of the immortality of the ſoul, and the reſurrection, by ſaying, that though it be moſt highly probable, that the ſoul is immaterial, yet upon my principles it cannot be demonſtrated; becauſe it is not impoſſible to God's omnipotency, if he pleaſes, to bellow upon ſome parcels of matter, diſpoſed as he ſees fit, a faculty of thinking?

This your accuſation of my leſſening the credibility of theſe articles of faith, is founded on this, that the article of the immortality of the ſoul abates of its credibility, if it be allowed, that its immateriality (which is the ſuppoſed proof from reaſon and philoſophy of its immortality) cannot be demonſtrated from natural reaſon: which argument of your lordſhip's, bottoms, as I humbly conceive, on this, that divine revelation abates of its credibility in all thoſe articles it propoſes, proportionably as human reaſon fails to ſupport the teſtimony of God. And all that your lordſhip in thoſe paſſages has ſaid, when examined, will, I ſuppoſe, be found to import thus much, viz. Does God propoſe any thing to mankind to be believed? It is very fit and credible to be believed, if reaſon can demonſtrate it to be true. But if human reaſon come ſhort in the caſe, and cannot make it out, its credibility is thereby leſſened; which is in effect to ſay, that the veracity of God is not a firm and ſure foundation of faith to rely upon, without the concurrent teſtimony of reaſon; i.e. with reverence be it ſpoken, God is not to be believed on his own word, unleſs what he reveals be in itſelf credible, and might be believed without him.

If this be a way to promote religion, the chriſtian religion, in all its articles, I am not ſorry that it is not a way to be found in any of my writings; for I imagine any thing like this would (and I ſhould think deſerved to) have other titles than bare ſcepticiſm beſtowed upon it, and would have raiſed no ſmall outcry againſt any one, who is not to be ſuppoſed to be in the right in all that he ſays, and ſo may ſecurely ſay what he pleaſes. Such as I, the profanum vulgus, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, though what he ſaid ſhould ſubvert the very foundations of the chriſtian faith.

for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the rest

What I have above observed, is so visibly contained in your lordship's argument, that when I met with it in your answer to my first letter, it seemed so strange for a man of your lordship's character, and in a dispute in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly persuade myself, but it was a slip of your pen: but when I found it in your second letter* made use of again, and seriously enlarged as an argument of weight to be insisted upon, I was convinced, that it was a principle that you heartily embraced, how little favourable soever it was to the articles of the christian religion, and particularly those which you undertook to defend.

I desire my reader to peruse the passages as they stand in your letters themselves, and see whether what you say in them does not amount to this: that a revelation from God is more or less credible, according as it has a stronger or weaker confirmation from human reason. For,

1. Your lordship says,† you do not question whether God can give immortality to a material substance; but you say it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of.

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immaterial, takes off not very much, nor at all, from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be immortal; because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonstration of a proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it. For where there is a clear demonstration, there is as much evidence as any truth can have, that is not self-evident. God has revealed that the souls of men should live forever. But, says your lordship, from this evidence it takes off very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of, i. e. The revelation and testimony of God loses much of its evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out by natural reason, that the soul is immaterial, and consequently in its own nature immortal.

* 2d Answer. † 1st Answer.

ribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life. And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other,

For that is all that here is or can be meant by these words, which of its own nature it is not capable of, to make them to the purpose. For the whole of your lordship's discourse here, is to prove, that the soul cannot be material, because then the evidence of its being immortal would be very much lessened. Which is to say, that it is not as credible upon divine revelation, that a material substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, that God is not equally to be believed, when he declares, that a material substance shall be immortal, as when he declares, that an immaterial shall be so; because the immortality of a material substance cannot be demonstrated from natural reason.

Let us try this rule of your lordship's a little farther. God hath revealed, that the bodies men shall have after the resurrection, as well as their souls, shall live to eternity. Does your lordship believe the eternal life of the one of these more than of the other, because you think you can prove it of one of them by natural reason, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of divine revelation in the case, doubt of one of them more than the other? Or think this proposition less credible, that the bodies of men, after the resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the souls of men shall, after the resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if he thinks either of them is less credible than the other. If this be so, reason is to be consulted how far God is to be believed, and the credit of divine testimony must receive its force from the evidence of reason; which is evidently to take away the credibility of divine revelation in all supernatural truths, wherein the evidence of reason fails. And how much such a principle as this tends to the support of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the christian religion, I shall leave it to your lordship to consider.

I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinosa, as to be able to say, what were their opinions in this matter. But possibly there be those, who will think your lordship's authority of more use to them in the case, than those justly decried names; and be glad to find your lordship a patron of the oracles of reason, so little to the advantage of the oracles of divine revelation. This at least, I think, may be subjoined

as ſome, over-zealous for or againſt the immateriality of the ſoul, have been forward to make the world believe. Who, either, on the one ſide, indulging too

to the words at the bottom of the next page,* That thoſe who have gone about to leſſen the credibility of the articles of faith, which evidently they do, who ſay they are leſs credible, becauſe they cannot be made out demonſtratively by natural reaſon, have not been thought to ſecure ſeveral of the articles of the chriſtian faith, eſpecially thoſe of the trinity, incarnation, and reſurrection of the body, which are thoſe upon the account of which I am brought by your lordſhip into this diſpute.

I ſhall not trouble the reader with your lordſhip's endeavours, in the following words, to prove, that if the ſoul be not an immaterial ſubſtance, it can be nothing but life; your very firſt words viſibly confuting all that you allege to that purpoſe, they are, † If the ſoul be a material ſubſtance, it is really nothing but life; which is to ſay, That if the ſoul be really a ſubſtance, it is not really a ſubſtance, but really nothing elſe but an affection of a ſubſtance; for the life, whether of a material or immaterial ſubſtance, is not the ſubſtance itſelf, but an affection of it.

2. You ſay, ‡ Although we think the ſeparate ſtate of the ſoul after death, is ſufficiently revealed in the ſcripture; yet it creates a great difficulty in underſtanding it, if the ſoul be nothing but life, or a material ſubſtance, which muſt be diſſolved when life is ended. For, if the ſoul be a material ſubſtance, it muſt be made up, as others are, of the coheſion of ſolid and ſeparate parts, how minute and inviſible ſoever they be. And what is it which ſhould keep them together, when life is gone? So that it is no eaſy matter to give an account how the ſoul ſhould be capable of immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial ſubſtance; and then we know the ſolution and texture of bodies cannot reach the ſoul, being of a different nature.

Let it be as hard a matter as it will, to give an account what it is that ſhould keep the parts of a material ſoul together, after it is ſeparated from the body; yet it will be always as eaſy to give an account of it, as to give an account what it is that ſhall keep together a material and immaterial

* 1ſt Anſwer. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

much their thoughts immerſed altogether in matter, can allow no exiſtence to what is not material: or who, on the other ſide, finding not *cogitation* within

ſubſtance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an account of that, I hope, does not, with your lordſhip, weaken the credibility of the inſeparable union of ſoul and body to eternity: and I perſuade myſelf, that the men of ſenſe, to whom your lordſhip appeals in the caſe, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakened by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your lordſhip's permiſſion would think ſo ſtill) that the union of the parts of matter, one with another, is as much in the hands of God, as the union of a material and immaterial ſubſtance; and that it does not take off very much, or at all, from the evidence of immortality, which depends on that union, that it is no eaſy matter to give an account what it is that ſhould keep them together: though its depending wholly upon the gift and good pleaſure of God, where the manner creates great difficulty in the underſtanding, and our reaſon cannot diſcover in the nature of things how it is, be that which, your lordſhip ſo poſitively ſays, leſſens the credibility of the fundamental articles of the reſurrection and immortality.

But, my lord, to remove this objection a little, and to ſhow of how ſmall force it is even with yourſelf; give me leave to preſume, that your lordſhip as firmly believes the immortality of the body after the reſurrection, as any other article of faith; if ſo, then it being no eaſy matter to give an account what it is that ſhall keep together the parts of a material ſoul, to one that believes it is material, can no more weaken the credibility of its immortality, than the like difficulty weakens the credibility of the immortality of the body. For, when your lordſhip ſhall find it an eaſy matter to give an account what it is, beſides the good pleaſure of God, which ſhall keep together the parts of our material bodies to eternity, or even ſoul and body, I doubt not but any one who ſhall think the ſoul material, will alſo find it as eaſy to give an account what it is that ſhall keep thoſe parts of matter alſo together to eternity.

Were it not that the warmth of controverſy is apt to make men ſo far forget, as to take up thoſe principles themſelves (when they will ſerve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, I ſhould wonder to find your

the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmoſt intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency itſelf cannot

lordſhip to argue, that becauſe it is a difficulty to underſtand what ſhall keep together the minute parts of a material ſoul, when life is gone; and becauſe it is not an eaſy matter to give an account how the ſoul ſhall be capable of immortality, unleſs it it be an immaterial ſubſtance: therefore it is not ſo credible, as if it were eaſy to give an account by natural reaſon, how it could be. For to this it is that all this your diſcourſe tends, as is evident by what is already ſet down; and will be more fully made out by what your lordſhip ſays in other places, though there needs no ſuch proof, ſince it would all be nothing againſt me in any other ſenſe.

I thought your lordſhip had in other places aſſerted, and inſiſted on this truth, that no part of divine revelation was the leſs to be believed, becauſe the thing itſelf created great difficulty in the underſtanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained, and it was no eaſy matter to give an account how it was. This, as I take it, your lordſhip condemned in others as a very unreaſonable principle, and ſuch as would ſubvert all the articles of the chriſtian religion, that were mere matters of faith, as I think it will: and is it poſſible, that you ſhould make uſe of it here yourſelf, againſt the article of life and immortality, that Chriſt hath brought to light through the goſpel, and neither was, nor could be made out by natural reaſon without revelation? But you will ſay, you ſpeak only of the ſoul; and your words are, That it is no eaſy matter to give an account how the ſoul ſhould be capable of immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial ſubſtance. I grant it; but crave leave to ſay, that there is not any one of thoſe difficulties, that are or can be raiſed about the manner how a material ſoul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.

But, if it were not ſo, I am ſure this principle of your lordſhip's would reach other articles of faith, wherein our natural reaſon finds it not ſo eaſy to give an account how thoſe myſteries are; and which therefore, according to your principles, muſt be leſs credible than other articles, that create leſs difficulty to the underſtanding. For your lordſhip ſays, * that you appeal to any man of ſenſe, whether to a

* 2d Anſwer.

give perception and thought to a ſubſtance which has the modification of ſolidity. He that conſiders how hardly ſenſation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to ex-

man, who thought by his principles he could from natural grounds demonſtrate the immortality of the ſoul, the finding the uncertainty of thoſe principles he went upon in point of reaſon, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural reaſon, doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental article, when it is conſidered purely as a matter of faith? which, in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this, that a propoſition divinely revealed, that cannot be proved by natural reaſon, is leſs credible than one that can: which ſeems to me to come very little ſhort of this, with due reverence be it ſpoken, that God is leſs to be believed when he affirms a propoſition that cannot be proved by natural reaſon, than when he propoſes what can be proved by it. The direct contrary to which is my opinion, though you endeavour to make it good by theſe following words; * If the evidence of faith fall ſo much ſhort of that of reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon men's minds, when the ſubſerviency of reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be when the grounds of certainty by reaſon are vaniſhed. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his reaſon deceive him in ſuch fundamental points, ſhould have his faith ſtand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation? Than which I think there are hardly plainer words to be found out to declare, that the credibility of God's teſtimony depends on the natural evidence of probability of the things we receive from revelation, and riſes and falls with it; and that the truths of God, or the articles of mere faith, loſe ſo much of their credibility, as they want proof from reaſon: which if true, revelation may come to have no credibility at all. For if, in this preſent caſe, the credibility of this propoſition, the ſouls of men ſhall live for ever, revealed in the ſcripture, be leſſened by confeſſing it cannot be demonſtratively proved from reaſon; though it be aſſerted to be moſt highly probable: muſt not, by the ſame rule, its credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural reaſon ſhould not be able to make it out to be ſo much as probable, or ſhould place the probability from natural principles on the other ſide? For, if mere want of demonſtration leſſens the credibility of any propoſition di-

* 2d Anſwer.

tended matter; or existence to any thing that hath no extension at all, will confess, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point

vinely revealed, must not want of probability, or contrary probability from natural reason, quite take away its credibility? Here at last it must end, if in any one case the veracity of God, and the credibility of the truths we receive from him by revelation, be subjected to the verdicts of human reason, and be allowed to receive any accession or diminution from other proofs, or want of other proofs of its certainty or probability.

If this be your lordship's way to promote religion, or defend its articles, I know not what argument the greatest enemies of it could use more effectual for the subversion of those you have undertaken to defend; this being to resolve all revelation perfectly and purely into natural reason, to bound its credibility by that, and leave no room for faith in other things, than what can be accounted for by natural reason without revelation.

Your lordship * insists much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I have said in my essay, by saying † that upon my principles it cannot be demonstratively proved, that it is an immaterial substance in us that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that my business there was to show, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material substance; and that from the ideas of thought, and a power of moving of matter, which we experienced in ourselves, (ideas originally not belonging to matter as matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial substance in us, than that we had material parts. These ideas of thinking, and power of moving of matter, I in another place showed, did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the existence of an immaterial thinking being, in whom we have the idea of spirit in the strictest sense; in which sense I also applied it to the soul, in the 23d ch. of my essay; the easily conceivable possibility, nay great probability, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial, giving me sufficient ground for it: in which sense I shall think I may safely attribute it to the thinking substance in us, till

* 1st Answer. † B. 2. C. 23.

which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge: and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate

your lordship shall have better proved from my words, that it is impossible it should be immaterial. For I only say, that it is possible, i. e. involves no contradiction, that God, the omnipotent immaterial spirit, should, if he pleases, give to some parcels of matter, disposed as he thinks fit, a power of thinking and moving: which parcels of matter, so endued with a power of thinking and motion, might properly be called spirits, in contradistinction to unthinking matter. In all which, I presume, there is no manner of contradiction.

I justified my use of the word spirit, in that sense, from the authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin word spiritus, from whence spirit is derived, to the soul as a thinking thing, without excluding materiality out of it. To which your lordship replies, * That Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, supposes the soul not to be a finer sort of body, but of a different nature from the body——That he calls the body the prison of the soul——And says, that a wise man's business is to draw off his soul from his body. And then your lordship concludes, as is usual, with a question, Is it possible now to think so great a man looked on the soul but as a modification of the body, which must be at an end with life? Ans. No; it is impossible that a man of so good sense as Tully, when he uses the word corpus or body for the gross and visible parts of a man, which he acknowledges to be mortal, should look on the soul to be a modification of that body; in a discourse wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another, that it was immortal. It is to be acknowledged that truly great men, such as he was, are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves. He had therefore no thought concerning the modification of the body of a man in the case: he was not such a trifler as to examine, whether the modification of the body of a man was immortal, when that body itself was mortal: and therefore, that which he reports as Dicæarchus's opinion, he dismisses in the beginning without any more ado, c. 11. But Cicero's was a direct, plain, and sensible inquiry, viz. What the soul was? to see whether from thence he could discover its immortality. But in all that discourse in his first book of

* 1st Answer.

part of each hypotheſis, will ſcarce find his reaſon able to determine him fixedly for or againſt the ſoul's materiality. Since on which ſide ſoever he views it, ei-

Tuſculan Queſtions, where he lays out ſo much of his reading and reaſon, there is not one ſyllable ſhowing the leaſt thought that the ſoul was an immaterial ſubſtance; but many things directly to the contrary.

Indeed (1) he ſhuts out the body, taken in the ſenſes he uſes * corpus all along, for the ſenſible organical parts of a man; and is poſitive that is not the ſoul: and body in this ſenſe, taken for the human body, he calls the priſon of the ſoul: and ſays a wiſe man, inſtancing in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he no where ſays any ſuch thing of matter: he calls not matter in general the priſon of the ſoul, nor talks a word of being ſeparate from it.

2. He concludes, that the ſoul is not, like other things here below, made up of a compoſition of the elements, ch. 27.

3. He excludes the two groſs elements, earth and water, from being the ſoul, ch. 26.

So far he is clear and poſitive: but beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get: for in ſome places he ſpeaks doubtfully, whether the ſoul be not air or fire. Anima ſit animus, igniſve, neſcio, c. 25. And therefore he agrees with Panætius, that, if it be at all elementary, it is, as he calls it, inflammata anima, inflamed air; and for this he gives ſeveral reaſons, c. 18, 19. And though he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own, yet he is ſo far from thinking it immaterial, that he ſays, c. 19. that the admitting it to be of an aerial or igneous nature, will not be inconſiſtent with any thing he had ſaid.

That which he ſeems moſt to incline to is, that the ſoul was not at all elementary, but was of the ſame ſubſtance with the heavens; which Ariſtotle, to diſtinguiſh from the four elements, and the changeable bodies here below, which he ſuppoſed made up of them, called quinta eſſentia. That this was Tully's opinion is plain from theſe words, Ergo animus (qui, ut ego dico, divinus) eſt, ut Euripides audet dicere, Deus: & quidem, ſi Deus aut anima aut ignis eſt, idem eſt animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura cœleſtis et terrâ vacat & humore; ſic utriuſque harum rerum humanus

* Ch. 19, 22, 30, 31, &c.

ther as an unextended ſubſtance, or as a thinking extended matter; the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilſt either alone is in his thoughts, ſtill drive him

animus eſt expers. Sin autem eſt quinta quædam natura ab Ariſtotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum eſt & animorum. Hanc nos ſententiam ſecuti, his ipſis verbis in conſolatione hæc expreſſimus, ch. 29, And then he goes on. c. 27. to repeat thoſe his own words, which your lordſhip has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his treatiſe De Conſolatione, the ſoul not to have its original from the earth, or to be mixed or made of any thing earthly; but had ſaid, ſingularis eſt igitur quædam natura & vis animi, ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis; whereby he tells us, he meant nothing but Ariſtotle's quinta eſſentia: which being unmixed, being that of which the gods and ſouls conſiſted, he calls it divinum cœleſte, and concludes it eternal; it being, as he ſpeaks, ſejuncta ab omni mortali concretione. From which it is clear, that in all his inquiry about the ſubſtance of the ſoul, his thoughts went not beyond the four elements, or Ariſtotle's quinta eſſentia, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wiſe men have always been) that the ſoul was immortal; but for that, it is plain, he never thought of its immateriality, but as the eaſtern people do, who believe the ſoul to be immortal, but have nevertheleſs no thought, no conception of its immateriality. It is remarkable what a very conſiderable and judicious author ſays * in the caſe. No opinion, ſays he, has been ſo univerſally received as that of the immortality of the ſoul; but its immateriality is a truth, the knowledge whereof has not ſpread ſo far. And indeed it is extremely difficult to let into the mind of a Siamite the idea of a pure ſpirit. This the miſſionaries who have been longeſt among them, are poſitive in. All the pagans of the eaſt do truly believe, that there remains ſomething of a man after his death, which ſubſiſts independently and ſeparately from his body. But they give extenſion and figure to that which remains, and attribute to it all the ſame members, all the ſame ſubſtances, both ſolid and liquid, which our bodies are compoſed of. They only ſuppoſe that the ſouls are of a matter ſubtile enough to

* Loubere du Royaume de Siam, T. 1. c. 19. § 4.

to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with themselves: who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one, throw

escape being seen or handled.—Such were the shades and manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And it is by these figures of the souls, answerable to those of the bodies, that Virgil supposed Æneas knew Palinurus, Dido, and Anchises, in the other world.

This gentleman was not a man that travelled into those parts for his pleasure, and to have the opportunity to tell strange stories, collected by chance, when he returned: but one chosen on purpose (and he seems well chosen for the purpose) to inquire into the singularities of Siam. And he has so well acquitted himself of the commission, which his epistle dedicatory tells us he had, to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there, that had we but such an account of other countries of the east, as he has given us of this kingdom, which he was an envoy to, we should be much better acquainted than we are, with the manners, notions, an religions of that part of the world inhabited by civilized nations, who want neither good sense nor acuteness of reason, though not cast into the mould of the logic and philosophy of our schools.

But to return to Cicero: it is plain, that in his inquiries about the soul, his thoughts went not at all beyond matter. This the expressions that drop from him in several places of this book evidently show. For example, that the souls of excellent men and women ascended into heaven; of others, that they remained here on earth, c. 12. That the soul is hot, and warms the body: that, at its leaving the body, it penetrates, and divides, and breaks through our thick, cloudy, moist air: that it stops in the region of fire, and ascends no farther, the equality of warmth and weight making that its proper place, where it is nourished, and sustained, with the same things wherewith the stars are nourished and sustained, and that by the convenience of its neighbourhood it shall there have a clearer view and fuller knowledge of the heavenly bodies, c. 19. That the soul also from this height shall have a pleasant and fairer prospect of the globe of the earth, the disposition of whose parts will then lie before it in one view, c. 20. That it is hard to determine what conformation, size, and place, the soul has in the body: that it

themſelves violently into the contrary hypotheſis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiaſed underſtanding. This ſerves not only to ſhow the

is too ſubtile to be ſeen: that it is in the human body as in a houſe, or a veſſel, or a receptacle, c. 22. All which are expreſſions that ſufficiently evidence, that he who uſed them had not in his mind ſeparated materiality from the idea of the ſoul.

It may perhaps be replied, that a great part of this which we find in chap. 19. is ſaid upon the principles of thoſe who would have the ſoul to be anima inflammata, inflamed air. I grant it. But it is alſo to be obſerved that in this 19th, and the two following chapters, he does not only not deny, but even admits, that ſo material a thing as inflamed air may think.

The truth of the caſe in ſhort is this: Cicero was willing to believe the ſoul immortal; but, when he ſought in the nature of the ſoul itſelf ſomething to eſtabliſh this his belief into a certainty of it, he found himſelf at a loſs. He confeſſed he knew not what the ſoul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 22. was no reaſon to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had ſaid in his 6th book, De Repub. concerning the ſoul. The argument, which, borrowed from Plato, he there makes uſe of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the ſoul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your lordſhip will allow to be true: for it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end: Neque nata certe eſt, & æterna eſt, ſays he.

Indeed from the faculties of the ſoul he concludes right, that it is of divine original: but as to the ſubſtance of the ſoul, he at the end of this diſcourſe concerning its faculties, c. 25. as well as at this beginning of it, c. 22. is not aſhamed to own his ignorance of what it is; Anima ſit animus, igniſve, neſcio; nec me pudet, ut iſtos, fateri neſcire quod neſciam. Illud ſi ulla alia de re obſcura affirmare poſſem, ſive anima, ſive ignis ſit animus, eum jurarem eſſe divinum, c. 25. So that all the certainty he could attain to about the ſoul, was, that he was confident there was ſomething divine in it, i. e. there were faculties in the ſoul that could not reſult from the nature of matter, but muſt have their original from a divine power; but yet thoſe qual-

weakneſs and ſcantineſs of our knowledge, but the inſignificant triumph of ſuch ſort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may ſatisfy us that we

ities, as divine as they were, he acknowledged might be placed in breath or fire, which, I think, your lordſhip will not deny to be material ſubſtances. So that all thoſe divine qualities, which he ſo much and ſo juſtly extols in the ſoul, led him not, as appears, ſo much as to any the leaſt thought of immateriality. This is demonſtration, that he built them not upon an excluſion of materiality out of the ſoul; for he avowedly profeſſes he does not know, but breath or fire might be this thinking thing in us: and in all his conſiderations about the ſubſtance of the ſoul itſelf, he ſtuck in air, or fire, or Ariſtotle's quinta eſſentia; for beyond thoſe it is evident he went not.

But with all his proofs out of Plato, to whoſe authority he defers ſo much, with all the arguments his vaſt reading and great parts could furniſh him with for the immortality of the ſoul, he was ſo little ſatisfied, ſo far from being certain, ſo far from any thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again profeſſes his ignorance and doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the ſeveral opinions of the philoſophers, which he had well ſtudied, about it: and then, full of uncertainty, ſays, Harum ſententiarum quæ vera ſit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ veriſimillima, magna quæſtio, c. 11. And towards the latter end, having gone them all over again, and one after another examined them, he profeſſes himſelf ſtill at a loſs, not knowing on which to pitch, nor what to determine. Mentis acies, ſays he, ſeipſam intuens, nonnunquam hebeſcit, ob eamque cauſam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumſpectans, hæſitans, multa adverſa revertens, tanquam in rate in mari immenſo, noſtra vehitur oratio, c. 30. And to conclude this argument, when the perſon he introduces as diſcourſing with him, tells him he is reſolved to keep firm to the belief of immortality; Tully anſwers, c. 32. Laudo id quidem, etſi nihil animis oportet confidere: movemur enim ſæpe aliquo acute concluſo; labamus, mutamuſque ſententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his eſt enim aliqua obſcuritas.

So unmoveable is that truth delivered by the ſpirit of truth, that though the light of nature gave ſome obſcure glimmering, ſome uncertain hopes of a future ſtate; yet human rea-

can find no certainty on one side of the question; but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion, which, on examination, will be

son could attain to no clearness, no certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alone, who had brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.* Though we are now told, that to own the inability of natural reason to bring immortality to light, or, which passes for the same, to own principles upon which the immateriality of the soul (and, as it is urged, consequently its immortality) cannot be demonstratively proved, does lessen the belief of this article of revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to light, and which consequently the scripture assures us is established and made certain only by revelation. This would not perhaps have seemed strange, from those who are justly complained of for slighting the revelation of the gospel, and therefore would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so plain a text of scripture, in favour of their all-sufficient reason: but what use the promoters of scepticism and infidelity, in an age so much suspected by your lordship, may make of what comes from one of your great authority and learning, may deserve your consideration.

And thus, my lord, I hope, I have satisfied you concerning Cicero's opinion about the soul, in his first book of Tusculan Questions; which, though I easily believe, as your lordship says, you are no stranger to, yet I humbly conceive you have not shown, (and, upon a careful perusal of that treatise again, I think I may boldly say you cannot show) one word in it, that expresses any thing like a notion in Tully of the soul's immateriality, or its being an immaterial substance.

From what you bring out of Virgil, your lordship concludes, †That he, no more than Cicero, does me any kindness in this matter, being both asserters of the soul's immortality. My lord, were not the question of the soul's immateriality, according to custom, changed here into that of its immortality, which I am no less an asserter of than either of them, Cicero and Virgil do me all the kindness I desired of them in this matter; and that was to show, that they attributed the word spiritus to the soul of man, without any

* 2 Tim. i. 10. † 1st Answer.

found clogged with equal difficulties. For w
what advantage to any one is it, for the av
seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmounta

thought of its immateriality; and this the verses you yourself bring out of Virgil,*

Et cum frigida mors animâ seduxerit artus,
Omnibus umbra locis adero; dabis, improbe, pœnas;

confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his 6th book: and for this monsieur de la Loubere shall be my witness in the words above set down out of him; where he shows, that there be those amongst the heathens of our days, as well as Virgil and others amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans, who thought the souls or ghosts of men departed did not die with the body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former. And what Virgil's notion of the soul is, and that corpus, when put in contradistinction to the soul, signifies nothing but the gross tenement of flesh and bones, is evident from this verse of his Æneid 6. where he calls the souls which yet were visible,

——— Tenues sine corpore vitas.

Your lordship's † answer concerning what is said in Eccles. xii. turns wholly upon Solomon's taking the soul to be immortal, which was not what I questioned: all that I quoted that place for, was to show, that spirit in English might properly be applied to the soul, without any notion of its immateriality, as רוח was by Solomon, which, whether he thought the souls of men to be immaterial, does little appear in that passage, where he speaks of the souls of men and beasts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for is evident from that place, in that the word spirit is there applied by our translators, to the souls of beasts, which your lordship, I think, does not rank amongst the immaterial, and consequently immortal spirits, though they have sense and spontaneous motion.

But you say, ‡ If the soul be not of itself a free thinking substance, you do not see what foundation there is in nature for a day of judgment. Ans. Though the heathen world did not of old, nor do to this day, see a foundation in nature for a day of judgment; yet in revelation, if that will satisfy

* Æneid 4. 385. † 1st Answer. ‡ Ibid.

ne meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on ſomething altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehen-

your lordſhip, every one may ſee a foundation for a day of judgment, becauſe God has poſitively declared it; though God has not by that revelation taught us, what the ſubſtance of the ſoul is; nor has any where ſaid, that the ſoul of itſelf is a free agent. Whatſoever any created ſubſtance is, it is not of itſelf, but is by the good pleaſure of its Creator: whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from the bountiful hand of its maker. For it is true in a natural, as well as a ſpiritual ſenſe, what St. Paul ſays,* Not that we are ſufficient of ourſelves to think any thing as of ourſelves, but our ſufficiency is of God.

But your lordſhip, as I gueſs by your following words, would argue, that a material ſubſtance cannot be a free agent; whereby I ſuppoſe you only mean, that you cannot ſee or conceive how a ſolid ſubſtance ſhould begin, ſtop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to anſwer, that when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent ſubſtance can move itſelf, or alter or ſtop its own motion, which it muſt to be a free agent; I ſuppoſe you will find it no harder for God to beſtow this power on a ſolid than an unſolid created ſubſtance. Tully, in the place above quoted, † could not conceive this power to be in any thing but what was from eternity; Cum pateat igitur æternum id eſſe quod ſeipſum moveat, quis eſt qui hanc naturam animis eſſe tributam neget? But though you cannot ſee how any created ſubſtance, ſolid or not ſolid, can be a free agent, (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordſhip pleaſe to explain it of either, and ſhow the manner how either of them can, of itſelf, move itſelf or any thing elſe) yet I do not think you will ſo far deny men to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to ſee how they are free agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for a day of judgment.

It is not for me to judge how far your lordſhip's ſpeculations reach: but finding in myſelf nothing to be truer than what the wiſe Solomon tells me, ‡ As thou knoweſt not what is the way of the ſpirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even ſo thou knoweſt

* 2 Cor. iii. 5. † Tuſculan Quæſt. L. 1. c. 23. ‡ Eccleſ. xi. 5.

ſion? It is paſt controverſy, that we have in us ſomething that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we muſt content ourſelves in the ignorance of what kind of

not the works of God, who maketh all things; I gratefully receive and rejoice in the light of revelation, which ſets me at reſt in many things, the manner whereof my poor reaſon can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no contradiction: ſo that I readily believe whatever God has declared, though my reaſon find difficulties in it which it cannot maſter. As in the preſent caſe, God having revealed that there ſhall be a day of judgment, I think that foundation enough to conclude men are free enough to be made anſwerable for their actions, and to receive according to what they have done; though how man is a free agent, ſurpaſſes my explication or comprehenſion.

In anſwer to the place I brought out of St. Luke,* your lordſhip aſks,† Whether from theſe words of our Saviour it follows, that a ſpirit is only an appearance? I anſwer, No; nor do I know who drew ſuch an inference from them: but it follows, that in apparitions there is ſomething that appears, and that which appears is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly called πνεῦμα, and was often looked upon, by thoſe who called it πνεῦμα in Greek, and now call it ſpirit in Engliſh, to be the ghoſt or ſoul of one departed; which I humbly conceive juſtifies my uſe of the word ſpirit, for a thinking voluntary agent, whether material or immaterial.

Your lordſhip ſays,‡ That I grant, that it cannot upon theſe principles be demonſtrated, that the ſpiritual ſubſtance in us is immaterial: from whence you conclude, That then my grounds of certainty from ideas are plainly given up. This being a way of arguing that you often make uſe of, I have often had occaſion to conſider it, and cannot after all ſee the force of this argument. I acknowledge that this or that propoſition cannot upon my principles be demonſtrated; ergo, I grant this propoſition to be falſe, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas. For that is my ground of certainty, and till that be given up, my grounds of certainty are not given up.

* C. xxiv. v. 39. † 1ſt Anſwer. ‡ Ibid.

being it is: and it is as vain to go about to be ſceptical in this, as it is unreaſonable in moſt other caſes to be poſitive againſt the being of any thing, becauſe we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what ſubſtance exiſts, that has not ſomething in it which manifeſtly baffles our underſtandings. Other ſpirits, who ſee and know the nature and inward conſtitution of things, how much muſt they exceed us in knowledge? To which if we add larger comprehenſion, which enables them at one glance to ſee the connection and agreement of very many *ideas*, and readily ſupplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we by ſingle and ſlow ſteps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laſt find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; we may gueſs at ſome part of the happineſs of ſuperior ranks of ſpirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating ſight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But to return to the argument in hand; our *knowledge*, I ſay, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the *ideas* we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes ſhort of that too. But how far it reaches, let us now inquire.

§ 7. *How far our Knowledge reaches.*

THE affirmations or negations we make concerning the *ideas* we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to theſe four ſorts, *viz.* identity, co-exiſtence, relation, and real exiſtence. I ſhall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of theſe.

§ 8. 1. *Our Knowledge of Identity and Diverſity as far as our* Ideas.

FIRST, As to identity and diverſity, in this way of the agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas*, *our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our* ideas themſelves: and there can be no *idea* in the mind, which it does not preſently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

§ 9. 2. *Of Co-exiſtence a very little way.*

SECONDLY, As to the ſecond ſort, which is the *agreement* or *diſagreement* of our *ideas in co-exiſtence*; in this, our knowledge is very ſhort, though in this con-

ſiſts the greateſt and moſt material part of our knowledge concerning ſubſtances. For our *ideas* of the ſpecies of ſubſtances being, as I have ſhowed, nothing but certain collections of ſimple *ideas* united in one ſubject, and ſo co-exiſting together; *v. g.* our *idea* of *flame* is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of *gold*, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fuſible: theſe, or ſome ſuch complex *ideas* as theſe in men's minds, do theſe two names of the different ſubſtances, *flame*, and *gold*, ſtand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning theſe, or any other ſort of ſubſtances, what do we inquire, but what other qualities or powers theſe ſubſtances have or have not? which is nothing elſe but to know what other ſimple *ideas* do or do not co-exiſt with thoſe that make up that complex *idea*?

§ 10. *Becauſe the Connection between moſt ſimple* Ideas *is unknown.*

THIS, how weighty and conſiderable a part ſoever of human ſcience, is yet very narrow, and ſcarce any at all. The reaſon whereof is, that the ſimple *ideas*, whereof our complex *ideas* of ſubſtances are made up, are, for the moſt part, ſuch as carry with them, in their own nature, no viſible neceſſary connection or inconſiſtency with any other ſimple *ideas*, whoſe *coexiſtence* with them we would inform ourſelves about.

§ 11. *Eſpecially of ſecondary Qualities.*

THE *ideas* that our complex ones of ſubſtances are made up of, and about which our knowledge concerning ſubſtances is moſt employed, are thoſe of their *ſecondary qualities*: which depending all (as has been ſhown) upon the primary qualities of their minute and inſenſible parts; or if not upon them, upon ſomething yet more remote from our comprehenſion, it is impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary union or inconſiſtency one with another: for not knowing the root they ſpring from, not knowing what ſize, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which reſult thoſe qualities which make our complex *idea* of gold, it is impoſſible we

ſhould know what other qualities reſult from, or are incompatible with, the ſame conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of *gold*; and ſo conſequently muſt always *co-exiſt* with that complex *idea* we have of it, or elſe are *inconſiſtent* with it.

§ 12. *Becauſe all Connection between any ſecondary and primary Qualities is undiſcoverable.*

BESIDES this ignorance of the primary qualities of the inſenſible parts of bodies, on which depend all their ſecondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, which ſets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the *co-exiſtence* or *in-co-exiſtence* (if I may ſo ſay) of different *ideas* in the ſame ſubject; and that is, that there is no diſcoverable connection between any *ſecondary quality, and thoſe primary qualities* which it depends on.

§ 13.

THAT the ſize, figure and motion of one body ſhould cauſe a change in the ſize, figure and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception: the ſeparation of the parts of one body upon the intruſion of another; and the change from reſt to motion upon impulſe; theſe, and the like, ſeem to us to have ſome *connection* one with another. And if we knew theſe primary qualities of bodies, we might have reaſon to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of theſe operations of them one upon another: but our minds not being able to diſcover any *connection* betwixt theſe primary qualities of bodies, and the ſenſations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to eſtabliſh certain and undoubted rules of the conſequences or *co-exiſtence* of any ſecondary qualities, though we could diſcover the ſize, figure or motion of thoſe inviſible parts which immediately produce them. We are ſo far from knowing what figure, ſize, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a ſweet taſte, or a ſharp ſound, that we can by no means conceive how any *ſize, figure, or motion* of any particles, can poſſibly produce in us the *idea* of any *colour, taſte, or ſound* whatſoever; there is no conceivable *connection* betwixt the one and the other.

§ 14.

In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our *ideas* (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other *ideas* are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex *idea* of any substance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend, nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary *connection* between them, and any of the *secondary qualities*: which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their *necessary co-existence*. So that let our complex *idea* of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple *ideas* contained in it, certainly determine the *necessary co-existence* of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little farther than our experience. Indeed, some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connection one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension: receiving or communicating motion by impulse supposes solidity. But though these, and perhaps some other of our *ideas* have, yet there are so *few* of them, that have a *visible connection* one with another, that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities are to be found united in substances: and we are left only to the assistance of our senses, to make known to us what qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are *co-existent* in any subject, without this dependence and evident connection of their *ideas* one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, though we see the yellow colour, and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility, and fixedness, that are united in a piece of gold; yet because no one of these *ideas* has any evident *dependence*, or necessary connection with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: because the highest probability amounts not

to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this *co-existence* can be no farther known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or in general, by the necessary *connection* of the *ideas* themselves.

§ 15. *Of Repugnancy to Co-existence larger.* *As to incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence*, we may know, that any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities, but one particular at once; *v. g.* each particular extension, figure, number of parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible *ideas* peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort; *v. g.* no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this perhaps, will be said, has not an *opall*, or an infusion of *lignum nephriticum*, two colours at the same time? To which I answer, That these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different colours: but I take liberty also to say, that to eyes differently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light: and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time.

§ 16. *Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.* But *as to the powers of substances* to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether *our knowledge reaches* much farther than our experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they are in any subject, by the connection with any of those *ideas* which to us make its essence. Because the active

and paſſive powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, conſiſting in a texture and motion of parts, which we cannot by any means come to diſcover; it is but in very few caſes, we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to, any of thoſe *ideas* which make our complex one of that ſort of things. I have here inſtanced in the corpuſcularian hypotheſis, as that which is thought to go fartheſt in an intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakneſs of human underſtanding is ſcarce able to ſubſtitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer diſcovery of the neceſſary connection and *co-exiſtence* of the powers which are to be obſerved united in ſeveral ſorts of them. This at leaſt is certain, that whichever hypotheſis be cleareſt and trueſt (for of that it is not my buſineſs to determine) our knowledge concerning corporeal ſubſtances will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to ſee what qualities and powers of bodies have a *neceſſary connection or repugnancy* one with another; which, in the preſent ſtate of philoſophy, I think, we know but to a very ſmall degree; and I doubt whether, with thoſe faculties we have, we ſhall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I ſay not particular experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that which in this part we muſt depend on. And it were to be wiſhed that it were more improved. We find the advantages ſome men's generous pains have this way brought to the ſtock of natural knowledge. And if others, eſpecially the philoſophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been ſo wary in their obſervations, and ſincere in their reports, as thoſe who call themſelves philoſophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our inſight into their powers and operations, had been yet much greater.

§ 17. *Of Spirits yet narrower.*

If we are at a loſs in reſpect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is eaſy to conclude, *we are much more in the dark in reference to ſpirits*; whereo

we naturally have no *ideas*, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own ſouls within us, as far as they can come within our obſervation. But how inconſiderable a rank the ſpirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongſt thoſe various and poſſibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far ſhort they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubims and ſeraphims, and infinite ſorts of ſpirits above us, is what by a tranſient hint, in another place, I have offered to my reader's conſideration.

§ 18. 3. *Of other Relations it is not eaſy to ſay how far.* As to the third ſort of our knowledge, *viz.* the *agreement or diſagreement of any of our* ideas *in any other relation:* this, as it is the largeſt field of our knowledge, ſo it is hard to determine how far it may extend, becauſe the advances that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our ſagacity in finding intermediate *ideas*, that may ſhow the *relations* and *habitudes* of *ideas*, whoſe co-exiſtence is not conſidered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of ſuch diſcoveries; and when reaſon has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or diſagreement of remote *ideas*. They that are ignorant of *algebra* cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it; and what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of knowledge, the ſagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the *ideas* of quantity are not thoſe alone that are capable of demonſtration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more uſeful parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, paſſions, and domineering intereſt did not oppoſe or menace ſuch endeavours.

Morality capable of Demonſtration.

The *idea* of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodneſs and wiſdom, whoſe workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the *idea* of ourſelves, as underſtanding rational beings, being ſuch as are clear in us, would, I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered and

purſued, afford ſuch foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place *morality amongst the ſciences capable of demonſtration*, wherein I doubt not but from ſelf-evident propoſitions, by neceſſary conſequences, as inconteſtible as thoſe in mathematics, the meaſures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of theſe ſciences. The *relation* of other *modes* may certainly be perceived, as well as thoſe of number and extenſion: and I cannot ſee why they ſhould not alſo be capable of demonſtration, if due methods were thought on to examine or purſue their agreement or diſagreement. *Where there is no property, there is no injuſtice*, is a propoſition as certain as any demonſtration in Euclid; for the *idea* of *property* being a right to any thing, and the *idea* to which the name *injuſtice* is given, being the invaſion or violation of that right, it is evident, that theſe *ideas* being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this propoſition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again, *No government allows abſolute liberty.* The *idea* of government being the eſtabliſhment of ſociety upon certain rules or laws which require conformity to them; and the *idea* of abſolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this propoſition, as of any in the mathematics.

§ 19. *Two things have made moral* Ideas *thought incapable of Demonſtration. Their complexedneſs, and want of ſenſible repreſentations.*

THAT which in this reſpect has given the advantage to the *ideas* of quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonſtration, is,

Firſt, That they can be ſet down and repreſented by ſenſible marks, which have a greater and nearer correſpondence with them than any words or ſounds whatſoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the *ideas* in the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty

that words carry in their ſignification. An angle, circle or ſquare, drawn in lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be miſtaken; it remains unchangeable, and may at leiſure be conſidered and examined, and the demonſtration be reviſed, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once without any danger of the leaſt change in the *ideas*. This cannot be thus done in *moral ideas*, we have no ſenſible marks that reſemble them, whereby we can ſet them down; we have nothing but words to expreſs them by; which though, when written, they remain the ſame, yet the *ideas* they ſtand for may change in the ſame man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different perſons.

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in *ethics*, is, that *moral ideas* are commonly more complex than thoſe of the figures ordinarily conſidered in mathematics. From whence theſe two inconveniencies follow: *Firſt*, That their names are of more uncertain ſignification, the preciſe collection of ſimple *ideas* they ſtand for not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the ſign that is uſed for them in communication always, and in thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame *idea*. Upon which the ſame diſorder, confuſion and error, follow, as would if a man, going to demonſtrate ſomething of a *heptagon*, ſhould in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by overſight make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported, or he intended it ſhould, when at firſt he thought of his demonſtration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral *ideas*, where the ſame name being retained, one angle, *i. e.* one ſimple *idea* is left out or put in, in the complex one (ſtill called by the ſame name) more at one time than another. *Secondly*, From the complexedneſs of theſe moral *ideas*, there follows another inconvenience, *viz.* that the mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe combinations, ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary in the examination of the habitudes and correſpondences, agreements or diſagreements, of ſeveral of

them one with another, especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions, and the intervention of several other complex *ideas*, to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this, which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by step, to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting up a long sum, either in *addition*, *multiplication*, or *division*, every part be only a progression of the mind, taking a view of its own *ideas*, and considering their agreement or disagreement; and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole, made up of such particulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet without setting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significations are known, and by marks, that last and remain in view when the memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different *ideas* in the mind, without confounding or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case, the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or proportions; that the mind has only by intuition of its own *ideas* of the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to the memory, to record and retain the several *ideas* about which the demonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars, has proceeded; that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown, and at last have in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

§ 20. *Remedies of those Difficulties.*

One part of *these disadvantages* in moral *ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be *remedied* by defini-

tions, ſetting down that collection of ſimple *ideas*, which every term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe collection. And what methods *algebra*, or ſomething of that kind, may hereafter ſuggeſt, to remove the other difficulties, is not eaſy to foretell. Confident I am, that if men would in the ſame method, and with the ſame indifferency, ſearch after moral, as they do mathematical truths, they would find them to have a ſtronger connection one with another, and a more neceſſary conſequence from our clear and diſtinct *ideas*, and to come nearer perfect demonſtration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilſt the deſire of eſteem, riches, or power, makes men eſpouſe the well-endowed opinions in faſhion, and then ſeek arguments either to make good their beauty, or varniſh over and cover their deformity: nothing being ſo beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind; nothing ſo deformed and irreconcileable to the underſtanding as a lie. For though many a man can with ſatisfaction enough own a no very handſome wife in his boſom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has eſpouſed a falſehood, and received into his breaſt ſo ugly a thing as a lie? Whilſt the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth or falſehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to ſearch after it; what improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for in the moral ſciences? The ſubject part of mankind in moſt places might, inſtead thereof, with *Egyptian* bondage expect *Egyptian* darkneſs, were not the candle of the Lord ſet up by himſelf in men's minds, which it is impoſſible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguiſh.

§ 21. *Of real Exiſtence: we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own; demonſtrative, of God's; ſenſitive, of ſome few other things.*

As to the fourth ſort of our knowledge *viz.* of the

real actual existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own *existence*; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God; of the *existence* of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses.

§ 22. *Our Ignorance great.*

Our knowledge being so narrow, as I have showed, it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of *our ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct *ideas*, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness (where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive any thing) out of a presumption, that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the *causes of our ignorance*; which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

First, Want of *ideas*.

Secondly, Want of a discoverable connection between the *ideas* we have.

Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our *ideas*.

§ 23. *First, One cause of it want of* Ideas, *either such as we have no conception of, or such as particularly we have not.*

First, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of for *want of ideas*.

Firſt, All the ſimple *ideas* we have, are confined (as I have ſhown) to thoſe we receive from corporeal objects by *ſenſation*, and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of *reflection*. But how much theſe few and narrow inlets are diſproportionate to the vaſt whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to perſuade thoſe who are not ſo fooliſh as to think their ſpan the meaſure of all things. What other ſimple *ideas* it is poſſible the creatures in other parts of the univerſe may have, by the aſſiſtance of ſenſes and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine. But to ſay, or think there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as ſight and colours, becauſe he had no manner of *idea* of any ſuch thing, nor could by any means frame to himſelf any notions about ſeeing. The ignorance and darkneſs that is in us, no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than the blindneſs of a mole is an argument againſt the quick-ſightedneſs of an eagle. He that will conſider the infinite power, wiſdom, and goodneſs of the Creator of all things, will find reaſon to think, it was not all laid out upon ſo inconſiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as he will find man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the loweſt of all intellectual beings. What faculties therefore other ſpecies of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmoſt conſtitutions of things, what *ideas* they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want ſeveral other views of them, beſides thoſe we have, to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the *ideas* we can attain to by our faculties, are very diſproportionate to things themſelves, when a poſitive clear diſtinct one of ſubſtance itſelf, which is the foundation of all the reſt, is concealed from us. But want of *ideas* of this kind being a part as well as cauſe of our ignorance, cannot be deſcribed. Only this, I

think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible world, are in this perfectly alike; that that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we see not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the rest.

§ 24. *Because of their Remoteness.*

SECONDLY, Another great cause of ignorance is the *want of* ideas *we are capable of*. As the want of *ideas*, which our faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of things, which it is reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of *ideas* I now speak of, keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *figure*, and *motion*, we have *ideas* of. But though we are not without *ideas* of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular *bulk*, *figure*, and *motion*, of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some things, by being *too remote*; and in others, by being *too minute*. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a small part of the immense universe, we shall then discover an huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings, how far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations, and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser masses of matter, that visibly move about it; what several sorts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual

corporeal beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this earth; there being no natural means, either by sensation or reflection, to convey their certain *ideas* into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct *ideas* of them.

§ 25. *Because of their Minuteness.*

If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of *bodies* in the universe, escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their *minuteness*. These insensible corpuscles being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations; our want of precise distinct *ideas* of their primary qualities, keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of *rhubarb*, *hemlock*, *opium*, and a *man*, as a watchmaker, does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able to tell beforehand, that *rhubarb* will purge, *hemlock* kill, and *opium* make a man sleep, as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going, till it be removed; or that some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in *aqua fortis*, and gold in *aqua regia*, and not *vice versa*,

would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a ſmith to underſtand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of ſenſes acute enough to diſcover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us *ideas* of their mechanical affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be aſſured about them any farther, than ſome few trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of univerſal truths concerning natural bodies: and our reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.

§ 26. *Hence no Science of Bodies.*

And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever human induſtry may advance uſeful and *experimental* philoſophy *in phyſical things*, *ſcientifical* will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate *ideas* of thoſe very bodies which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our command. Thoſe which we have ranked into claſſes under names, and we think ourſelves beſt acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete *ideas* of. Diſtinct *ideas* of the ſeveral ſorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our ſenſes, perhaps we may have: but adequate *ideas*, I ſuſpect we have not of any one amongſt them. And though the former of theſe will ſerve us for common uſe and diſcourſe, yet whilſt we want the latter, we are not capable of *ſcientifical knowledge*; nor ſhall ever be able to diſcover general, inſtructive, unqueſtionable truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *demonſtration* are things we muſt not, in theſe matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, taſte, and ſmell, and other ſenſible qualities, we have as clear and diſtinct *ideas* of ſage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle: but having no *ideas* of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of theſe plants, nor of other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will pro-

duce; nor when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no *ideas* of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations: and of bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions.

§ 27. *Much less of Spirits.*

This, at first sight, will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add the consideration of that infinite number of *spirits* that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct *ideas* of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial *ideas* of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent Author of them and us and all things; we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery: and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man, that considers, to be ignorant, that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there that by his own search and ability can come to know? Much less have we dis-

tinct *ideas* of their different natures, conditions, ſtates, powers, and ſeveral conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore, in what concerns their different ſpecies and properties, we are under an abſolute ignorance.

§ 28. *Secondly, Want of a diſcoverable Connection between* Ideas *we have.*

Secondly, What a ſmall part of the ſubſtantial beings that are in the univerſe, the want of *ideas* leaves open to our knowledge, we have ſeen. In the next place, another cauſe of ignorance, of no leſs moment, is a want of a *diſcoverable connection* between thoſe *ideas* we have: for wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of univerſal and certain knowledge; and are, as in the former caſe, left only to obſervation and experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, we need not be told. I ſhall give ſome few inſtances of this cauſe of our ignorance, and ſo leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of ſeveral bodies about us, produce in us ſeveral ſenſations, as of colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, pleaſure and pain, &c. Theſe mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with thoſe *ideas* they produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between any impulſe of any ſort of body, and any perception of a colour, or ſmell, which we find in our minds) we can have no diſtinct knowledge of ſuch operations beyond our experience, and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wiſe Agent, which perfectly ſurpaſs our comprehenſions. As the *ideas* of ſenſible ſecondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily cauſes, nor any correſpondence or connection be found between them and thoſe primary qualities which (experience ſhows us) produce them in us: ſo on the other ſide, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought ſhould produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our *ideas* as how any body

should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and regular connection, in the ordinary course of things, yet that connection being not discoverable in the *ideas* themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connection to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that all-wise Agent who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive.

§ 29. *Instances.*

In some of our *ideas* there are certain relations, habitudes, and connections, so visibly included in the nature of the *ideas* themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the *idea* of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of these two *ideas*, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c. by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connection with any *ideas* we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free Agent. The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them, but yet by a law that we know not: whereby, though

causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their *connections* and *dependencies* being not discoverable in our *ideas*, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical *knowledge* of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their secondary qualities, powers and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far *sensitive knowledge*; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy, to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect *science* of natural bodies (not to mention spiritual beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

§ 30. *Thirdly, want of tracing our* Ideas.

Thirdly, Where we have adequate *ideas*, and where there is a certain and discoverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of *tracing* those *ideas* which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate *ideas*, which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those *ideas*. That which has most contributed to hinder the due *tracing* of our *ideas*, and finding out their rela-

tions, and agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of *words*. It is impossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the agreement or disagreement of *ideas* themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians, abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the *ideas* themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of the men of letters, the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own or the general stock of knowledge. Had men in the discoveries of the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking. Volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

§ 31. *Extent in respect of Universality.*

HITHERTO we have examined the *extent* of our knowledge, in respect of the several sorts of beings that are.

There is another *extent* of it, *in respect of universality*, which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our *ideas*. If the *ideas* are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general *ideas*, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that essence, *i. e.* that abstract *idea*, is to be found; and what is once known of such *ideas*, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own minds, and it is only the examining of our own *ideas*, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract *ideas*) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: as the existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more to say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1. Obj. *Knowledge placed in* Ideas *may be all bare Vision.*

I DOUBT not but my reader by this time may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own *ideas*: but who knows what those *ideas* may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the imaginations of men's brains? where is the head that has no *chimeras* in it? Or, if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their *ideas*, and perceive their agreement and disagreement one

with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's ſide, as having the more *ideas*, and the more lively: and ſo, by your rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own *ideas*, the viſions of an enthuſiaſt, and the reaſonings of a ſober man, will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are, ſo a man obſerve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such caſtles in the air, will be as ſtrong holds of truth, as the demonſtrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur, is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a ſquare is not a circle.

But *of what uſe is all this* fine *knowledge of men's own imaginations*, to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what men's fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized; it is this alone gives a value to our reaſonings, and preference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they really are, and not of dreams and fancies.

§ 2. Anſw. *Not ſo where* Ideas *agree with Things.* To which I anſwer, That if our knowledge of our *ideas* terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious thoughts will be of little more uſe, than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight, than the diſcourſes of a man who ſees things clearly in a dream, and with great aſſurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own *ideas*, goes a little farther than bare imagination; and I believe it will appear, that all the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing elſe.

§ 3. Anſ. *Not ſo, where* Ideas *agree with Things.* It is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the *ideas* it has of

them. *Our knowledge* therefore is *real*, only so far as there is a conformity between our *ideas* and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own *ideas*, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of *ideas*, that, we may be assured, agree with things.

§ 4. *As*, 1. *All simple* Ideas *do.*

First, The first are simple *ideas*, which since the mind, as has been showed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which, by the wisdom and will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that *simple* ideas *are not fictions* of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires: for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the *idea of* whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our simple *ideas*, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge.

§ 5. 2. *All complex* Ideas, *except of Substances.*

Secondly, *All our complex* Ideas, *except those of substances*, being *archetypes* of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their originals, *cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge.* For that which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true

apprehenſion of any thing, by its diſlikeneſs to it; and ſuch, excepting thoſe of ſubſtances, are all our complex *ideas*: which, as I have ſhowed in another place, are combinations of *ideas* which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without conſidering any connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all theſe ſorts the *ideas* themſelves are conſidered as the *archetypes*, and things no otherwiſe regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning theſe *ideas*, is real, and reaches things themſelves; becauſe in all our thoughts, reaſonings and diſcourſes of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our *ideas*. So that in theſe we cannot miſs of a certain and undoubted reality.

§ 6. *Hence the Reality of Mathematical Knowledge.* I DOUBT not but it will be eaſily granted, that the *knowledge* we have *of mathematical truths, is* not only certain, but *real knowledge*; and not the bare empty viſion of vain inſignificant *chimeras* of the brain: and yet, if we will conſider, we ſhall find that it is only of our own *ideas*. The mathematician conſiders the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle, only as they are in *idea* in his own mind. For it is poſſible he never found either of them exiſting mathematically, *i. e.* preciſely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheleſs true and certain, even of real things exiſting; becauſe real things are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any ſuch propoſitions, than as things really agree to thoſe *archetypes* in his mind. Is it true of the *idea* of a *triangle*, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true alſo of a *triangle*, wherever it really exiſts. Whatever other figure exiſts, that is not exactly anſwerable to that *idea* of a *triangle* in his mind, is not at all concerned in that propoſition: and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning ſuch *ideas*, is

real knowledge; becauſe intending things no farther than they agree with thoſe his *ideas*, he is ſure what he knows concerning thoſe figures, when they have barely *an ideal exiſtence* in his mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they have a real exiſtence in matter; his conſideration being barely of thoſe figures, which are the ſame, wherever or however they exiſt.

§ 7. *And of Moral.*

AND hence it follows, that *moral knowledge* is as *capable of real certainty* as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas*; and demonſtration nothing but the perception of ſuch agreement, by the intervention of other *ideas*, or mediums; our *moral ideas*, as well as mathematical, being *archetypes* themſelves, and ſo adequate and complete *ideas*; all the agreement or diſagreement, which we ſhall find in them, will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

§ 8. *Exiſtence not required to make it real.*

FOR the attaining of *knowledge* and certainty, it is requiſite that we have determined *ideas*; and to make our knowledge *real*, it is requiſite that the *ideas* anſwer their *archetypes*. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the conſideration of our *ideas*, with ſo little care and regard (as it may ſeem) to the real exiſtence of things: ſince moſt of thoſe diſcourſes, which take up the thoughts, and engage the diſputes of thoſe who pretend to make it their buſineſs to inquire after truth and certainty, will, I preſume, upon examination, be found to be *general propoſitions*, and notions in which exiſtence is not at all concerned. All the diſcourſes of the mathematicians about the ſquaring of a circle, conic ſections, or any other part of mathematics, *concern not the exiſtence* of any of thoſe figures; but their demonſtrations, which depend on their *ideas*, are the ſame, whether there be any ſquare or circle exiſting in the world or no. In the ſame manner, the truth and certainty of *moral* diſcourſes abſtracts from the lives

of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat. Nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in *idea*. If it be true in speculation, *i. e.* in *idea*, that *murder deserves death*, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that *idea* of *murder*. As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other species of things, which have no other essences but those *ideas* which are in the minds of men.

§ 9. *Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral* Ideas *are of our own making and naming.*

But it will here be said, that if *moral knowledge* be placed in the contemplation of our own *moral ideas*, and those, as other modes, be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of *justice* and *temperance*? What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what *ideas* of them he pleases? No confusion or disorder in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a *trapezium* with four right angles; that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the *idea* of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, *equilaterum* or *trapezium*, or any thing else, the properties of, and demonstrations about, that *idea* will be the same, as if he called it a *rectangular triangle*. I confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what *idea* it stands for; but as soon as the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in *moral*

knowledge, let a man have the *idea* of taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of, and call this *justice*, if he please. He that takes the name here without the *idea* put to it will be mistaken, by joining another *idea* of his own to that name: but strip the *idea* of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it *injustice*. Indeed wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics, where the figure once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names, that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex *ideas* of those modes. But yet for all this, *miscalling of* any of those *ideas*, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise *ideas*, and trace them in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds we make use of.

§ 10. *Misnaming disturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledge.*

One thing more we are to take notice of, that where God, or any other lawmaker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases, it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation, and comparing of those even nick-named *ideas*.

§ 11. Ideas *of Subſtances have their Archetypes without us.*

THIRDLY, There is another ſort of *complex ideas*, which being referred to *archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our knowledge about them may come ſhort of being real. Such are our *ideas* of ſubſtances, which conſiſting of a collection of ſimple *ideas*, ſuppoſed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them, by having more or different *ideas* united in them, than are to be found united in things themſelves. From whence it comes to paſs, that they may, and often do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themſelves.

§ 12. *So far as they agree with thoſe, ſo far our Knowledge concerning them is real.*

I SAY then, that to have *ideas* of *ſubſtances*, which, by being conformable to things, may afford us *real* knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together ſuch *ideas* as have no inconſiſtence, though they did never before ſo exiſt: *v. g.* the *ideas* of *ſacrilege* or *perjury*, &c. were as real and true *ideas* before, as after the exiſtence of any ſuch fact. But *our ideas of ſubſtances* being ſuppoſed copies, and referred to *archetypes* without us, muſt ſtill be taken from ſomething that does or has exiſted; they muſt not conſiſt of *ideas* put together at the pleaſure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconſiſtence in ſuch a combination. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe we, knowing not what real conſtitution it is of ſubſtances whereon our ſimple *ideas* depend, and which really is the cauſe of the ſtrict union of ſome of them one with another, and the excluſion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be ſure are, or are not inconſiſtent in nature, any farther than experience and ſenſible obſervation reach. Herein therefore is founded the *reality* of our knowledge concerning *ſubſtances*, that all our complex *ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple ones as have been diſcovered to coexiſt in nature. And our *ideas* being thus true,

though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of *real* (as far as we have any) *knowledge* of them; which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far; but so far as it does, it will still be *real knowledge*. Whatever *ideas* we have, the agreement we find they have with others, will still be knowledge. If those *ideas* be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it *real* concerning substances, the *ideas* must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever simple *ideas* have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract *ideas* of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again.

§ 13. *In our Inquiries about Substances, we must consider* Ideas, *and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.*

This, if we rightly consider, and *confine not our thoughts* and abstract *ideas* to names, as if there were, or could be no other *sorts* of things than what known names had already determined, and as it were set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falsehood, if I should say, that some *changelings*, who have lived forty years together without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, *man* and *beast*, stand for distinct species to set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them. Whereas, if we will abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast and formed, we should find that the *idea* of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason, is as much a distinct *idea*, and makes as much a distinct *sort* of things from

man and beaſt, as the *idea* of the ſhape of an *aſs* with reaſon, would be different from either that of man or beaſt, and be a ſpecies of an animal between, or diſtinct from both.

§ 14. *Objection againſt a Changeling, being ſomething between a Man and Beaſt, anſwered.* HERE every body will be ready to aſk, if *changelings* may be ſuppoſed ſomething between man and beaſt, pray what are they? I anſwer, *changelings*, which is as good a word to ſignify ſomething different from the ſignification of *man* or *beaſt*, as the names man and beaſt are to have ſignifications different one from the other. This, well conſidered, would reſolve this matter, and ſhow my meaning without any more ado. But I am not ſo unacquainted with the zeal of ſome men, which enables them to ſpin conſequences, and to ſee religion threatened whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of ſpeaking, as not to foreſee what names ſuch a propoſition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt it will be aſked, if *changelings* are ſomething between man and beaſt, what will become of them in the other world? To which I anſwer, 1. It concerns me not to know or inquire. To their own maſter they ſtand or fall. It will make their ſtate neither better nor worſe, whether we determine any thing of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who diſpoſes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor diſtinguiſhes them according to names and ſpecies of our contrivance. And we that know ſo little of this preſent world we are in, may, I think, content ourſelves without being peremptory in defining the different ſtates, which creatures ſhall come into when they go off this ſtage. It may ſuffice us, that he hath made known to all thoſe, who are capable of inſtruction, diſcourſe and reaſoning, that they ſhall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this body.

§ 15. BUT, *ſecondly*, I anſwer, the force of theſe men's queſ-

tion, (*viz.* will you deprive *changelings* of a future ſtate)? is founded on one of theſe two ſuppoſitions, which are both falſe. The firſt is, that all things that have the outward ſhape and appearance of a man muſt neceſſarily be deſigned to an immortal future being after this life: or, ſecondly, that whatever is of human birth muſt be ſo. Take away theſe imaginations, and ſuch queſtions will be groundleſs and ridiculous. I deſire then thoſe who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themſelves and *changelings*, the eſſence in both being exactly the ſame, to conſider whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward ſhape of the body; the very propoſing it, is, I ſuppoſe, enough to make them diſown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much ſoever immerſed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the groſs ſenſible outward parts, as to affirm eternal life due to it, or a neceſſary conſequence of it; or that any maſs of matter ſhould, after its diſſolution here, be again reſtored hereafter to an everlaſting ſtate of ſenſe, perception, and knowledge, only becauſe it was moulded into this or that figure, and had ſuch a particular frame of its viſible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a certain ſuperficial figure, turns out of doors all conſideration of ſoul or ſpirit, upon whoſe account alone, ſome corporeal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outſide than inſide of things; to place the excellency of a man more in the external ſhape of his body, than internal perfections of his ſoul: which is but little better than to annex the great and ineſtimable advantage of immortality and life everlaſting, which he has above other material beings; to annex it, I ſay to the cut of his beard, or the faſhion of his coat. For this or that outward make of our bodies no more carries with it the hopes of an eternal duration, than the faſhion of a man's ſuit gives him reaſonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be ſaid, that nobody thinks

that the ſhape makes any thing immortal, but it is the ſhape is the ſign of a rational ſoul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the ſign of any ſuch thing; for barely ſaying it, will not make it ſo. It would require ſome proofs to perſuade one of it. No figure that I know ſpeaks any ſuch language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life than there is in a ſtatue, has yet nevertheleſs a living ſoul in it, becauſe of its ſhape; as that there is a rational ſoul in a *changeling*, becauſe he has the outſide of a rational creature, when his actions carry far leſs marks of reaſon with them, in the whole courſe of his life, than what are to be found in many a beaſt.

§ 16. *Monſters.*

But it is the iſſue of rational parents, and muſt therefore be concluded to have a rational ſoul. I know not by what logic you muſt ſo conclude. I am ſure this is a concluſion that men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to deſtroy ill-formed and miſhaped productions. Ay, but theſe are *monſters*. Let them be ſo; what will your driveling, unintelligent, untractable *changeling* be? Shall a defect in the body make a *monſter*: a defect in the mind (the far more noble, and in the common phraſe, the far more eſſential part) not? Shall the want of a noſe or a neck make a *monſter*, and put ſuch iſſue out of the rank of men; the want of reaſon and underſtanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded juſt now: this is to place all in the ſhape, and to take the meaſure of a man only by his outſide. To ſhow that, according to the ordinary way of reaſoning in this matter, people do lay the whole ſtreſs on the figure, and reſolve the whole eſſence of the ſpecies of man (as they make it) into the outward ſhape, how unreaſonable ſoever it be, and how much ſoever they diſown it: we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little farther and then it will plainly appear. The well ſhaped

changeling is a man, has a rational ſoul, though it appear not; this is paſt doubt, ſay you. Make the ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the noſe a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the face yet narrower, flatter and longer, and then you are at a ſtand: add ſtill more and more of the likeneſs of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of ſome other animal, then preſently it is a *monſter*: and it is demonſtration with you that it hath no rational ſoul, and muſt be deſtroyed. Where now (I aſk) ſhall be the juſt meaſure of the utmoſt bounds of that ſhape, that carries with it a rational ſoul? For ſince there have been human *fœtus's* produced, half beaſt and half man; and others three parts one, and one part the other; and ſo it is poſſible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other ſhape, and may have ſeveral degrees of mixture of the likeneſs of a man or a brute; I would gladly know what are thoſe preciſe lineaments, which according to this hypotheſis, are, or are not capable of a rational ſoul to be joined to them? What ſort of outſide is the certain ſign that there is, or is not ſuch an inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of *man*: and ſhall always, I fear, do ſo, as long as we give ourſelves up to certain ſounds, and the imaginations of ſettled and fixed ſpecies in nature, we know not what. But after all, I deſire it may be conſidered, that thoſe who think they have anſwered the difficulty by telling us, that a miſhaped *fœtus* is a *monſter*, run into the ſame fault they are arguing againſt, by conſtituting a ſpecies between man and beaſt. For what elſe, I pray, is their monſter in the caſe (if the word *monſter* ſignifies any thing at all) but ſomething neither man nor beaſt, but partaking ſomewhat of either? And juſt ſo is the *changeling* before mentioned. So neceſſary is it to quit the common notion of ſpecies and eſſences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them, by what our faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by

groundleſs fancies, that have been taken up about them.

§ 17. *Words and Species.*

I HAVE mentioned this here, becauſe I think we cannot be too cautious that *words* and *ſpecies*, in the ordinary notions which we have been uſed to of them, impoſe not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obſtacle to our clear and diſtinct knowledge, eſpecially in reference to ſubſtances; and from thence has roſe a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accuſtom ourſelves to ſeparate our contemplations and reaſonings from words, we might, in a great meaſure, remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our diſcourſe with others, as long as we retained the opinion, that *ſpecies* and their eſſences were any thing elſe but our abſtract *ideas* (ſuch as they are) with names annexed to them, to be the ſigns of them.

§ 18. *Recapitulation.*

WHEREVER we perceive the agreement or diſagreement of any of our *ideas*, there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are ſure thoſe *ideas* agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreement of our *ideas* with the reality of things, having here given the marks, I think I have ſhown wherein it is, that *certainty*, *real certainty*, conſiſts: which, whatever it was to others, was, I confeſs, to me heretofore, one of thoſe *deſiderata* which I found great want of.

CHAP. V.

OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.

§ 1. *What Truth is.*

WHAT is *truth*, was an inquiry many ages ſince; and it being that which all mankind either do, or pretend to ſearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it con-

fists, and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood.

§ 2. *A right joining or separating of Signs: i. e.* Ideas *or Words.*

TRUTH then seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but *the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another.* The *joining* or *separating* of signs here meant, is what by another name we call proposition. So that truth properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two sorts, *viz.* mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, *viz. ideas* and words.

§ 3. *Which makes mental or verbal Propositions.*

To form a clear notion of *truth*, it is very necessary to consider *truth* of thought, and *truth* of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then the instances given of *mental propositions* cease immediately to be barely mental, and become *verbal.* For a *mental proposition* being nothing but a bare consideration of the *ideas*, as they are in our minds stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely *mental propositions*, as soon as they are put into words.

§ 4. *Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of.*

AND that which makes it yet *harder to treat of mental* and verbal *propositions separately*, is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of *ideas*: at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex *ideas.* Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our *ideas* of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to show us, what are those things we have clear and perfect established *ideas* of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our mind

takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about *white* or *black*, *sweet* or *bitter*, a *triangle* or a *circle*, we can and often do frame in our minds the *ideas* themselves, without reflecting on the names. But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more complex *ideas*, as of a *man*, *vitriol*, *fortitude*, *glory*, we usually put the name for the *idea*: because the *ideas* these names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the *names* themselves, because they are more clear, certain and distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure *ideas*: and so we make use of these words instead of the *ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental propositions. In *substances*, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the imperfection of our *ideas*; we making the name stand for the real essence, of which we have no *idea* at all. In *modes*, it is occasioned by the great number of simple *ideas*, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the *name* occurs much easier than the complex *idea* itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of their language, yet perhaps never trouble themselves in all their lives to consider what precise *ideas* the most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of *religion* and *conscience*, of *church* and *faith*, of *power* and *right*, of *obstructions* and *humors*, *melancholy* and *choler*, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves, and lay by those words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

§ 5. *Being nothing but the joining or separating* Ideas *without Words.*

BUT to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making.

First, mental, wherein the *ideas* in our understandings are without the use of words *put together, or separated* by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement.

Secondly, Verbal propositions, which *are words,* the signs of our *ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences.* By which way of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are as it were put together or separated one from another. So that proposition consists in joining or separating signs, and truth consists in the putting together or separating those signs, according as the things which they stand for agree or disagree.

§ 6. *When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.*

EVERY one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either by perceiving or supposing the agreement or disagreement of any of its *ideas,* does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms, *putting together* and *separating.* But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his mind the *idea* of two lines, *viz.* the *side* and *diagonal* of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the *idea* also of the division of that line, into a certain number of equal parts; *v. g.* into five, ten, an hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the *idea* of that inch line being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his *idea* of

that line, he, as it were, *joins* or *separates* thoſe two *ideas*, *viz.* the *idea* of that line, and the *idea* of that kind of diviſibility; and ſo makes a mental propoſition, which is true or falſe, according as ſuch a kind of diviſibility, a diviſibility into ſuch *aliquot* parts, does really agree to that line or no. When *ideas* are ſo put together, or ſeparated in the mind, as they, or the things they ſtand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, *mental truth*. But *truth of words* is ſomething more; and that is, the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the *ideas* they ſtand for agree or diſagree: and this again is twofold; either *purely verbal* and trifling, which I ſhall ſpeak of, *chap.* 10. or *real* and inſtructive; which is the object of that real knowledge which we have ſpoken of already

§ 7. *Objection againſt verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.*

But here again will be apt to occur the ſame doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but the joining or ſeparating of words in propoſitions, as the *ideas* they ſtand for agree or diſagree in men's minds, the knowledge of *truth is not ſo valuable a thing* as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ to the ſearch of it: ſince *by this account* it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the *chimeras* of men's brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and what ſtrange *ideas* all men's brains are capable of? But if we reſt here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the viſionary world in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns *harpies* and *centaurs*, as men and horſes. For thoſe, and the like, may be *ideas* in our heads, and have their agreement and diſagreement there, as well as the *ideas* of real beings, and ſo have as true propoſitions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a propoſition, to ſay all *centaurs are animals*, as that *all men are animals*; and the certain-

ty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together, according to the agreement of the *ideas* in our minds: and the agreement of the *idea* of *animal* with that of *centaur*, is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the *idea* of *animal* with that of *man*; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

§ 8. *Answered, Real Truth is about* Ideas *agreeing to things.*

THOUGH what has been said in the foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish *real truth* from *chimerical*, or (if you please) *barely nominal*, they depending both on the same foundation, yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our words signify nothing but our *ideas*, yet being designed by them to signify things, the *truth* they contain, when put into propositions, will be only *verbal*, when they stand for *ideas* in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And therefore truth, as well as knowledge, may well come under the distinction of *verbal* and *real*; that being only *verbal truth*, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* they stand for, without regarding whether our *ideas* are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence in nature. But then it is they contain *real truth*, when these signs are joined, as our *ideas* agree; and when our *ideas* are such, as we know are capable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

§ 9. *Falsehood is the joining of Names otherwise than their* Ideas *agree.*

TRUTH is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of *ideas* as it is. *Falsehood* is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of *ideas* otherwise than it is. And so far as these *ideas*, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the *truth real*. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what *ideas* the

words ſtand for, and the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe *ideas*, according as it is marked by thoſe words.

§ 10. *General Propoſitions to be treated of more at large.*

But becauſe words are looked on as the great conduit of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reaſoning about it, we make uſe of words and propoſitions, I ſhall more at large inquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propoſitions, conſiſts, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to ſhew in what ſort of univerſal propoſitions we are capable of being *certain* of their real truth or falſehood.

I ſhall begin with general propoſitions, as thoſe which moſt employ our thoughts, and exerciſe our contemplation. *General truths* are moſt looked after by the mind, as thoſe that moſt enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehenſiveneſs, ſatisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and ſhorten our way to knowledge.

§ 11. *Moral and Metaphyſical Truth.*

Besides truth taken in the ſtrict ſenſe before mentioned, there are other ſorts of truths; as, 1. *Moral truth*, which is ſpeaking of things according to the perſuaſion of our own minds, though the propoſition we ſpeak agree not to the reality of things. 2. *Metaphyſical truth*, which is nothing but the real exiſtence of things, conformable to the *ideas* to which we have annexed their names. This, though it ſeems to conſiſt in the very beings of things, yet when conſidered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit propoſition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the *idea* it had before ſettled with a name to it. But theſe conſiderations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our preſent purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

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